

3-19-2019

# A Dynamic Approach to Understanding Immigration, Ethnicity and Violent Crime in Chicago Communities

Saundra Trujillo

*University of Missouri-St. Louis*, [sdt7c9@mail.ums.edu](mailto:sdt7c9@mail.ums.edu)

Follow this and additional works at: <https://irl.ums.edu/dissertation>



Part of the [Community-Based Research Commons](#), [Criminology Commons](#), and the [Race and Ethnicity Commons](#)

---

## Recommended Citation

Trujillo, Saundra, "A Dynamic Approach to Understanding Immigration, Ethnicity and Violent Crime in Chicago Communities" (2019). *Dissertations*. 825.

<https://irl.ums.edu/dissertation/825>

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the UMSL Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact [marvinh@ums.edu](mailto:marvinh@ums.edu).

A Dynamic Approach to Understanding Immigration, Ethnicity and Violent Crime  
in Chicago Communities

Saundra D. Trujillo  
M.A. Sociology, University of New Mexico, 2011  
B.A. Sociology, University of New Mexico, 2009

Dissertation Submitted to The Graduate School at  
the University of Missouri – St. Louis in  
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree  
Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology and Criminal Justice

May 2019

Advisory Committee:

Finn-Aage Esbensen, Ph.D.  
Co-Chairperson  
Adam Boessen, Ph.D.  
Co-Chairperson

Stephanie DiPietro, Ph.D.  
Charis Kubrin, Ph.D.  
Maria Vélez, Ph.D.

# **A Dynamic Approach to Understanding Immigration, Ethnicity and Violent Crime in Chicago Communities**

Saundra D. Trujillo

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>ABSTRACT.....</b>	<b>III</b>
<b>DEDICATION .....</b>	<b>IV</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....</b>	<b>V</b>
<b>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
DISAGGREGATING BY ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL ORIGIN .....	1
Reasons to Expect Ethnic Variation in Community Crime Effects .....	2
ETHNORACIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANTS AND ETHNORACIAL NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT.....	5
GENERAL OVERVIEW & ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY .....	8
<b>CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION AND CRIME IN THE COMMUNITY .....</b>	<b>11</b>
CHANGES IN COMMUNITY STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND CHANGES IN CRIME .....	12
CHANGES IN COMMUNITIES' FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, REVITALIZATION, AND CRIME.....	13
IMMIGRANT POPULATION CHANGES BY HISPANIC/LATIN@, NON-HISPANIC/LATIN@ AND CRIME .....	18
Hypothesis (1) .....	19
Hypothesis (2) .....	19
CHANGES IN THE HISPANIC/LATIN@ IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY NATION OF ORIGIN AND CRIME .....	19
Hypothesis (3) .....	24
IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS WITHIN THE U.S. ETHNORACIAL REGIME .....	24
Hypothesis (4) .....	29
<b>CHAPTER THREE: EXAMINING SECONDARY DATA SOURCES TO UNDERSTAND COMMUNITY STRUCTURE, POPULATION CHANGES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN CRIME.....</b>	<b>30</b>
RESEARCH DESIGN .....	30
STUDY SITE: CHICAGO, ILLINOIS .....	30
FIGURE 3.1: FOREIGN-BORN CENSUS TRACT COMPOSITION 2009 .....	33
DATA .....	33
The United States Decennial Census and American Community Survey.....	33
The National Neighborhood Crime Study I and II .....	34
Dependent Variable: Change in Violent Crime Rate.....	35
Independent Variables .....	36
Neighborhood Types .....	38
Figure 3.2: Neighborhoods by Predominant Ethnoracial Type 2009.....	39
Control Variables .....	39
Sample Description .....	40
Table 3.1 Chicago Census Tract Descriptive Statistics and Change 2009 - 2000 (n=814) .....	41
Figure 3.3: Changes in Tract Population and Select Tract Characteristics (2009 – 2000)*.....	42
Figure 3.4: Changes in Chicago Tract Violent Crime per 1,000 residents (2012-2000)*.....	44
Analytical Approach.....	45
Equation 1: Ordinary Least Squares Regression with Robust Standard Errors.....	46
Equation 2: Spatial Error Model.....	47
<b>CHAPTER FOUR: DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES, DIFFERENTIAL CRIME RATES .....</b>	<b>48</b>
DESCRIPTIVE AND BIVARIATE ANALYSES OF SAMPLE VARIABLES.....	48
Violent Crime, Community Characteristics, and Change.....	48
Table 4.1 Correlations between Control Variables (2000), Community Change (2009-2000) & Change in Violent Crime (2012-2000) .....	50
Foreign-born Populations, Crime, Change and Community Characteristics .....	51
Foreign-Born Populations by Ethnicity, Crime & Community Characteristics .....	52
Foreign-born Hispanic by Nation of Origin, Crime & Community Characteristics .....	53

Summary of the Descriptive and Correlation Analyses .....	54
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES.....	55
Examining Foreign-Born Populations on Violent Crime .....	55
Change in the Foreign-born population and Change in Violent Crime .....	56
Table 4.2 OLS Regressions: Foreign-born populations by Ethnicity & Change in Foreign-born Populations on Changes in Community Violent Crime Rates .....	60
Table 4.2 (continued) OLS Regressions: Foreign-born populations by Hispanic Nativity & Change in Foreign-born Populations (2009-2000) on Changes in Community Violent Crime Rates (2012-2000) .....	61
Summary of Findings for Foreign-born Population Effects on Changes In Violent Crime .....	62
Variation in the Foreign-born Hispanic Population and Changes in Violent Crime.....	62
Summary of Findings For Disaggregated Foreign-Born Hispanic Population Effects on Changes in Violent Crime .....	63
ANALYSES OF ETHNORACIAL COMMUNITY CONTEXT, CHANGES IN IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS & CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME .....	64
Descriptive & Bivariate Results By Predominant Ethnoracial Neighborhood Types .....	64
Table 4.3: Crosstabulation of neighborhood types and increase in Foreign-born by Ethnicity.....	65
White Neighborhoods.....	66
Black Neighborhoods .....	67
Hispanic Neighborhoods .....	68
Integrated Neighborhoods .....	68
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics by Predominant Ethnoracial Neighborhood Types .....	70
Multiple Regression Results: Foreign-born population changes on changes in crime by ethnoracial neighborhood types .....	71
Table 4.5: OLS Regression of Foreign-born on changes in violent crime with community type controls...	73
Table 4.5.1: OLS Regression of Foreign-born on changes in violent crime with community type controls and Spatial Error ( $\lambda$ ) .....	74
White Neighborhoods.....	75
Black Neighborhoods .....	77
Table 4.6: OLS Regression of Foreign-Born Populations in White Communities on Changes in Violent Crime .....	79
Table 4.6.1: OLS Regressions of Foreign-Born Populations in Black Communities on Changes in Violent Crime .....	80
Hispanic Neighborhoods .....	81
Integrated Neighborhoods .....	81
Table 4.6.2: OLS Regressions of Foreign-Born Populations in Hispanic Communities on Change in Violent Crime .....	83
Table 4.6.3: OLS Regressions of Foreign-Born Populations in Integrated Communities on Change in Violent Crime .....	84
Summary of Regression Results: Foreign-Born Population Effects on Changes in Violent Crime by Predominant Ethnoracial Neighborhood Type Neighborhoods .....	85
<b>CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION .....</b>	<b>86</b>
WHAT IS IT ABOUT ETHNICITY AND HISPANIC/LATIN@ NATION OF ORIGIN? .....	89
IMMIGRATION IN COMMUNITY CONTEXT .....	92
LIMITATIONS .....	95
Definition and Measure of Community .....	95
Generalizability of Findings.....	96
Time Measures and Omitted Variables .....	97
FUTURE RESEARCH .....	100
CONCLUSION .....	105
<b>APPENDICES.....</b>	<b>107</b>
APPENDIX A: VARIABLES AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS.....	107
APPENDIX TABLE 1: HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2 WITH PROPOSED MODELS 1 THROUGH 6 .....	108
APPENDIX TABLE 1.1: HYPOTHESES 3 AND 4 WITH PROPOSED MODELS 7 THROUGH 23 .....	109
APPENDIX TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR COMMUNITIES WHERE FOREIGN-BORN INCREASED .....	110
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>111</b>

## ABSTRACT

Once again, politically-driven events in the United States have brought the relationship between immigration and crime to the forefront in public, political, and academic discourses. Yet, despite proclamations made by a key U.S. political figure claiming that immigrants, specifically Mexican immigrants, are “bringing drugs...[and] bringing crime” (Trump, 2015) to U.S. communities, criminological research consistently finds that there is either an inverse relationship between immigration and crime- or no relationship at all (see Ousey and Kubrin, 2017 and National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, 2015 for review). Moreover, with decades of research on the relationship between immigration and crime, this large body of literature has remained either cross-sectional in nature and/or relied on pan-ethnic foreign-born measures of immigration.

Following the tradition of early urban sociology, this dissertation contributes to immigration and crime scholarship by focusing on the dynamic nature of neighborhoods, ethnoracial neighborhood structure, and changes in community populations’ ethnic immigrant groups on community violent crime. The current work draws upon fundamental ecological theories of crime, note-worthy immigration, communities and crime scholarship to argue for including measures of ethnicity in immigration and crime studies. Further, it argues that the logical next-step in immigration-crime research is to examine how changing community population compositions affect safety within neighborhoods inherently shaped by the U.S. ethnoracial regime. Using secondary data from the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census, the 2005-2009 American Community Survey (ACS) and the National Neighborhood Crime Study I and II (NNCS) on 814 Chicago census tracts, the current work adds another layer of richness to the body of communities, immigration, and crime scholarship. Thus, it presents how all things equal, changes (2009-2000) in Chicago communities’ foreign-born populations by ethnicity and nativity affect changes in community violent crime (2012).

## DEDICATION

To Edward and Dorothy Vulgan for their unwavering, unconditional support and encouragement.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is a pleasure to express my appreciation for the incredible scholars who worked with me throughout this project. The completion of this work would not have been possible without the teaching and support from these first two, wonderful, people. Thank you, Finn Esbensen, for sharing your editing skills, stepping-up to take the helm more than a year into this project, and teaching me so many things about theoretically-driven research design. I'll never forget the kindness you showed me at my first ASC meeting, for providing the ability for an ol' Albuquerque gal to work on a meaningful evaluation with a G.R.E.A.T. team, for welcoming me into Finland, sharing your wisdom and knowing just when to offer encouragement and/or a serious push. I am also truly indebted and grateful for Maria Vélez who has been an inspiration, and the very definition of a mentor. Maria, thank you for taking this non-traditional, community college student under your wing, for your teaching, encouragement, helping me put my disorganized thoughts into words, your willingness to persevere with me, and your genuine desire to help me succeed. Without you, I would not have attempted to take my education this far, nor would I have had the experience of completing this project from THE University of Missouri- St. Louis.

I owe sincere and earnest appreciation to Adam Boessen; Adam, your quiet, contemplative, serious, demeanor is betrayed by your grin and sense of humor; thank you for stepping into a committee to guide and lead a student whom you didn't know and whom you rarely saw. I learned so much from you along the way, and your suggestions- always reasonable. Stephanie DiPietro, your kindness is matched only by your brilliance and superhero-like abilities to see and understand so many people and situations. Thank you for helping me see things and think through things in ways I had not considered before. Charis Kubrin, thank you for being so generous with your time and guiding me through a century's worth of material, pointing me to other notable scholars, and for always offering meaningful, thoughtful, comments. Finally, some of the ideas in this dissertation were conceived throughout many theoretical discussions and casual conversations about communities with Bob Bursik. Throughout these conversations, Bob made me feel like less of an outsider- his mentorship style will never be replicated. We enjoyed drawing connections between some overlooked nuances in historical works, the communities we had each experienced in different eras and in different places. In addition, Bob's dedication to ensuring that his students produce well-written work led to countless self-loathing yet, productive, hours. Without his meticulous critiques of my previous projects, this dissertation would have many-many more, loaded, simply unreadable and untenable, sentences- damn it, Bob.

This study is the culmination of nearly a decade in graduate school- in many ways, a second life- yet it hardly represents the amount of knowledge gained, sacrifices, and generosity I experienced throughout these years. My awesome personal support network worked equally hard to see the completion of this work. Eric, thank you for your endless support and encouragement. Not a single memory of the tasks we navigated along the way can compare to the confidence you have in me, and your unwavering determination to push/shove, even drag, me over the finish-line. Evan and Janelle, you are the bright-spots in every one of my days. You have each taught me a lot about forgiveness and patience. You have shown me the forgiveness, patience, and support that other moms can only dream of receiving from her kids (but, don't stop now). Thank you, Mom, for always being at the ready at any hour to offer encouragement, and support. Dad, thanks for the advice on navigating new situations, and your endless heartfelt generosity. Brook, thank you for always being an honest sounding-board and, thanks for bringing Kelly along for the ride. Rebecca, I am thankful for our early office adventures that resulted in a wonderfully supportive friendship between two wildly insecure grad students. Pat, Erica, and Sarah, although my journey started at CNM, I never imagined returning decades later to find myself still learning from such amazing mentors, colleagues, and inspirational friends. To the Loma Linda Locos (LLL), thank you for your understanding, support, for celebrating every milestone, and being the embodiment of true community. If the LLL could be replicated throughout the U.S., crime would be non-existent- and I'd be out of a job- so, I guess it's good that there is only one community like ours!

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

For decades, criminologists have challenged the widely-held, long-standing political and public rhetoric claiming that there is a positive, and clear relationship between immigrants, immigrant populations, and crime (Chavez, 2013; Johnston and Morse, 2011; Green, 2016; Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012; Provine and Doty, 2011; Reid et al, 2005; Zatz and Smith, 2012). While much of the noteworthy immigration and crime research has been cross-sectional, theoretically-driven studies conducted at every level of analysis have led to overwhelming evidence that increases in the immigrant population have either an inverse or null effect on crime (see National Academies, 2015; Ousey and Kubrin, 2017 for reviews). Yet, as Ousey and Kubrin remind us in their recent (2017) review, there are many aspects of the immigration-crime literature that have rarely been studied, leaving conclusions somewhat tentative.

### **DISAGGREGATING BY ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL ORIGIN**

The lion's share of studies on immigration and crime have used pan-ethnic measures of immigration such as the percentage of foreign-born in the community, the percent of the community population that self-identifies as Hispanic/Latin@, the percent of the community population that does not speak English well or at all, or a measure that combines some of these indicators into an immigration index (Desmond and Kubrin, 2009; Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012; Lee and Martinez, 2002; Lee et al, 2001; Martinez, 2000; Martinez et al., 2004; 2008; Morenoff and Sampson, 1997; Nielsen et al., 2005; Ramey, 2013; Stowell and Martinez, 2007). However, the use of pan-ethnic measures misses two key issues in immigration and crime research. First, pan-ethnic measures (percent foreign-born) do not address differential effects of the Hispanic/Latin@ and non-Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant populations on community crime. Second, a pan-ethnic foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ measure does not recognize variations in the Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population by nation of origin (Bursik, 2009; Rumbaut, 2009). As



Rumbaut (2009) asserts: “Although a single label implies otherwise, ‘Hispanics’ or ‘Latinos’ are not a homogenous entity and should not be presumed to be so” (Rumbaut, 2009:18). Treating this large foreign-born group as if they are united by shared experiences, traditions and language may miss the heterogeneity of this population and miss how changes in the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ population by nation of origin may differentially influence changes in community violent crime.

#### REASONS TO EXPECT ETHNIC VARIATION IN COMMUNITY CRIME EFFECTS

Throughout criminological and sociological studies on the influence of immigrant populations on crime, there are noted differences between immigrant groups who settle in U.S. communities, and there are theoretical reasons to expect ethnic variation in immigrant population effects on crime. Some of the differences between incoming migrant populations include: the reason(s) for migration (i.e., voluntary or involuntary, like those who migrate as refugees or asylum seekers forced to leave their home nation versus those who intentionally choose to leave their home country), and the contexts of reception that immigrant groups encounter once in the United States (Kubrin, Hipp and Kim, 2016). Empirical findings suggest two mechanisms that may work to fuel differences between immigrant ethnic groups and differential crime effects in communities.

The first mechanism commonly discussed is immigrant self-selection (Tonry, 1997). Immigrant groups that have, traditionally, chosen to migrate to the United States absent coercion from their home government or threat to their life and family from political/social conflict, are likely to hold more human capital and skills that are desirable in the labor market where they settle (Bauer, Lofstrom, Zimmerman, 2001). Further, self-selecting migrants are more likely to have made a thoughtfully, calculated, decision to leave their home country to experience more upward social mobility than what they could expect in their home nation (Bauer, et al., 2001). Thus, communities with immigrant populations who make the intentional investment to migrate

and are motivated to achieve upward social mobility, benefit from population change that increases crime controlling mechanisms such as the proportion of the population tied to the workforce, residents actively building social networks and social capital.

The second mechanism underlying the reason to expect that there may be differences between immigrant populations by ethnicity is community context of reception. Prior to the 1965 Immigration Act, U.S. immigration policy carefully dictated and controlled the number of migrants coming to the United States from very select nations (i.e., Eastern Europe, some parts of Asia) (Martin, 2010). Certainly, the U.S. has a long legacy of anti-immigrant sentiment (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005; Salinas, 2007); however, lighter-skinned, English-speaking immigrant experiences today are not only different from those in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, but they are different from the experiences of darker-skinned, Hispanic/Latin@, Spanish-speaking immigrants (Ferraro, 2014; Flores, 2017). After the Bracero program<sup>1</sup> of 1942 that resulted in a large U.S. population increase of male, documented and undocumented, Mexican immigrant farm workers, the 1965 Immigration Act intentionally opened legal migration opportunities for family members affected by the Bracero program to join those already working and residing in U.S. communities. However, one consequence of the Bracero program, and the subsequent relaxation of migration quotas from Mexico and other Hispanic/Latin@ nations, was an increase in the darker-skinned, Spanish-speaking immigrant population who were often low-skilled, transient, manual laborers with little education (Mize, 2006). Therefore, although immigrants from Hispanic/Latin@ nations

---

<sup>1</sup> The Bracero program, established and implemented between Mexico and the U.S. shortly after World War II, allowed Mexico to “loan” male Mexican citizens to the United States to provide non-unionized, inexpensive labor for large agricultural operations. While the agreement, initiated by the U.S., included written agreements to protect the Bracero workers, over time most protections (i.e., fair pay, safe and sanitary housing) were not enforced and were intentionally violated by many farm owners as they sought to coerce their migrant workers into labor intensive work for long hours to increase profits. Further, during the Bracero era (1942-1964) millions of Mexican men entered the U.S. as farm laborers; however, due to poor regulation of incoming workers, estimates of equally large numbers of Mexican men entered the U.S. illegally and these men were not protected at all by the Bracero program. Thus the Bracero program, in effect, contributed to illegal migration, depressing unionization efforts of farm workers, unfair low wages for Mexican workers as well as poor living and unsafe working conditions (Mize, 2006).

to the United States quickly became one of the largest immigrant populations, their darker skin, use of foreign-language, and low economic status pushed them into the lower ranks of the U.S. ethnoracial hierarchy where they were constrained to disadvantaged communities, labeled and stereotyped as low-class, less-capable/worthy, “illegal” residents (Chavez, 2013; Ferraro, 2014). Further, recent research suggests that the prejudice and discrimination faced by many Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant populations in community schools, medical establishments, banks, and retail businesses can lead to social isolation that limits educational and workforce opportunities, contributes to physical and mental health disparities, as well as acts as a barrier to assimilation (Cohen and Chavez, 2013; Morey, 2018; Salas, Ayón, and Gurrola, 2013). Moreover, the social and economic isolation of Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants in a community can impede collective efficacy in the community thus threatening community safety.

Differential results in the influence of immigrant groups by ethnicity and/or nation or origin on crime have been presented in some notable communities, immigration, and crime scholarship. For example, recent research has concluded that in some cities with predictable patterns of immigrant settlement, such as Miami, some Latin@ immigrant (Nicaraguan, Honduran, Cuban) population increases in a community contribute to a statistically significant decrease in homicide while increases in other immigrant groups (Haitian) do not (Stowell and Martinez, 2007; 2009). Stowell and Martinez (2007) found that, in Houston, immigration increases by predominant ethnic groups (Mexican, Salvadoran, Vietnamese and Chinese) had no influence on violent crime; this finding led them to conclude that research should not assume a negative association between immigration and crime (Stowell and Martinez; 2007).

Disaggregating the foreign-born population by contributing world regions, Kubrin and colleagues (2016) found that in Southern California, communities with a higher percentage of immigrants from Latin world regions (Mexico, Central America, South America and New World) had higher violent crime than communities with a higher percentage of Black or Asian

immigrants. Using a dynamic approach, this dissertation examines how changes (2009-2000) in the foreign-born population of a community, disaggregated by ethnicity, and changes (2009-2000) in the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, disaggregated by nation of origin, relate to changes in community violent crime. The goal of this dissertation is to examine how ethnicity contributes to our understanding of immigration and crime; the current work will build on much of the cross-sectional and pan-ethnic research by looking at change in immigration and crime over time while unpacking the idea of ethnic heterogeneity within the foreign-born population.

*Research Questions (1): How does change in the percent Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population, from 2000-2009 affect change in community violent crime rates (2000-2012)? (2): How does change in the percent Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population, disaggregated by nation of origin, (2000-2009) affect change in community violent crime rates (2000-2012)?*

## **ETHNORACIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANTS AND ETHNORACIAL NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT**

There are theoretical reasons that disaggregating the foreign-born population by ethnicity, and nation of origin may lead to differential crime results at a community level. First, the United States is characterized by a racial regime that influences access to resources and conventional opportunities based on socially constructed conceptualizations of race and ethnicity. Race, in the United States, is largely defined by phenotypical characteristics such as skin color, hair texture, eye shape etc. Ethnicity is very broadly defined in much of the sociological literature as shared ancestry, identity, language, tradition, and beliefs (ASA, 2017). A large body of research has noted community structural differences by predominant ethnoracial types (see Peterson and Krivo, 2012 and Ramey, 2013 for a review) that differentially affect opportunities for, and likelihood of, crime.

In their research on communities across the United States, Peterson and Krivo (2012) found such extreme racial disparity between communities that “there are few—if any—white neighborhoods as poor as the poorest black neighborhoods” (Hagan, 2012:xvii). Further, they find that racial and ethnic segregation exists along a socio-economic and crime continuum with predominantly Latin@ communities situated between predominantly white and Black neighborhoods (Peterson and Krivo, 2012). Compared to the predominantly white European immigrants of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, most immigrants who have emigrated to the U.S. in recent decades are from Latin nations; as such, the physical appearance of immigrants, as well as languages and customs associated with their various nations of origin have changed. Ramey (2013) used a multi-level framework to examine how the racial regime milieu structured the changes in community violent crime within the cities and neighborhoods where there had been growth or decline in the foreign-born population<sup>2</sup> (1995-2000). He found that in established destination cities, like Chicago, white and integrated neighborhoods where there was growth in the foreign-born population experienced lower violent crime rates; however, in predominantly African American or Latin@ neighborhoods, immigrant population growth had a null effect on crime (Ramey, 2013).

The differential findings in the effect of an increasing immigrant population on community crime rates by ethnoracial community type is likely related to the segregated communities where some immigrants settle. As Ferraro (2014) notes, there are some differences between immigrants today and immigrants in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century: “The first is skin color. Generally, the darker the skin color of the incoming group, the more likely it is that members will be ascribed a lower social status” (Ferraro, 2014:64). Immigrants of color may be confined to lower-income, lower-status areas that have resulted from the U.S. racial-spatial divide. The ethnoracial characteristics of some immigrants, and their constrained neighborhood choices due

---

<sup>2</sup> Measured as absolute growth or decline in the proportion of a census tract that was born outside the United States (Ramey, 2013).

to race and ethnicity may contribute to the differential effects of immigrant population changes on crime found in previous studies (Kubrin et al., 2016; Ramey, 2013; Stowell and Martinez 2007, 2009). To better understand why immigrant growth had an inverse effect on crime in some communities but not others, the current work will build on Ramey's (2013) community-level analyses by examining the effect of ethnicity (Hispanic/Latin@ and non-Hispanic/Latin@) of foreign-born population changes on violent crime. Moreover, this dissertation will explore the impact of foreign-born population changes by ethnicity (i.e., Hispanic foreign-born versus non-Hispanic foreign-born) on changes in neighborhood violent crime rates across neighborhoods that vary in their predominant ethnoracial compositions.

Further, beyond ethnicity of the immigrant population, immigrant status itself matters. Communities where immigrants settle vary in their willingness or ability to allow recent immigrants access to resources for social mobility, as well as vary in opportunities for crime (Chavez, 2013). In predominantly Latin@ communities, as in predominantly Black or white communities, the nation of origin of incoming foreign-born groups may introduce ethnic heterogeneity not evident when the foreign-born population is treated as homogenous. Chavez (2013) posits that in the United States, public fears related to immigration are due to what he terms the "Latino Threat". Chavez (2013) argues that Latin@s differ from past immigrants due to a U.S. obsession with labeling Mexicans (native and immigrant) as illegal members of society and therefore criminal, uneducated, incapable of assimilating and undeserving of citizenship; such stereotypes fueled by the media and politicians often cast an undesirable light on Latin@ immigrants from any nation of origin (Chavez, 2013). However, despite the stereotypes of Latin@ immigrants, within the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population there are differences in physical characteristics, national identity, language and customs by nation of origin that may contribute to different community choices for settlement and later integration/assimilation outcomes.

Disaggregating the foreign-born population by ethnicity and the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ population by nation of origin are logical steps toward better understanding the influence of ethnicity in community-level immigration and crime research. Moreover, the social structure and related ethnoracial structure of the community may encourage or limit successful immigrant integration therefore strengthening or weakening community mechanisms known to inhibit crime. The current work extends Kubrin and colleague's (2016) and Ramey's (2013) studies by examining the ethnicity of foreign-born populations and further disaggregating the immigrant Hispanic/Latin@ populations by nation of origin in the analyses of changes in community violent crime. Disaggregation of the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population contributes to our contemporary theoretical understanding of ethnic heterogeneity in communities by reflecting recent changes in U.S. communities' population diversity. Examining community population changes over time, the influence of immigration in segregated neighborhoods (measured by predominant ethnoracial type of the community population; for example, Black, white, Hispanic, minority or integrated), and ethnic heterogeneity of the foreign-born population in communities and crime studies will open new avenues for research on the influence of modern-day immigration on crime.

*Research Questions (3): How do the effects of changes (2000-2009) in the immigrant population of Hispanic/Latin@ by nation of origin and non-Hispanic/Latin@) on changes in community violent crime rates (2000-2012) vary by ethnoracial neighborhood type? (4) How does change (2000-2000) in the percent Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population, disaggregated by nation of origin, affect change in community violent crime rates (2000-2012)?*

## **GENERAL OVERVIEW & ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY**

Using data on violent crime measured by reports of murder and robbery known to police within Chicago communities (2000 & 2012) from the National Neighborhood Crime Study I and II (2000, 2012), Decennial Census Summary File 3 (SF 3) and census tract data from the

American Community Survey (ACS; 2006-2009) this dissertation uses a dynamic approach to examine changes in the community immigrant population by ethnicity on changes in community violent crime. The current work focuses on change in violent crime due to the jurisdictional similarities of violent crime definitions and victims' likelihood to report violent victimization. Recent comparisons between police-reported crime statistics and self-report victimization statistics suggest that between 2000 and 2010 roughly 60% to 66% of all violent crime incidents were reported to police; simple assaults (about 50% were reported to police) and property crime (roughly 40% to 43% were reported to police) incidents went largely unreported (Langton, Berzofky, Krebs and Smiley-McDonald, 2012). Langton and colleagues (2012) posit that assaults and property crimes are less-likely to come to the attention of police in communities with concentrated disadvantage, and/or where there are poor police-community relations (Langton, et. al., 2012). Moreover, in communities with large Hispanic/Latin@, Black and immigrant populations, crime reporting may be even lower (specifically in reporting property crime and simple assault) due to distrust of law enforcement/criminal justice system and/or fear of deportation (Davis and Henderson, 2003; Messing, Becerra, Ward-Lasher, and Androff, 2015). Therefore, because communities with changing immigrant populations are likely to suffer from varying levels of disadvantage, and knowing that predominantly Black, Hispanic/Latin@ as well as immigrant populations are less likely to report assault and property crimes, the current work ensures the most reliable findings on changes in immigration and crime relationships by only including measures of violent crime.

To examine the dynamic nature of community populations, community structure and crime, this dissertation returns to Chicago- the home of early, urban, ecological, crime research. Not only is there a considerable amount of previous, theoretically-guided empirical work on crime in Chicago communities (dating back to Shaw and McKay's (1942) conceptualization of social disorganization theory), Chicago remains an economically and ethnoracially diverse city that has, consistently, maintained community-level demographic and crime data. Moreover,



communities in Chicago have a long history with immigrants from various nations of origin (Paral, 2003) and, as such, it has less predictable patterns of immigrant settlement and may be less limited in the nations represented by its changing immigrant populations.

The examination of the relationship between changes in immigrant populations by ethnicity on community crime within the context of ethnoracial community composition proceeds as follows. Chapter Two presents a theoretical and empirical overview of immigration and crime situated within the context of the community; it begins with theoretically guided research that finds a protective effect of immigrant population increases followed by theoretical reasons to expect differential crime effects in communities where there are immigrant population increases disaggregated by ethnicity and Latin nation of origin. Chapter Three provides a detailed discussion of the data used in the current study, variable operationalizations, and outlines the dynamic analytical methods that will be used to conduct hypothesis testing. Chapter Four first presents the descriptive and bivariate results across and between the variables included in this study, followed by the results of the regression models and hypothesis tests. Finally, Chapter Five discusses the implications of the results, contributions of the current work to community-level immigration and crime research, as well as potential avenues for better understanding the role of ethnicity measures in examining immigration and crime research.

## CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION AND CRIME IN THE COMMUNITY

Immigration and crime research at the community level has been guided primarily by social ecology, social disorganization, and systemic theories. Some of the earliest community-level research employed cartographic techniques and resulted in two primary conclusions. First, crime and delinquency do not occur randomly across space; crime and delinquency tend to occur more in some areas than others (Park and Burgess, 1924; Shaw and McKay, 1942). Second, areas with higher crime and delinquency rates display similar structural characteristics; areas with lower crime and delinquency rates also have similar structural characteristics yet their structural characteristics differ from those in areas with higher crime and delinquency (Shaw and McKay, 1942). Further, classical social ecology and social disorganization theory posit that city residents will live in the best area that they can afford and, as residents' economic situations improve, residents will relocate to a more desirable area- the most desirable areas not only have fewer signs of disorder, but they also have less crime. This type of residential mobility tends to occur in what Burgess defined as "concentric zones" (Burgess, 1925). By the 1940s, on the heels of Park and Burgess' (1924) ecological research in Chicago, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay's (1942) examinations of Chicago communities suggested that there were concentrations of male delinquency in the central business district and zone of transition. Shaw and McKay conclude:

The high degree of consistency in the association between delinquency and other characteristics of the community not only sustains the conclusion that delinquent behavior is related dynamically to the community but also appears to establish that all community characteristics, including delinquency, are products of the operation of general processes more or less common to American cities...delinquency-producing factors are inherent in the community (1942:193).

Therefore, the causal logic of the classical social disorganization theory suggests that, where immigrant populations tend to settle, changes in crime are the result of various community conditions that contextualize immigrant settlement- crime changes are not influenced by various immigrant population groups themselves.

### **CHANGES IN COMMUNITY STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND CHANGES IN CRIME**

At the heart of community-level crime research is the idea that places are dynamic and changes within a neighborhood can affect changes in community crime. Classical social disorganization theory posits that communities with high levels of: economic disadvantage, residential mobility, and an ethnoracially diverse population (ethnic heterogeneity) will be unable to exert the social controls necessary to control/prevent crime (Kornhauser, 1978; Martinez, 2002; Ramey, 2013; Stowell, 2007; Shaw and McKay, 1942). Historically, the concept of ethnic heterogeneity has been measured using the percent of a community that identifies as foreign-born. As noted in Stowell (2007), “a central tenet of disorganization theory is the belief that immigration will have a deleterious impact on the social order of neighborhoods” (Stowell, 2007:95). Although this measure has been consistently used in communities and crime literature as one way to indicate the level of social (dis)organization in an area, using the percent foreign-born as a proxy measure for ethnic heterogeneity neglects ethnoracial variation within both the native and foreign-born community populations.

For decades, sociological and criminological scholars have examined social disorganization as an explanation for crime and research has been devoted to uncovering the mechanisms in disorganized communities that contribute to crime variation across place (Bordura, 1958; Bursik and Webb, 1982; Bursik, 1984; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Chilton and Dussich, 1974; Gordon, 1967; Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974; Kornhauser, 1978; Lander, 1954; Wirth, 1938; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Shaw and McKay, 1942). In their study on neighborhoods and crime, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) found that residents in disorganized communities tend to keep to themselves and are therefore less attached to other

residents in the neighborhood as well as less willing to intervene when they witness crime occurring in the community (low collective efficacy). Sampson and colleagues (1997) posit that this low collective efficacy contributes to crime by leaving residents in disadvantaged communities, absent effective social control, free to commit crime.

### **CHANGES IN COMMUNITIES' FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, REVITALIZATION, AND CRIME**

Early research on the effects of immigration increases on crime suggested that movement of large numbers of immigrants into a community contributed to increased poverty, a larger population with low levels of formal education, fewer residents employed in professional occupations, linguistic isolation, and political powerlessness (Martinez, 2002). These changes, from a classical social disorganization perspective would predict increases in community crime rates. Yet, despite the deleterious structural characteristics, crime is much lower than social disorganization theory would predict (Browning, 2002; Desmond and Kubrin, 2009; Lauritsen 2001; Lee et al., 2001)—this departure from social structural causes of crime and reported crime in immigrant Latin@ enclaves is referred to as “The Latino Paradox” or “immigration effect”. There is reason to believe that increased immigration into a community, specifically communities suffering from disadvantage, encourages crime to decrease by strengthening collective values and increasing social control through changes in social institutions such as family, education, government and the economy.

One framework used to explain this “paradox” phenomenon argues that many immigrants are ambitious, hard-working, and subscribe to conventional, mainstream ideals/norms (Butcher and Piehl, 1995; Tonry, 1997). In other words, not just anyone who wishes to migrate to the United States can do so successfully; the immigrant population is a self-selected group with drive and the perseverance necessary for success in a new social world (Feliciano and Lanuza, 2017). In fact, recent scholarship by Feliciano and Lanuza (2017) suggests that despite initial socioeconomic struggles, the successes and beneficial community outcomes of immigrants and

the immigrant population should not be considered paradoxical at all. Feliciano and Lanuza (2017) note that: “Migrants who change structural locations after moving to the United States nevertheless bring with them cultural skills, dispositions, beliefs, and aspirations associated with their previous class status” (Feliciano and Lanuza, 2017:215). They further argue that the “immigrant paradox” is evidence of recent immigrants re-establishing themselves into a U.S. social class comparable to the class they left behind in their home country. Such findings echo studies that suggest many recent immigrants often come to the United States with higher levels (or at least comparable levels) of education than the average native-born American, as well as the economic and social resources necessary for making such a complex move (Alba and Nee, 1997; Ousey and Kubrin, 2009; National Academies, 2015).

In addition to the immigrant self-selection perspective, the immigrant revitalization perspective (Feldmeyer, 2009; Lee et al., 2001, Martinez, 2002; Martinez et al., 2004) suggests that immigrant concentration in a community influences crime rate decreases, or crime prevention, in two primary ways. First, the presence of immigrants in a community strengthens community social organization (Chinchilla, Hamilton and Loucky, 1993; Ley, 2008; Martinez et al., 2004; Theodore and Martin, 2007). Research on the number and strength of social ties among immigrants is mixed; however, some empirical works find that many first-generation immigrants have more social support and larger social networks after migrating to the U.S. than later generations (Landale and Oropesa, 2001; Ousey and Kubrin, 2009; Vertovec, 2003, 2004). Further, unlike previous generations and waves of immigration to the United States, immigrants today are better able to maintain contact with friends and relatives in their home country, thereby maintaining social control through an increasingly advanced telecommunication network (Vertovec, 2004). Vertovec’s (2003) research on the influence of communication technologies on recent migrants led him to suggest that,

Whereas in previous eras migrants had to make do with exorbitantly expensive calls or slow-paced post, they are now able to communicate with their families abroad on a

regular, if not day-to-day basis. This obviously has considerable impact on domestic and community-life, inter-generational and gender relations, religious and other cultural practices, and local economic development in both migrant sending and migrant-receiving contexts (Vertovec, 2004: 220).

Such technological advances naturally reduce the types of social isolation experienced by some of the earliest waves of immigrants (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1920) and negate the social problems associated with severed ties between new immigrants and their established social networks. Moreover, family and neighbor cohesion in networks within host communities operate to provide informal social control (Martinez et al., 2004; Morenoff et. al., 2001; Portes and Zhou, 1993). Martinez and colleagues (2004) posit that ethnically heterogeneous communities often have dense social tie networks where recent immigrants and their families are offered educational, occupational and other types of support systems that promote successful integration. They note that increases in social capital for new immigrants may help buffer the criminogenic risks of some of the communities in which they settle (Martinez et al., 2004).

Contemporary immigrant communities are often characterized by the presence of two-parent families and strong ties with family members as well as neighbors and other social institutions in the community (Vélez and Lyons, 2012); this suggests an increase in collective efficacy in communities where immigrant concentration is high. Portes and Zhou (1993) note that the influx of immigrants into the U.S. in the twentieth century has evolved into immigration of families to the U.S. rather than the immigration of older, single adults that was commonplace in the nineteenth century. Immigrant women in the new millennium have also changed considerably compared to immigrant women who immigrated in the nineteenth century. The Pew Hispanic Center and The Panel on The Integration of Immigrants into American Society both report that immigrant women in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are young adults and have higher fertility rates than native women (Passel and Taylor, 2010; National Academies, 2015). Family structure and the presence of young children in a community are important components for both

informal social control as well as the strengthening of social capital. Ousey and Kubrin (2009) examined changes in immigration (measured using a three-item immigration index) on city violent crime rate (1980-2000). Their results suggest that increased immigration in a city contributes to declines in violent crime because this demographic change strengthens the institution of family in the city by decreasing divorce rates and increasing two-parent families (Ousey and Kubrin, 2009).

Further, although foreign-born residents tend to be disproportionately underrepresented in local government and political organizations, there is some evidence that immigrant families with children in school do get involved and perhaps create bridges to the larger political economy (National Academies, 2015). Terriquez and Kwon (2014) found that children in immigrant families who are being educated in U.S. schools are not only likely to become registered voters themselves, but they may take what they learn in school about participation in local organization and politics home to their parents (Terriquez and Kwon, 2014). Similarly, Bloemraad and Trost, (2008) found that immigrant school children often encourage their immigrant parents to become active and join in immigrant rights' demonstrations (Bloemraad and Trost, 2008). Finally, immigrant participation in the institution of religion offers even more opportunity for joining social networks that inform recent immigrants about potential jobs, opportunities for civic engagement, and emotional support (Foley and Hoge, 2007; Hirschman, 2004).

Another avenue through which immigrant concentration in a community aids in social organization is through the stimulation and bolstering of the local economy and in redevelopment of the city's urban center (Sampson, 2008; Vélez 2009). Recent findings by the Panel of the Integration of Immigrants into American Society note that although the earnings of immigrants remain lower than earnings of the native-born, the immigrant population overall has a high level of employment in the low-skilled labor market relative to the native-born population (National Academies, 2015). Research by Reid and colleagues (2005) suggests that an influx of immigrants into a community may reverse the effects of depopulation in a community thereby stimulating the

local economy and encouraging business capital to remain in, or re-invest in, the community. Further, ethnic enclave research focuses on communities with large numbers of immigrants who contribute to the community's broad division of labor and who have enough social capital to both create jobs in the community and offer higher pay for their employees (Portes and Zhou, 1993). Although residents in these enclaves may lack financial security and disposable income, the majority are involved in the local labor market- they are working and are attached to the broader labor market.

Attachment to the conventional labor market and lower levels of jobless residents are recognized indicators of social integration that make participation in crime a less attractive and less lucrative option (Martinez, 2002). Reid and colleagues' (2005) study of 150 U.S. metropolitan areas, using data from Decennial Census and Uniform Crime Report, led them to suggest that contrary to public rhetoric suggesting that immigrants "take" jobs from the native-born, an influx of immigrants into an metropolitan area:

creates a population to be served both by the public and private sector, a large immigrant population may actually produce better jobs for native-born persons. Hence native-born minority group members may be promoted into higher-paying jobs as immigration increases because immigrants do not only 'take' jobs, they also 'make' jobs that the native-born obtain" (Reid et al., 2005:776).

Vélez's (2009) research on homicide rates in Chicago census tracts (1993-1995) led her to conclude that: "ethnic economies are no doubt strengthened with the infusion of immigrants who both consume ethnic goods and services as well as find employment opportunities in their production" (Vélez, 2009: 333).

In sum, there are theoretical reasons to believe that changes in a community's immigrant population can affect crime. Moreover, as immigrants in the community begin to navigate U.S. social life, the strengthening of community institutions facilitates crime control by defending neighborhood interests through creating and organizing activities focused on providing youth



activities, creating neighbor networks, supporting relationships between community members and conventional institutions outside the community (Ley, 2008). However, it is not clear if the revitalizing effect of increases in the immigrant population of a community are generalizable to all immigrant groups. That is, we know less about how the ethnicity of immigrant population groups might differentially affect the relationships between immigration and crime.

#### **IMMIGRANT POPULATION CHANGES BY HISPANIC/LATIN@, NON-HISPANIC/LATIN@ AND CRIME**

The U.S. immigrant population is a diverse group, and although migration from Mexico and other Latin nations increased significantly after the 1965 Immigration Act, there are numerous nations of origin represented in the U.S. foreign-born population. As recently as 2015, the U.S. Census reported that there were 43.2 million foreign-born residents (roughly 13.4% of the U.S. population) in the United States (Lopez and Bialik, 2017). Further, the majority of immigrants in the U.S. (2000-2010) migrated from Mexico, India, China and Canada (Lopez and Bialik, 2017).

There is historical evidence that U.S. residents of Mexican or other Latin ancestry recognized the social barriers and exclusion based on the United States' phenotypical social hierarchy; in fact, as Moore (2008) notes "Mexican Americans rejected the term minority, and its implied association with black America" (Moore, 2008:xx). This rejection led to the eventual adaptation of an ethnic designation in the U.S. Decennial Census in 1970 allowing residents to select a race as well as self-identify their ethnicity as Hispanic or Latino. By 2000, residents in the United States were able to self-identify as multiple races; yet, there is still only one officially recognized ethnicity - Hispanic/Latino. Some criminological research has examined how changes in the Hispanic population affects changes in community crime. Martinez (2002) examined differential community characteristics of areas where Hispanic and non-Hispanic immigrants settled across five cities (Miami, El Paso, San Diego, Chicago and Houston). He argued that in the cities examined, the Hispanic population was disproportionately comprised of foreign-born

Hispanics; he did not, however, disaggregate the Hispanic population by foreign-born status. In his longitudinal analyses (1980-1995), Martinez concluded that the Hispanic homicide victimization rate fell between the rates for non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic Black populations despite Hispanics and non-Hispanic Blacks living in structurally similar communities across all five cities.

However, in a recent report published by the U.S. Census (2017), the percent of the U.S. population who self-identified as Hispanic was 57.5 million (Census, 2017). Further, using American Community Survey population data, the Pew Research Center reported that as recently as 2012, 64.5% of U.S. Hispanic residents were native-born and 35.5% were foreign-born (Brown and Patten, 2014). Therefore, it is warranted to limit investigations on changes in Hispanic/Latin@ immigration and crime to the foreign-born Hispanic population and exclude the native-born Hispanic population from the foreign-born Hispanic measure. To better understand the relationship between changes in the immigrant population in Chicago communities, community composition, community characteristics and crime, the current dissertation will examine community changes where there were changes in the Hispanic and non-Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born populations.

***Hypothesis (1): In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, there will be decreases (2012-2000) in the communities' violent crime rates.***

***Hypothesis (2): In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the non-Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, there will be decreases (2012-2000) in the communities' violent crime rates.***

## **CHANGES IN THE HISPANIC/LATIN@ IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY NATION OF ORIGIN AND CRIME**

Like the idea that there are differences in the immigrant population by Hispanic/Latin@ and non-Hispanic/Latin@ ethnicity, there is also heterogeneity within the Hispanic/Latin@

population. Stowell (2007) notes: “The fact that ethnic populations reside in areas with varying levels of disadvantage suggests that the association between immigration and crime may differ as a product of ethnicity” (Stowell, 2007:78). In his study on immigration and crime patterns, Stowell (2007) confirmed that across three cities (Alexandria, Virginia, Houston, Texas, and Miami, Florida) neighborhood crime rates and social structure characteristics varied across each city; further, he found that immigrant settlement patterns by immigrant ethnicity (Hispanic by predominant nation of origin, and African by predominant nation of origin) also varied across neighborhoods with structurally dissimilar levels of disorganization (Stowell, 2007). Moreover, he found that immigrants tended to live in communities with fewer home-owners, a larger recent immigrant population, a smaller non-white population, and many lived in communities that were more economically disadvantaged than what was found in predominantly native-born resident communities. Stowell’s (2007) conclusions highlight the need for criminological scholars to disaggregate the foreign-born population and discontinue assuming uniformity in immigration and crime patterns (Stowell, 2007). Similar observations have been made in southern California cities in which the foreign-born population was disaggregated by world-regions (Kubrin et al., 2016).

The current dissertation focuses on immigrant population changes and the effect of such changes in Chicago communities, where there are many Hispanic/Latin@ and non-Hispanic/Latin@ nations represented in the immigrant population. Within criminological research on immigration and crime, some studies disaggregated the Hispanic/Latino immigrant population. Using data on Miami neighborhoods and police reports, Stowell and Martinez (2009) examined the influence of immigrant populations from Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti and Cuba on homicide. They found that Latin@ immigrant groups settle in communities that are insulated from violence compared to their non-Latin@ counterparts. Further, they found that Latin@ immigrant group population concentrations had a statistically significant, negative impact on homicide (Stowell and Martinez, 2009). The choice to examine Miami neighborhoods and prominent immigrant

groups in Miami by nation of origin is important for better understanding how immigrants carve-out their own unique spaces in the U.S. city as well as for understanding if crime is related to immigration. However, these studies are limited to cities with “predictable patterns of settlement” and a limited number of immigrant groups (Stowell and Martinez, 2009) such as Los Angeles, Miami, Houston and San Antonio (Stowell and Martinez, 2007; Stowell and Martinez, 2009). Further, using data on a port city with such a long history of accepting very specific immigrant groups is likely not generalizable to other cities that may have an equally long history of immigrant settlement from an array of other nations; yet, their (2007) findings in a similar study in Houston and Miami (disaggregating the foreign-born into Nicaraguan, Honduran, Cuban and Haitian in Miami and Mexican El Salvadorian, Chinese and Vietnamese in Houston) paved the way for subsequent immigration crime studies as well as the current work.

Recent scholarship has investigated violent crime in neighborhoods with, or surrounded by, predominantly immigrant residents. Kubrin and Ishizawa (2012) examined Chicago and Los Angeles neighborhood violent crime (homicide and robbery) in immigrant neighborhoods. They measured immigrant neighborhoods as clusters of neighborhoods situated within areas of greater immigrant presence and found that Chicago immigrant neighborhoods had half the violent crime of immigrant neighborhoods in Los Angeles. Kubrin and Ishizawa (2012) suggested comparing the characteristics of the immigrant neighborhoods both within and across cities while taking into consideration the neighborhoods’ historical contexts. Perhaps one reason that there were such stark differences between the crime rates in the neighborhoods examined in each city is because their immigrant concentration measure used both a pan-ethnic (percent Latino) and pan-foreign-born (percent foreign-born) measure (Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012) rather than disaggregating the immigrants by nation of origin. Although the percent Latino measure and percent foreign-born measures in each city are highly correlated due to the increased wave of immigration from Mexico and other Latin nations (Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012), these measures may obscure important differences in how immigrants from various Latin nations are accepted into

communities as well as the community structures of each community where immigrants from various nations settle.

Within the pan-ethnic Hispanic/Latin@ population in Chicago, there are at least 23 nations represented<sup>3</sup>; while certainly, the empirical choice to aggregate some of the nations of origin into world regions facilitates a larger population for statistical practice, this may mask cultural variations within the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population that affect community integration and limit the communities where immigrants may settle. As Rumbaut (2009) asserts: “Although a single label implies otherwise, ‘Hispanics’ or ‘Latinos’ are not a homogenous entity, and should not be presumed to be so” (Rumbaut, 2009:18). For example, sociolinguistic scholars who focus on understanding the various dialects of Spanish spoken in the United States highlight that variations in the U.S. Spanish languages can signal to other Spanish speakers’ social characteristics such as social class and level of education; differences in dialect can also lead to breakdowns in collective efficacy, misunderstanding and frustrations.

Zentella (1990) examined Spanish dialect differences in New York city between Puerto Rican, Mexican, and Dominican Spanish speakers. She noted: “Among the groups that we studied, and in New York in general, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans are the poorest, the least educated, and the darkest Latinos in the city; they are discriminated against as individuals and as a group, and so is the variety of Spanish that they speak” (Zentella, 1990: 1102). Further, she explains “The fact that Cuban Spanish does not suffer the same wide-spread condemnation that is voiced against Puerto Rican and Dominican Spanish, despite its linguistic similarities, reveals the overriding power that social factors have in the face of linguistic ones” (Zentella, 1990). This is somewhat akin to the variations of English spoken throughout the United States. Word choice, inflection, and accents are often used by English speakers to make generalized assumptions about

---

<sup>3</sup> The nations of origin in the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ population include: Mexico, Puerto Rico (a U.S. territory), Cuba, The Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuelan, Spain, Other Central American Origin, Other South American Origin (Census, 2017).

those with whom they speak; however, among the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, dialectical contact differences may add yet another level of discrimination in the host community that immigrants may confront - one within the immigrant or native Spanish speaking population.

Díaz-Campos and Navarro-Galisteo (2009) examined the perception of dialect variation within Spanish by native Spanish speakers in the United States. They found that Spanish speakers, without formal training in linguistics, were able to correctly categorize their own dialect as well as identify a talker's nation of origin after listening to some sentences spoken in Spanish (Díaz-Campos and Navarro-Galisteo, 2009). Taken together, previous works suggest that investigating nation of origin as a characteristic of the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population and examining changes in various immigrant populations by nation of origin within community ethnoracial context may yield a better understanding of different immigration-crime results found in previous research.

In their (2016) work, Kubrin, Hipp, and Kim used data from the Southern California Crime Study to address the limitation in much of the community-level immigration and crime literature created by treating the foreign-born population as homogenous (percent foreign-born). Kubrin and colleagues (2016) disaggregated the foreign-born population in Southern California by measuring Black and white immigrants from eighteen world regions of origin (see Kubrin et al., 2016). They found that communities with a high percentage of Latino immigrants had higher violent crime than communities with a higher percentage of Black or Asian immigrants; further, they argue that their findings suggest that disaggregating the immigrant population by nation of origin is the more appropriate way to measure the immigrant population in community and crime research. It may be useful to take this approach in studying the impact of immigration further by disaggregating the Latino immigrant population by specific nation of origin and thus examine patterns of community structure in settlement as well as nearby areas. Massey and Sánchez (2010) note that "immigrant assimilation is more complex than many Americans realize, and the

process is shaped by the actions of natives as much as by immigrants' own actions" (Massey and Sánchez, 2010:2).

***Hypothesis (3):** Where there are changes in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population by nation of origin (2000-2009), there will be an inverse effect of immigrant population change on community violent crime.*

### **IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS WITHIN THE U.S. ETHNORACIAL REGIME**

Ramey (2013) and Kubrin et al., (2016) both found differential effects of immigrant population growth on crime across communities disaggregated by predominant ethnoracial compositions. One reason that immigrants who have arrived in the United States since the 1965 Immigration Act may fare differently than did earlier waves of immigrants is the current U.S. conceptualizations and functions of race and ethnicity in American society. As Ferraro (2014) notes, there are some differences between immigrants today and immigrants in the early 19th century. "The first is skin color. Generally, the darker the skin color of the incoming group, the more likely it is that members will be ascribed a lower social status" (Ferraro, 2014:64).

The Panel on The Integration of Immigrants into American Society notes that many recent immigrants are introduced to their "ethnoracial identity" soon after arriving to the U.S., and this classification sticks with them as a status that becomes a part of their identity in U.S. institutions (education, government, economy etc...) (National Academies, 2015). Although the suggestion of an intersection between race, ethnicity, and social class is not new (see Shaw and McKay, 1942; Wilson, 1987 and Anderson, 1999 for discussions of this intersection and its relationship to crime), it is important to note that the physical (i.e., phenotypical such as skin tone, hair texture, facial feature) characteristics of many immigrants who have migrated since the 1965 Immigration Act look differently than those who migrated prior to 1965. Such visible differences contribute to an immigrant's ethnoracial identity and may limit or influence immigrants to settle in predominantly minority communities that have historically been communities affected by structural disadvantage (Ferraro, 2014).

Stowell and Martinez (2007) found that, depending on the prevalence of violence in surrounding communities, there was a decrease in crime where there were increases in the foreign-born Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Haitian populations; this was not found for the Cuban immigrant population in Miami (Stowell and Martinez, 2007). It may be that the Cuban population in Miami is more affected by the intersections of race and ethnicity than the other Latino groups that were included in the study, thus constraining their opportunities for successful integration devoid of crime. In Houston, Stowell and Martinez (2007) found no impact of immigration on violent crime; this result might have been influenced by the community context into which the immigrants settle beyond the city context of reception.

In a study of the Dominican immigrant population growth in Reading, Pennsylvania (2006), Jensen and colleagues specifically examined how race and ethnicity intersected and influenced the community context of reception for the growing Dominican immigrant population. Using in-depth, open-ended survey techniques with a convenience sample of 65 Dominican-origin adults, Jensen and colleagues found that newer arrivals recognized that their skin-color was “very dark” yet, due to their home-country’s (Dominican Republic) rejected use of the term Black, the newer immigrants chose to self-identify as Dominican and Hispanic/Latin@. They comment that “Several of our respondents did regard themselves as very dark skinned and recognized that they are sometimes regarded as black by members of the wider community” (Jensen et al., 2006:1098). Therefore, the perceptions and assumptions of native-born residents may constrain the community settlement choices for darker-skinned Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants and lead to very complex contexts of reception within the Hispanic/Latin@ and minority communities. Community structural characteristics where lighter or darker skinned immigrants settle may be missed in criminological works that examine only a pan-ethnic categorization of immigrants and assume uniformity across the Hispanic/Latin@ populations. Further, Jensen and colleagues (2006) found that immigrants who had resided in the U.S. for an extended period and who were lighter in skin tone were more likely to self-identify using a pan-ethnic



Hispanic/Latin@ designation and they also benefitted from higher socioeconomic status (i.e., better education, employed, higher income and home owners) (Jensen and colleagues, 2006).

Jensen and colleagues' (2006) finding offered support for Daniel's (2002) assertion that the history of Hispanic/Latin@ and Mexican peoples in the United States provided some with the privileges associated with whiteness but excluded others. Mexican Americans residing in the U.S. in the late 1800's were largely "multi-racial" by contemporary definitions of race. After the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, mestizos<sup>4</sup> in the U.S. were guaranteed rights to citizenship and thus extended an official white identity; however, in practice, mestizos were not granted all the social privileges of whiteness, and only the lightest-skinned (elite) mestizos from Mexico were able to truly claim Spaniard (Castilian) ancestry (Daniel, 2002). This history is key to contextualizing Hispanic, Latin@ and Mexican people and communities in the United States. Multiple generations of lighter-skinned U.S. born Hispanics have been socially afforded more opportunity for upward social mobility that is closer to that experienced by Anglo Americans. In the modern U.S. ethnoracial regime of modern America, within the Hispanic/Latin@ ethnic designation, there are many who occupy positions of higher social status who, despite their own Mexican ancestry, set themselves apart from recent Mexican immigrants- and certainly apart from Latin@s who, historically, are a multi-racial combination of Spanish and African (therefore never considered European) descent.

Immigrants with darker skin tones may face constrained opportunities for community settlement, and discrimination, due to the structure of the U.S. racial regime; this may explain why immigrant populations in predominantly Black communities have little to no effect on changes in crime. Either the immigrant populations settling in Black communities are too small to effectively influence change in crime, or, the immigrant population remain socially or economically isolated thus not contributing to community labor market improvements and/or

---

<sup>4</sup> Defined, mestizo refers to the historical genetic mix of Native American and European ancestry.

collective efficacy. In his 2013 study, Ramey examined the effect of changes in the immigrant population of communities across 84 new and established immigrant destination cities. Using data from the National Neighborhood Crime Study 1990-2000 (NNCS I) and data from the National Neighborhood Crime Database (NCDB), Ramey investigated how immigrant population and immigrant composition (measured as percent foreign-born) influenced census tract violent crime rates across cities. Ramey further considered how immigrant growth and immigrant composition in tracts that were predominantly white, or black or Latino, affected violent crime rates (Ramey, 2013). He found that communities with a larger immigrant composition significantly predicted less violent crime in all neighborhood types except in predominantly Black communities (Ramey, 2013). Increases in immigrant composition (immigrant growth) significantly affected violent crime decreases in predominantly white and integrated communities (Ramey, 2013). Ultimately, Ramey concluded that immigrant revitalization (measured as decreases in violent crime) was contingent upon neighborhood type within the context of new or established destination cities. Following the work of Stowell (2007), Kubrin et al., (2016), and Ramey (2013), this dissertation will examine changes in Chicago communities' violent crime (2012-2000) where there were changes in the immigrant population by ethnicity.

Moreover, although the census now allows for a delineation between race and one ethnicity, there remains public, political, and to some extent academic, confusion/debate regarding ethnicity and social inclusion/exclusion. Ethnicity is very broadly defined in much of the sociological literature as shared ancestry, identity, language, tradition, and beliefs (ASA, 2017). Yet, as Andreas Wimmer (2013) argues, defining ethnic groups is far more complex than simply assigning a social group a label based on the region of the world from which they (or their ancestors) originate and a population's shared beliefs/practices. Rather, Wimmer states: "ethnicity is more than an 'imagined community,' a cognitive classification or a discourse of identity. Ethnic boundary making is driven by hierarchies of power and prestige and is meant to stabilize and institutionalize these hierarchies (see Tilly, 1998; Mackert, 2004)" (Wimmer, 2013). Further,

keeping Wimmer's argument in mind, Bonilla-Silva notes that: "To maintain 'white supremacy'...whites (1) create an intermediate racial group to buffer racial conflict, (2) allow some newcomers into the white racial strata, and (3) incorporate most immigrants into the collective black strata" (Bonilla-Silva, 2004:934).

Bonilla-Silva asserts that many immigrants are assigned a low social status upon entering the United States, and he also suggests that this is not uniform across all groups of immigrants; therefore, there is reason to believe that some immigrant groups will fare better in communities and may contribute to community life differently than others. Regarding immigrant ethnicity, Chavez (2013) notes that Latino immigrants to the United States must navigate the Latino Threat narrative. He explains that the Latino Threat narrative

works so well and is so pervasive precisely because its basic premises are taken for granted as true...Latinos, whether immigrant or U.S. born, are a homogenous population that somehow stands apart from normal processes of historical change. They are immutable and impervious to the influences of the larger society and thus are not characterized as experiencing social and cultural change. They are uneducated, monolingual Spanish speakers, segregated into ethnic enclaves. Because they lead separate social and linguistic lives, one must assume that they marry only their own kind. They are locked into Catholic doctrine, leading to high fertility rates. In this narrative, Latinos, especially Mexican immigrants and their children, are seldom represented as agents of positive change, because their unwillingness to integrate denies them the opportunity to influence the larger society in any appreciable way, except in the negative-as a threat to existing social institutions (Chavez, 2013:45).

Therefore, assumptions and stereotypes about the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, particularly Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants with darker skin tones, may be more likely to settle in communities with higher levels of economic disadvantage and social disorganization, further from predominantly white communities, and in areas with consistently higher levels of crime.

***Hypothesis (4):*** *In communities disaggregated by predominant ethnoracial type, where there is a change in the immigrant population by ethnicity (2000-2009) there will be inverse effects on community violent crime (2012).*

Although research has consistently shown that immigrants are not more crime prone than individuals in the native population, the contexts of the community to which the immigrants from specific nations move may structure their ability to avoid crime and criminal participation. Building on previous community-level immigration and crime research, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of immigration and crime predictions by: 1) using dynamic community-level models to better capture the changing nature of communities noted in the urban sociological and social disorganization frameworks; 2) following early social disorganization theory's prediction that ethnic heterogeneity contributes to increases in crime by disaggregating the foreign-born population by Hispanic/Latin@ and non-Hispanic/Latin@ ethnicity; 3) disaggregating the diverse Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population by nation of origin to better examine if the diversity within the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population differentially affects violent crime in communities; and 4) considering how race, ethnicity, and the context of community characteristics differentially condition criminogenic factors. Using 2000 and 2012 data on census tracts in Chicago for which there are available crime data in the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS I) and forthcoming NNCS II in combination with data from the 2000 Decennial Census SF3 and the 2006-2009 ACS, the current work examines how changes in the immigrant (measured as foreign-born from various Hispanic/Latin@ contributing nations or non-Hispanic/Latin@) populations in a community affect community violent crime.

## CHAPTER THREE: EXAMINING SECONDARY DATA SOURCES TO UNDERSTAND COMMUNITY STRUCTURE, POPULATION CHANGES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN CRIME

### **RESEARCH DESIGN**

To better understand the impact of disaggregating the foreign-born population by ethnicity on violent crime in Chicago, the current work uses several secondary data sources (U.S. Decennial Census Summary File 3, The 2005-2009 American Community Survey, and the National Neighborhood Crime Study I and II) with demographic, economic and crime data for Chicago census tracts. First, I explore the effects of changes in the immigrant population on community violent crime rates. Due to the large population size of census tracts across Chicago, (see table 3.1 for descriptive statistics), relative to the average violent crime rate, it is acceptable to analyze the change in crime rates rather than analyze a change in crime counts (Osgood, 2000). Analyses then move to examine how changes in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population and non-Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population affect violent crime in the community. Next, models examine how diversity within the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population (measured as immigration by nation of origin) may differentially affect changes in community violent crime. Finally, I assess the influence of changes in the immigrant population by Hispanic/Latin@ nation of origin on changes in community violent crime for neighborhoods with different predominant ethnoracial compositions.

### **STUDY SITE: CHICAGO, ILLINOIS**


Historically, Chicago has been home to a large population of the nation's immigrants; in fact, by 1870 the city's foreign-born population was one of the largest in the United States – nearly half of all residents (48%) in Chicago were foreign-born (Paral, 2003). As recently as 2009, roughly 21% of all Chicago residents self-identified as foreign-born; at the census tract level, the foreign-born population comprised between 0 and 67% of the community's population (see Table 3.1 for select census tract population descriptive statistics). Like the foreign-born

population in destination cities across the United States, Chicago's early immigrant population generally migrated from Europe. Immigrants, particularly Mexican and Latino immigrants, relocated to Chicago after World War II for agricultural, industrial and railroad jobs (Fernandez, 2017). By the mid to late 20<sup>th</sup> century, the city experienced a shift in foreign-born migration after the 1965 Immigration Act and throughout that period immigrants were largely from Latino and Asian nations with the largest increases in the immigrant population migrating from Mexico (Paral, 2003). Census tracts across Chicago in 2009 vary in their immigrant resident population; Figure 3.1 presents maps of foreign-born census tract compositions (n=814). Chicago's long history with a racially and ethnically diverse population, currently comprised of census tracts with up to 59% Hispanic foreign-born residents and up to 65.1% non-Hispanic foreign-born residents (2009) allows for an examination of how changes in the community immigrant population, contextualized by the intersections of race, ethnicity, and social class operate to influence changes in community violent crime. Moreover, as a city that has, historically, been the center of community-level crime research in sociology/criminology and as the city where social disorganization theory was first conceptualized thus informing social scientists on the causes of crime at a meso-level, the current work conducts an investigation of immigration, ethnicity, and crime in communities across Chicago.

Early 21<sup>st</sup> century research has noted that, like findings in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, increased immigration does not have the deleterious effects on communities as suggested by public and political discourses (Browning, 2002; Desmond and Kubrin, 2009; Lauritsen 2001; Lee et al., 2001, Martinez, 2002; Martinez and Lee, 2000; Martinez, Lee and Nielsen, 2004). Using data on Chicago census tracts, the current work contributes to sociological and criminological scholarship by considering how the following community characteristics influence changes in violent crime: 1) change in the foreign-born population, 2) change in communities' foreign-born population by ethnicity, 3) change in communities' foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ population by nation of

origin within the Hispanic/Latin@ ethnicity, and 3) the community context of neighborhood  
ethnoracial structure where there have been changes in the foreign-born population.

FIGURE 3.1: FOREIGN-BORN CENSUS TRACT COMPOSITION 2009



## DATA

### THE UNITED STATES DECENNIAL CENSUS AND AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY

Every ten years, as a department within the United States Department of Commerce and under the supervision of the Economics and Statistics Administration, the United States Census Bureau (Census) counts every U.S. resident as well as collects various housing, person, and economic information from residents (U.S. Decennial Census of Population and Housing). Mandated by the U.S. Constitution, the fundamental purpose of the Decennial Census is to determine the allocation of government representatives to act and speak on behalf of U.S. residents; however, the U.S. Census Bureau regularly collects, analyzes and disseminates aggregate information about the U.S. population. The current work uses data from the 2000 Decennial Census Summary File Three (SF 3) to measure demographic, economic, social, and housing characteristics on census tracts for which there are also National Neighborhood Crime Data (NNCSI and II), across the city of Chicago, Illinois (n=814). Using a nationally representative, random sample of the population, the 2000 Census SF 3 contains rich, detailed



demographic and economic data at the census tract, city, county, and state levels. Further, SF 3 data also contain detailed information on a random, representative, housing (i.e., physical structures, tenure etc.) sample (for a thorough discussion of the 2000 Census SF3, see Summary File 3: Technical Documentation, 2007).

In response to the federal need for consistent, comparable information on the U.S. population and communities, the American Community Survey (ACS) was funded and began data collection in 2005. As part of the U.S. Census Bureau, the ACS is a random, nationally representative, rolling survey of U.S. and Puerto Rican population samples that provide information on the U.S. population, housing, and group quarters between (one, three and five years) the decennial Census years (ACS, 2014). Like the Decennial Census SF 3 data, the ACS contains population demographic, housing, and economic data reported in aggregate at the place, census tract, county, city, and state levels. Moreover, rather than continue to have the Decennial Census collect SF 3 (long form) data every ten years, the ACS data collects very similar data on a sample of the U.S. population and is now the primary source for detailed census tract level population and housing information. As such, ACS data are regularly used in social science, medical, policy, and government research/publications (for a thorough discussion of history and methodology see ACS Design and Methodology, 2014). This dissertation uses ACS 2005-2009 survey data on Chicago census tracts for 2009 measures of community demographic and economic census tract characteristics. The 2000 SF 3 and 2005-2009 ACS are ideal secondary sources for the current project due to the rigorous, representative and consistent methodology of the U.S. Census Bureau, the comparability and availability of census tract-level data on the native-born, and foreign-born population groups disaggregated by race as well as foreign-born nation of origin.

#### THE NATIONAL NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME STUDY I AND II

The key outcome variable change in the violent crime rate (2012), for census tracts in Chicago, Illinois comes from unique, nationally representative datasets. The National

Neighborhood Crime Study I and II (NNCSI and NNCSII, respectively) are data files that contain data from the 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census combined with tract-level crime data for 9,593 census tracts in 91, randomly chosen large U.S. cities that are representative of all large cities in the United States. Created by Ruth D. Peterson and Lauren J. Krivo, the NNCSI and NNCSII (forthcoming) are housed and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research within the ICPSR Resource Center for Minority Data (RCMD). The original purpose of these data was to explore community-level sources of variation in FBI index crime rates. Crime data in each census tract were gathered by the principal investigators who contacted individual police departments in each city and requested address-based crime incident data or tract-level counts of index crimes. Police departments in 26 of the selected cities provided crime data for the census tract. The remaining 65 city jurisdictions provided address-based crime incident reports. Peterson and Krivo (2001) geocoded the incident data and assigned these to the appropriate census tracts before aggregation for final census tract crime rates. Data quality checks were performed on the crime data by comparing the jurisdiction-reported crimes to the total agency count for the same crimes reported in the FBI's Uniform Crime Report. Crimes reported in tracts were included in the NNCS if the quality check was within 10 percentage points of each other; otherwise, tract crimes were coded as missing. Tracts with fewer than 300 residents ( $n=623$ ), or tracts with more than 50% institutionalized residents ( $n=164$ ), were excluded from the NNCS (Krivo et. al., 2009). The current dissertation uses information on 814 Chicago census tracts included in the 2000 Decennial Summary File 3, the American Community Survey (2005-2009), and the NNCS I & II. A complete list of variables from all datasets, and operationalizations, are presented in Appendix A.

#### DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CHANGE IN VIOLENT CRIME RATE

The dependent variable, change in the violent crime rate (2012-2000), is the difference between the 2012 violent crime rate per 1,000 residents in the census tract and the 2000 violent crime rate per 1,000 residents in the same census tract (tracts are normalized to 2000 tract

boundaries). The violent crime rate for each year included in this dissertation are three-year averages of the homicide and robbery events known to police (i.e., 1999-2001 and 2011-2013) divided by the total tract populations (2000 and 2009), then multiplied by 1,000.

The choice to use only robbery and homicide in the violent crime measure(s) is guided by empirical examinations comparing self-report and official reports of crime incidents in communities with large immigrant population concentrations. For example, Hillenbrand and Davis (1993) found that in communities with large immigrant populations, there were substantive differences in residents' willingness to report less serious crimes to police. Further, Davis and Henderson (2003) found that in communities with low levels of collective efficacy, large ethnoracial minority and immigrant populations, residents were hesitant to report less serious crimes. Moreover, Latin@ immigrant residents' perceptions regarding the relationship between police contact and fear of deportation as well as excessive use of force influence an underreporting of assault and property crime (Messing, Becerra, Ward-Lasher and Androff; 2015).

#### INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The independent variables used in the current project come from the 2000 Decennial Census, reported at the census tract level for tracts in the city of Chicago. The current work follows Kubrin and colleagues' (2016) and others' (DiPietro and Bursik, 2012; Ferraro, 2016) suggestions for measurement of the foreign-born population in a community to include ethnic designations across different nations of origin, with various cultural characteristics and motivations for migration. That is, this dissertation uses measures of ethnicity (Hispanic or non-Hispanic) and nation of origin (from Hispanic/Latin@ nations) in conjunction with a measure of foreign-born status to capture the percent (and percent change 2000-2009) of Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants versus non-Hispanic foreign-born residents in a community. Currently, the only ethnic designation recognized by the decennial census is Hispanic/Latino. As recently as the 2000 Census, U.S. residents who self-identified as Hispanic/Latino alone or in any race combination

were then asked to identify their nation of origin. For this reason, in the current work, the percent of residents from Census-defined Hispanic/Latino nations represent the percent of the tract population who are both Hispanic/Latin@ and foreign-born.

The independent variable *percent foreign-born* is the number of residents in a census tract who self-report being born in a nation outside of the United States, divided by the total tract population and multiplied by one hundred. *Percent Hispanic/Latino immigrant population*<sup>5</sup> is constructed using the following steps. The first step is to sum the number of residents in a census tract who report their origin as being from the Hispanic/Latino nations recognized as such in the decennial census (see also Kubrin et al., 2016). The number of foreign-born Hispanic/Latino residents is then divided by the total tract population and multiplied by one hundred. *Change in percent foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@*<sup>6</sup> is constructed by taking the difference between the percent foreign-born Hispanic/Latino population (2009-2000); the year 2000 percent foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ variable comes from the 2000 Census SF 3 and is measured in the same way described above for the 2009 (ACS 2005-2009) foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ variable. *Percent non-Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population* is measured as the number of foreign-born Hispanic/Latino residents in a tract subtracted from the total foreign-born tract population; this

---

<sup>5</sup> The U.S. Census defines Hispanic or Latino as “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture regardless of race” (Census, 2017; see also Kubrin, Hipp and Kim, 2016). In the current work, foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ is measured as persons who report their nation of origin as one of the following: Cuba, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Other Central America, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Other South America or Spain. In several population tables, the ACS reports the percent of the foreign-born population who are Hispanic/Latino; to confirm the appropriateness of summing Hispanic/Latino nations of origin to obtain the percent of the foreign-born population (while maintaining the ability to disaggregate the foreign-born Hispanic-Latin@ population by nation of origin), a correlation analysis was performed between the measure used in the current work and the measure reported in the ACS ( $r=.96^{**}$ ).

<sup>6</sup> NNCS I crime data, 2000 SF 3, and 2005-2009 ACS data are, originally, reported in the Census 2000 census tract boundaries. Census tract boundaries may change between decennial census data collections (i.e., some tracts will be combined with others or some will be split into more than one -new or existing- tracts). In the city of Chicago, roughly 30% of the census tracts in 2000 underwent some type of boundary change by the 2010 census. To analyze similarities and change in crime across Chicago census tracts between the two time points, the LTDB (Longitudinal Tract Database) reverse-interpolation procedure was used to interpolate the 2010 crime data to 2000 census tract boundaries (see Logan et al., 2014 for more details). While there are some concerns about the methods used in census data interpolation where census tracts have undergone boundary changes, the LDTB procedure combines areal and population interpolation (without including water covered areas) and “are clearly preferable to the NCDB [Neighborhood Change Database] for the 2000 to 2010 decade” (Logan et al., 2016:1026).

value is then divided by the total tract population and multiplied by one hundred. The *change in the non-Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born immigrant population* is measured as the (2009-2000) difference in the percent of residents in a tract that self-identify as foreign-born and not from a Hispanic/Latino nation (2000 SF 3 and 2005-2009 respectively).<sup>7</sup> Positive, higher, values in each change variable indicate an increase in the measure whereas negative values indicate a decrease in the measure. Finally, *Percent Foreign-born Hispanic Mexico nativity* measures only the percent of the foreign-born Hispanic residents in a tract who reported being born in Mexico; *Percent Foreign-born Hispanic nativity other than Mexico* measures the percent of the foreign-born Hispanic residents in a tract who reported being born in a Hispanic/Latino nation other than Mexico (see footnote 3 for a list of other Hispanic/Latino nations). All percentage measures are constructed out of the total tract population.

#### NEIGHBORHOOD TYPES

Following the work of Krivo, Peterson and Kuhl (2009), and Martinez and colleagues (2016), this dissertation explores the context of changes in foreign-born populations by examining community characteristics in communities that are predominantly white, Black, Hispanic/Latin@, and integrated according to aggregate percentages of community residents' self-reported race and ethnicity in the 2005-2009 American Community Survey. The communities are defined as a predominant ethnoracial community if the population of the respective racial or ethnic group constituted 70% or more of the total tract population<sup>8</sup>. Minority communities are defined as tracts where each of the self-reported Black and self-reported


---

<sup>7</sup> While some of the political and public immigration-crime rhetoric involves discussions of differences between the documented and undocumented statuses of immigrants, the tract-level census data used in the current work does not allow for such an examination. However, recent work by Light and Miller (2018) concluded that, at the state-level, the relationship between changes in the states' undocumented and documented population alike was most often negative and, in some instances, statistically significant.

<sup>8</sup> Minority tracts are defined as such when the population of the tract consists of a combined Hispanic/Latin@ and Black population that is at least 70% and has a white population of less than 30% and where none of the racial or ethnic groups alone constitute more than 70%. There were 37 tracts identified as predominantly minority, as well as 3 tracts classified as predominantly Asian; due to the small number of minority and Asian communities, a total of 40 tracts were excluded from the neighborhood type analyses.

Hispanic resident population proportions are no less than 35% and neither population alone equals more than 70%. All other tracts are designated “integrated” communities.

Figure 3.2: Neighborhoods by Predominant Ethnoracial Type 2009



#### CONTROL VARIABLES

To examine and better understand how community characteristics and changes in immigrant population affect violent crime, the following variables - based on previous research on crime in communities – serve as control variables (see Appendix A for list of all variables and operationalizations). First, the age and family structure compositions of a census tract population may contribute to or protect against crime: therefore, the current analyses include measures for the *percent young male population* (the number of residents in a tract who are male aged 15-24, divided by the total tract population, then multiplied by 100) and the *percent married with children* (the number of residents in a tract who report being married with children under age eighteen, divided by the total tract population, then multiplied by 100). Second, the level of disadvantage in a community has consistently predicted the amount of crime in a community and

is measured in the current work as a *disadvantage index*. Based on the results of a factor analysis, the disadvantage index is comprised of six variables: 1) percent female-headed households; 2) percent unemployed; 3) percent high school graduates; 4) percent poverty; 5) the percent of residents who are employed in *low-wage* occupations<sup>9</sup>; and 6) the percent of *professional*, high-wage, workers who self-report employment in professional, scientific and technical services as well as in the management of companies and enterprises. Third, *Residential instability* is measured based on the results of a factor analysis and is comprised of the percent of the population renting their residence and the percent who moved into their residence within the past year.

#### SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

The current work includes census and crime data across 814 Chicago census tracts (774 census tracts are used in analyses that include predominant ethnoracial neighborhood types). Descriptive statistics presented in Table 3.1 suggest that community characteristics such as level of disadvantage, racial heterogeneity, and residential stability remained fairly stable from 2000-2009. Overall, change in the tract population ranged from a loss of over 4,500 residents to a gain of roughly 6,600 residents. The median change in tract population was an increase of 180 residents. The change in tract levels of key variables (i.e., the change in the young male population, change in tract disadvantage, change in racial heterogeneity, and change in the foreign-born population) are normally distributed with a mean at or close to zero; the maps in Figure 3.2 depict the variation in population and key community characteristic changes across the sample. It appears that in communities where disadvantage increased, residential instability increased as well. Further, in many tracts where racial heterogeneity increased, disadvantage decreased.

---


<sup>9</sup> Following the work of Krivo and Peterson (2001) in the NNCSI, *low-wage* occupations is measured by the percent of working residents in a tract who self-report employment in six occupations with the lowest average incomes (accommodation and food services, health and social support services, transportation and warehousing, agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, building maintenance/cleaning and other services such as personal care).

Table 3.1 Chicago Census Tract Descriptive Statistics and Change 2009 - 2000 (n=814)

Dependent Variable (Change in Violent Crime Rate)	2000				2012				Change 2012-2000			
	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Violent Crime Rate	25.8	23.7	0.0	198.1	18.7	19.1	0.0	188.1	-7.1	17.7	-123.3	140.0
Independent and Control Variables	2000				2009				Change 2009-2000			
	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Total Tract Population	3523	2556	302	15359	3434	2498	101	15073	-89	658	-4540	6570
Percent Foreign-born	17.8	17.5	0.0	73.9	17.2	16.5	0.0	66.9	-0.6	6.5	-28.8	25.6
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic	10.7	14.7	0.0	62.9	9.7	13.8	0.0	58.5	-1.0	6.2	-33.1	29.9
Percent from Argentina	0.0	0.2	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.2	0.0	3.8				
Percent from Bolivia	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	3.9				
Percent from Chile	0.0	0.1	0.0	3.6	0.0	0.3	0.0	8.1				
Percent from Colombia	0.2	0.6	0.0	11.1	0.1	0.5	0.0	7.6				
Percent from Costa Rica	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.3	0.0	7.7				
Percent from Cuba	0.2	0.4	0.0	6.6	0.1	0.4	0.0	6.4				
Percent from Dominican Republic	0.0	0.2	0.0	2.8	0.1	0.4	0.0	7.7				
Percent from Ecuador	0.2	0.7	0.0	7.6	0.3	1.0	0.0	14.1				
Percent from El Salvador	0.1	0.3	0.0	4.1	0.1	0.4	0.0	7.2				
Percent from Guatemala	0.4	1.0	0.0	13.8	0.3	1.0	0.0	14.0				
Percent from Honduras	0.1	0.3	0.0	3.5	0.1	0.4	0.0	3.9				
Percent from Mexico	8.5	13.1	0.0	60.2	8.2	12.7	0.0	58.1				
Percent from Nicaragua	0.0	0.1	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.7				
Percent from Panama	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	3.1				
Percent from Peru	0.1	0.3	0.0	2.9	0.1	0.3	0.0	3.6				
Percent from Spain	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	2.5				
Percent from other Central American country	0.0	0.1	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	2.2				
Percent from other South American country	0.1	0.2	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.1	0.0	2.6				
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic	7.2	10.4	0.0	73.9	7.5	10.1	0.0	65.1	0.3	4.7	-27.2	25.9
Percent Young Male	7.3	2.5	0.0	17.3	7.2	3.7	0.0	31.2				
Percent Married Families with Children	6.0	3.2	0.0	15.8	20.0	8.5	0.0	68.1				
Disadvantage Index	0.0	1.0	-2.3	3.6	0.0	1.0	-2.8	4.0				
Residential Instability	0.0	1.0	-2.7	2.3	0.0	1.0	-5.2	2.6				




Figure 3.3: Changes in Tract Population and Select Tract Characteristics (2009 – 2000)\*



\*Darker shades indicate an increase in the community characteristic; to visualize changes, color variants are binned into 20 groups.

On average, across the 814 Chicago census tracts used in the current work, violent crime rates declined (much like the decline seen across the United States during the same time-period) and consistent with community-crime research, there are some communities with larger declines in violent crime than others (Baumer, Vélez and Rosenfeld, 2018). Between 2000 and 2012, Figure 3.4 suggests that there was an increase in the violent crime rate where there was a greater increase in the communities' foreign-born population (see Figure 3.1); however, there is a slight difference in the change in violent crime in communities where there was a greater increase in the percent non-Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population compared to communities where there was a greater increase in the percent Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population. Further, a brief look at the figures of foreign-born population distributions, change in violent crime, and communities by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood types (Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 respectively) preliminarily suggest that there are some differences in the predominant ethnoracial neighborhood types where the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ and non-Hispanic/Latin@ settle; moreover, it also appears that change in violent crime varies by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type. The maps in Figures 3.1 and 3.4 offer initial support for investigating how changes in the foreign-born population, and changes in the foreign-born population disaggregated by ethnicity, affect changes in violent crime. In addition, the maps in Figure 3.2 and 3.4 offer initial support for examining the changes in violent crime rates, community characteristics and ethnoracial neighborhood contexts where the foreign-born populations were changing.

Figure 3.4: Changes in Chicago Tract Violent Crime per 1,000 residents (2012-2000)\*



\*Darker color represents a greater decrease in violent crime; to visualize changes in violent crime, color variants are binned into 25 color groups.

## ANALYTICAL APPROACH

Recognizing that communities are dynamic places where change is expected, the current work uses census-tract level data across 814 Chicago census tracts with select change scores to systematically test the four hypotheses presented in Chapter Two (see Appendix Table 1 series for a list of hypotheses and proposed analytical models). The first two hypotheses are tested using six ordinary least squares regression models with, all things equal, the percent foreign-born (2000), the change in the percent foreign-born (2009-2000), the percent foreign-born Hispanic (2000), the change in the percent foreign-born Hispanic (2009-2000), the percent foreign-born non-Hispanic (2000), and the change in the percent foreign-born non-Hispanic populations as independent variables to predict change in community violent crime rates (2012-2000). Hypothesis 3 is tested using ordinary least squares regression models with the percent of a tract population that is foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico, and foreign-born Hispanic born in Hispanic/Latino nations other than Mexico,<sup>10</sup> as well as change in both populations (2009-2000)<sup>11</sup>.

Ordinary Least Squares regression analyses are appropriate for testing hypotheses with a continuous dependent variable, and when the assumptions of this statistical method are met (i.e., random sampling, independence of residuals, linear relationship between independent and dependent variables, homoscedastic error terms, absence of autocorrelation in the model(s), normal distribution of errors, and absence of multicollinearity) (Gujarati, 2018). Visual inspection of scatterplots revealed slight, linear relationships between the independent and

---

<sup>10</sup> Due to the small numbers of Hispanic foreign-born residents from nations other than Mexico, the analyses focus only on foreign-born Hispanic residents from Mexico and Hispanic foreign-born residents born in Hispanic nations other than Mexico.

<sup>11</sup> To minimize the number of models presented in this proposal, model 7 is described and presented in Appendix Table 1.1 as one large model with all nations of origin and change in each nation of origin in one model; however, when the analyses are conducted, prior to running the model 7 that is presented, an intercept-only model will be compared with models in which each nation of origin and change score are added in step-wise fashion.

dependent variables; in addition, a histogram of the dependent variable (change in violent crime) reveals a generally normal distribution with a mean of zero. After examining census tract outliers, and comparing post-estimation plots of the model residuals, the six outliers do not disproportionately influence the regression results; further, the residuals are normally distributed. However, due to heteroscedasticity confirmed by a visual inspection of residual versus predicted values, the OLS hypotheses tests in this dissertation use robust standard errors.

***Equation 1: Ordinary Least Squares Regression with Robust Standard Errors***

$$\Delta Y_i = B_1 X_{1i} + B_2 X_{2i} + B_3 X_{3i} + B_k X_{ki} \dots u_i$$

Where  $\Delta Y$  denotes the change in the tract violent crime rate (violent crime rate at time one (2000) subtracted from the violent crime rate at time two (2011)),  $B_1$  is the intercept,  $B_2 \dots B_k$  are the regression coefficients,  $X_1 \dots X_k$  are the independent or control variables and include a control of violent crime at time one (2000),  $i$  is the observation at time one (2000), and  $u$  denotes the error term. The addition of the control variable for violent crime at time one (2000) ensures that the starting-point/lower limit of violent crime per 1000 residents (floor effect) in these analyses is accounted for across each model (see Allison, 1990).

As found throughout community and neighborhood studies for over a century, communities that are geographically near one another are more similar in their characteristics and structure than are communities that are geographically further apart. Therefore, in neighborhood-level research it is necessary, albeit not always sufficient, to acknowledge the spatial proximity and effects of changes in one are on changes in nearby areas. Despite the diagnostic finding, using post-estimation plot comparisons, that residuals in the full-model using pan-ethnic foreign-born measures are independent, Figures 3.1 through 3.4 all present clusters of census tracts with similar characteristics (i.e., predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type, change in independent and dependent variables). Further, the Moran's I statistic measures the linear correlation between variable values and the weighted average (measured by distance between tracts) of nearby tracts

(Moran, 1950). The Moran's I statistic for the OLS residuals of the full regression model using pan-ethnic percent foreign-born measures is -0.02 with a p-value in favor of the null hypothesis—that there is no spatial dependence. While it could be that changes occurring in the foreign-born populations in one Chicago community may affect changes in a neighboring community, as an initial examination of the dynamic nature of immigration, ethnicity and violent crime, and despite the non-significant, substantially small Moran's I statistic, this dissertation includes models that recognize spatial dependence through error terms (spatial error models).

***Equation 2: Spatial Error Model***

$$\Delta Y_i = B_1 X_{1i} + B_2 X_{2i} + B_3 X_{3i} + B_k X_{ki} \dots + (I - \lambda W)^{-1} u_i$$

Where  $\Delta Y$  denotes the change in the tract violent crime rate (violent crime rate at time one (2000) subtracted from the violent crime rate at time two (2011)),  $B_1$  is the intercept,  $B_2 \dots B_k$  are the regression coefficients,  $X_1 \dots X_k$  are the independent or control variables and include a control of violent crime at time one (2000),  $i$  is the observation at time one (2000),  $(I - \lambda W)$  is the inverse covariance weight matrix, and  $u$  denotes the error term. Using this model, spatial dependence between observations is treated as a nuisance thus improving the OLS estimates, standard errors, significance and model fit (Anselin, 2017).

## CHAPTER FOUR: DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES, DIFFERENTIAL CRIME RATES

Chapter Four follows the methods previously outlined to examine the descriptive as well as predictive relationships between population and structural community characteristics of Chicago communities (n=814) and crime. The chapter begins with thorough descriptive and bivariate analyses to examine the strength and direction of associations between the study's variables. Analyses then move to test the effects of foreign-born population concentrations and, changes in foreign-born populations on changes in community violent crime rates.

### **DESCRIPTIVE AND BIVARIATE ANALYSES OF SAMPLE VARIABLES**

#### **VIOLENT CRIME, COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS, AND CHANGE**

Before turning to the multiple regression model analyses of the change in crime, the current work examines variation across Chicago communities, and relationships between the community level study variables. The results of the Spearman's rank-order correlations between all variables used in the analyses are presented in Table 4.1. During the crime decline (from roughly 1991 through 2012), communities across the United States were experiencing declines in violent and property crime; however, some communities experienced greater declines in crime than others (2000-2012 across 842 Chicago communities: mean= -6.7, minimum= -66.7, maximum= 39.9). In Chicago communities, a higher crime rate in the year 2000 is related to a statistically significant, greater decline in crime between 2000 and 2012 ( $\rho = -0.85^{***}$ ). The percent of a community that is married with children (2000) is associated with lower levels of violent crime in 2000 and 2012 ( $\rho = -0.5^{***}$  both years) but has an inverse relationship to the change in the violent crime rate. Level of disadvantage is positively related to violent crime in 2000 and 2012 ( $\rho = 0.5^{**}$  for both); however, disadvantage is negatively associated with the change in violent crime ( $\rho = -0.25^{***}$ )- and this result, while strange to those familiar with the

large body of work driven by social disorganization, is best interpreted as an artifact of the crime decline that was already in motion across the United States in combination with the decrease in disadvantage across Chicago's safest communities (Papachristos, Brazil and Chang, 2018)<sup>12</sup>.

---

<sup>12</sup> Steps were taken to verify that the coding and interpretation of the disadvantage index were correct. First, the disadvantage index variable was examined by placing the values of the disadvantage index into categories; low disadvantage was defined as the minimum value (-2.3) through one standard deviation above the mean (1.0); moderate disadvantage was defined as the range between 1.1 and two standard deviations above the mean (2.0); high disadvantage was defined as the range between 2.01 and the maximum value 3.63. The disadvantage index categorical variable was then examined in a crosstabulation with the neighborhood type categorical value. Consistent with previous research, using these very broad ranges of disadvantage yielded the following: only Black neighborhoods in the (2000) sample represented all three categories of disadvantage (192 had low levels, 91 had moderate levels, and 26 were categorized as high disadvantage). Further examination of the disadvantage index variable was then conducted by examining each of the index variable statistics by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type. On average, across the 26 predominantly Black neighborhoods defined as high disadvantage: 22% of the population were employed in secondary, low-wage occupations; 10% were employed as professional workers, 18% of the population were unemployed; 29% had only a high school education, 16% of the households were female headed with children, and 66% of the population were living below the poverty line. By comparison, the other three neighborhood types were all defined as having low levels of disadvantage. After this verification of coding and interpretation was conducted, it is reasonable to note that higher numbers of the disadvantage index score represent communities with high disadvantage.



Table 4.1 Correlations between Control Variables (2000), Community Change (2009-2000) & Change in Violent Crime (2012-2000)

	Change in Violent Crime Rate	Crime Rate 2000	Crime Rate 2012	Percent Foreign-Born	Change Percent Foreign-Born	Percent Foreign-Born Hispanic	Change Percent Foreign-Born Hispanic	Percent Foreign-Born non-Hispanic	Change Percent Foreign-Born non-Hispanic	Percent Foreign-Born Nativity Mexico	Change Percent Foreign-Born Nativity Mexico	Percent Foreign-Born Hispanic Nativity other than Mexico	Change Percent Foreign-Born Hispanic Nativity other than Mexico	Percent Young Male	Percent Married Families with Children	Neighborhood Type (white reference)	Disadvantage Index	Residential Instability
Change in Violent Crime Rate	1																	
Crime Rate 2000	-0.849***	1																
Crime Rate 2012	-0.186***	0.677***	1															
Percent Foreign-Born	0.192***	-0.393***	-0.463***	1														
Change Percent Foreign-Born	-0.0186	0.0600	0.0857*	-0.331***	1													
Percent Foreign-Born Hispanic	0.117***	-0.251***	-0.304***	0.802***	-0.316***	1												
Change Percent Foreign-Born Hispanic	-0.00613	0.0439	0.0733*	-0.234***	0.722***	-0.361***	1											
Percent Foreign-Born non-Hispanic	0.155***	-0.301***	-0.344***	0.558***	-0.118***	-0.0471	0.103**	1										
Change Percent Foreign-Born non-Hispanic	-0.0125	0.0156	0.0116	-0.173***	0.451***	-0.00622	-0.284***	-0.282***	1									
Percent Foreign-Born Nativity Mexico	0.108**	-0.228***	-0.275***	0.758***	-0.278***	0.976***	-0.304***	-0.0925**	-0.0185	1								
Change Percent Foreign-Born Nativity Mexico	0.180***	-0.295***	-0.298***	0.343***	0.0537	0.273***	0.114**	0.194***	-0.0815*	0.251***	1							
Percent Foreign-Born Hispanic Nativity other than Mexico	-0.0666	0.0598	0.0184	0.196***	-0.137***	0.268***	-0.252***	-0.00617	0.0461	0.156***	0.108**	1						
Change Percent Foreign-Born Hispanic Nativity other than Mexico	0.0694*	-0.161***	-0.203***	0.505***	-0.269***	0.516***	-0.358***	0.147***	0.0400	0.334***	0.196***	0.597***	1					
Percent Young Male	0.0101	-0.0308	-0.0433	0.261***	-0.0730*	0.423***	-0.108**	-0.150***	0.0183	0.436***	0.0940**	0.0296	0.128***	1				
Percent Married Families with Children	0.299***	-0.504***	-0.520***	0.715***	-0.150***	0.633***	-0.0845*	0.317***	-0.118***	0.605***	0.359***	0.154***	0.359***	0.177***	1			
Neighborhood Type (white reference)	0.0458	-0.153***	-0.222***	0.535***	-0.185***	0.481***	-0.226***	0.233***	0.0333	0.425***	0.230***	0.182***	0.413***	0.242***	0.368***	1		
Disadvantage Index	-0.250***	0.459***	0.505***	-0.250***	0.0540	-0.0299	0.0744*	-0.374***	-0.0355	0.00213	-0.172***	-0.0477	-0.107**	0.177***	-0.329***	-0.0314	1	
Residential Instability	0.165***	-0.141***	-0.0322	-0.0698*	0.111**	-0.0306	0.195***	-0.0752*	-0.102**	-0.00811	0.0474	-0.0424	-0.109**	-0.110**	0.321***	-0.0939**	0.0710*	1

## FOREIGN-BORN POPULATIONS, CRIME, CHANGE AND COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS

Consistent with prior research results, where there was a higher concentration of foreign-born residents (overall) in a community, there was a moderate, statistically significant decline in the violent crime rate in the years 2000 and 2012 ( $\rho = -0.4^{***}$ ). Although larger population concentrations of the foreign-born population are slightly related to statistically significant higher changes in crime rates (2012-2000) ( $\rho = 0.2^{***}$ ), there is no relationship between the change in the foreign-born population overall and the change in community crime rates (2012-2000). This finding is not surprising because communities with a higher concentration of foreign-born residents in 2000 had a statistically significant relationship ( $\rho = -0.3^{***}$ ) to a decrease (or smaller increase) in the foreign-born population (2009-2000). Therefore, a larger foreign-born population in 2000 represented a relatively stable proportion of the foreign-born population (2009-2000). Moreover, the foreign-born population concentration (2000) had a significant, positive relationship ( $\rho = 0.2^{***}$ ) with the change in violent crime (2012-2000).

As reported in other research on immigration across the United States, the concentration of the foreign-born population at time one (2000) was strongly associated with a larger proportion of Hispanic foreign-born residents ( $\rho = 0.8^{***}$ ). This offers support for findings that note the foreign-born population in the United States after the 1965 Immigration Act largely self-reports Hispanic/Latino nations of origin (Lopez and Bialik, 2017). Further, it also offers support for the methodological choice in some research to allow the percent foreign-born to act as a measure of the percent foreign-born Hispanic population (Martinez, 2002).

The foreign-born population was, on average (mean and median = -0.6), declining across Chicago communities between 2000 and 2009, thus it is interesting to note that there is a statistically significant, negative relationship ( $\rho = -0.2^{***}$ ) between the concentration of foreign-born residents and the change in the percent of the community that was foreign-born Hispanic. It could be that communities with a higher concentration of foreign-born residents in 2000 were experiencing out-migration (Hispanic foreign-born residents moving out of Chicago

communities), or less in-migration of the Hispanic foreign-born population (fewer foreign-born Hispanic residents moving into Chicago communities). This correlation provides support for research that suggests new immigrants are not necessarily moving into or remaining in traditionally immigrant communities (Stowell, 2007). Similarly, larger foreign-born community population concentrations are moderately associated with the percent of the community population that is non-Hispanic foreign-born ( $\rho = 0.6^{***}$ ) and the foreign-born concentration of a community in 2000 had a weak, negative relationship with change in the non-Hispanic foreign-born population ( $\rho = -0.2^{***}$ ).

A larger concentration of foreign-born residents is, not surprisingly, strong and positively related to the percent of the foreign-born population that is from Mexico ( $\rho = 0.8^{***}$ ), and it is positively related to a larger change in the percent foreign-born from Mexico ( $\rho = 0.3^{***}$ ). Thus, it could be suggested that, at first glance, newer Mexican immigrants sought communities with large foreign-born populations and perhaps saw more opportunities for establishing human and economic capital by settling in areas where other Mexican immigrants were established. The same is true for foreign-born Hispanic residents who migrated from nations other than Mexico ( $\rho = 0.5^{***}$ ), and the change in the foreign-born Hispanic population from nations other than Mexico ( $\rho = 0.2^{***}$ ). Finally, the larger the concentration of the foreign-born population in the community at time one (2000) was associated with a higher percentage of young men in the population ( $\rho = 0.3^{***}$ ), a higher percentage of married families with children ( $\rho = 0.7^{***}$ ), lower levels of disadvantage ( $\rho = -0.3^{***}$ ) and no relationship to community residential instability. Moreover, more foreign-born population concentrations were in neighborhood types that were predominantly non-white ( $\rho = 0.5^{***}$ ).

#### FOREIGN-BORN POPULATIONS BY ETHNICITY, CRIME & COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS

Relationships between the community-level measures of the changes in foreign-born populations in Chicago communities by ethnicity and nation of origin reveal slightly different associations to changes in violent crime. In 2000, across Chicago communities, the concentration

of foreign-born Hispanic residents in communities (2000) had moderately-weak, negative relationships to the 2000 and 2012 crime rates ( $\rho = -0.3^{***}$ ). This supports previous findings that areas with more foreign-born Hispanic residents had lower levels of violent crime (Martinez, 2002; Stowell and Martinez, 2009; Vélez, 2009). However, change in the foreign-born Hispanic population (2009-2000) was positively, yet very weakly, associated with a higher violent crime rate in 2012 ( $\rho = 0.1^*$ ). Moreover, higher proportions of a community population that is foreign-born Hispanic is positively associated with the percent of young males in the population ( $\rho = 0.4^{***}$ ), a higher percent of married families with children ( $\rho = 0.6^{***}$ ), and had no relationship to disadvantage or residential instability.

Population concentration of non-Hispanic foreign-born residents (2000) was negatively related to both the 2000 and 2012 violent crime rates ( $\rho = -0.3^{**}$  both years) suggesting that areas with non-Hispanic foreign-born residents were also in areas with lower levels of violent crime. A higher percent of a community population that was foreign-born non-Hispanic was associated with a lower proportion of young males in the community ( $\rho = -0.1^{**}$ ); a higher percent of the community who were married with children ( $\rho = 0.3^{***}$ ), and lower levels of disadvantage ( $\rho = -0.4^{***}$ ). Larger proportions of young males in the community and more residential stability at time one (2000) was associated with decreases, or smaller increases, in the foreign-born non-Hispanic population (2009-2000) ( $\rho = -0.1^{**}$  for both).

#### FOREIGN-BORN HISPANIC BY NATION OF ORIGIN, CRIME & COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS

Concentrations of foreign-born Hispanic by nativity had differential effects on crime in 2000 and 2009. Foreign-born residents from Mexico had an inverse relationship with violent crime, ( $\rho = -0.2^{***}$  and  $\rho = -.3^{***}$  in 2000 & 2009 respectively) and there was no relationship between Hispanic foreign-born residents from other Hispanic/Latino nations of origin. The relationships between the changes in foreign-born populations by Hispanic/Latino nation of origin and crime are slightly different; increases, or smaller decreases, in the percent foreign-born from Mexico had a weak, positive relationship to change in the violent crime rate ( $\rho = 0.1^{**}$ )

whereas there was almost no relationship between changes in the percent foreign-born Hispanic population from nations other than Mexico and change in violent crime rates ( $\rho = 0.07^*$ ).

The proportion of young men in a community is positively associated with the change in the percent of the population from both Mexico and foreign-born from Hispanic/Latino nations other than Mexico ( $\rho = 0.1^{**}$  and  $\rho = 0.1^{***}$  respectively). Similarly, the proportion of residents married with children was positively associated with the percent of the population from Mexico and the percent of the foreign-born Hispanic population from nations other than Mexico ( $\rho = 0.4^{***}$  and  $\rho = 0.2^{***}$  respectively). Disadvantage at time one was negatively related to the change in the percent foreign-born from Mexico as well as the percent Hispanic foreign-born from nations other than Mexico ( $\rho = -0.2^{***}$  and  $\rho = -0.1^{**}$  respectively). Finally, only the percent of the foreign-born from Hispanic/Latino nations other than Mexico was correlated with residential instability ( $\rho = -0.1^{**}$ ).

At time one (2000), higher percentages of young men in the population and married families with children were positively related to change in the percent of the population who were foreign-born from Mexico ( $\rho = 0.4^{***}$   $\rho = 0.6^{***}$  respectively). The level of disadvantage in 2000 was negatively associated with the change in the percent of the population foreign-born from Mexico ( $\rho = -0.2^{***}$ ). Bivariate associations between study variables are important for examining the possibility of multicollinearity in subsequent regression models, as well as for acquiring a base-line understanding of the strength of linear relationships in between variables; however, they cannot provide a very clear picture of what is going on in communities because these relationships are not open to accounting for other contextual influences on either or both measures.

#### SUMMARY OF THE DESCRIPTIVE AND CORRELATION ANALYSES

At first glance it is evident, and not surprising, that there is variation across Chicago communities in population demographic and structural characteristics. Moreover, it appears that many of the community characteristics included in this dissertation remained fairly stable

between 2000 and 2009; yet, the usual communities and crime social disorganization, structural, measures continue to predict crime as expected. Consistent with immigration and crime research, there is less support for social disorganization theory's immigrant population and crime predictions. That is, the correlational analyses of relationships between changes in the foreign-born populations and changes in community crime offer only weak, and partial support for predictions based on social disorganization theory. The weak, yet statistically significant, relationships between foreign-born populations by ethnicity and many of the community characteristic measures suggest that differences in the foreign-born population by ethnicity may only predict indirect effects of foreign-born Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations on crime. Limiting an analysis to the relationship between the overall foreign-born population concentrations in a community and change in crime offers descriptive support for previous immigration and crime works. Yet, ending the analyses with this finding ignores many other pieces in the immigration, communities and crime story.

Moreover, the correlational analyses reveal that parsing-out the foreign-born population by ethnicity hints at a more complex relationship between immigration and crime, as noted in Kubrin et. al., (2016). Similarly, the correlation analyses suggest that there is something happening in communities where there were changes in the Hispanic foreign-born population by nation of origin because these changes are related (differentially) to changes in community crime. Next, this dissertation will use multiple regression analyses to examine the nuances of changes in communities, neighborhood foreign-born populations, and changes in crime.

## **MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES**

### **EXAMINING FOREIGN-BORN POPULATIONS ON VIOLENT CRIME**

Prior to presenting the analyses that test this dissertation's hypotheses, it is necessary to note that each multiple regression model (see table 4 series) accounts for the proper temporal order of the measures. Endogeneity and simultaneity are noted issues throughout community and crime literature. There is always the possibility that, rather than community characteristic

variables such as residential instability contributing to crime, it is crime that contributes to community structural characteristics, such as residential instability, in the community. For example, it is plausible to think that population turnover is the result of increasing crime in the community rather than increases in crime that result from population churn.

Ensuring that there is proper temporal order of study variables is one small way to confront endogeneity and simultaneity; for example, it is highly unlikely that the crime rate in 2012 influenced the proportion of the communities' immigrant population to increase (or decrease) between 2000 and 2009. However, it is not unreasonable to think that there could have simultaneously been changes in crime between 2000 and 2012 and changes in community structure and population characteristics (2009-2000) that were driven by an omitted (exogenous) variable. To address the issue of omitted variable bias, the multiple regression models include the most frequently used, theoretically relevant community structure variables known to predict violent crime (cited throughout previous chapters), as well as control for the percent of the population who were foreign-born (2000) in models that include change in the foreign-born populations. The percent foreign-born population in 2000 recognizes that one predictor of subsequent increases in the foreign-born population are existing social ties with immigrant family and friends already living in the community (MacDonald, Hipp, and Gill, 2013; Vélez, 2009).

#### CHANGE IN THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AND CHANGE IN VIOLENT CRIME

Consistently in the immigration-crime literature, scholars conclude that communities with a proportionally large foreign-born population benefit from lower levels of crime and some also benefit from revitalization (Lee et. al, 2001; Martinez et. al, 2004; Morenoff and Astor, 2006; Vélez, 2009). Turning to a test of hypotheses one and two<sup>13</sup>, regression models one and two

---

<sup>13</sup> **Hypothesis (1):** *In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, there will be decreases (2012-2000) in the communities' violent crime rates.*

(Table 4.2) provide a baseline examination of the concentration of the foreign-born population overall (2000) and change in the foreign-born population (2009-2000) on change in violent crime rates (2012-2000). Results of the first two regression models are consistent with previous immigration, communities and crime research (see National Academies Press, 2010 and Ousey and Kubrin, 2017). First, communities with higher violent crime rates in 2000 predict a statistically significant, larger, decrease in the violent crime rate. When measuring the overall foreign-born population concentration in communities, areas with a higher percent of residents who are foreign-born predicts a significant decrease in violent crime. In 2000, communities with a greater foreign-born population concentration predicts a decrease in the violent crime rate ( $B = -0.12^{***}$ ) despite, as social disorganization theory predicts, having higher levels of disadvantage and more residential instability. Moreover, in communities where there were more residents living in a married-parent family structure there was a significant decrease in the violent crime rate. Model two presents similar results across the community structure control variables; higher levels of disadvantage and residential instability predict smaller decreases, or increases, in the violent crime rate. More married families in the community significantly predict decreases in the violent crime rate. Yet, when the concentration in a community's percent foreign-born (2000) is considered alongside the change in the foreign-born population (2009-2000), the concentration of established foreign-born residents (2000) predicts the same decrease, or smaller increase in the violent crime rate ( $B = -0.13^{***}$ ), and the 2000-2009 changes in the foreign-born population have no effect on changes in the community violent crime rate. That an increase in the foreign-born population between 2000 and 2009 did not significantly influence change in violent crime (2012-2000) is not surprising because, on average, the foreign-born population across Chicago communities decreased roughly 0.6%.

---

**Hypothesis (2):** *In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the non-Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, there will be decreases (2012-2000) in the communities' violent crime rates.*



Therefore, to better understand if an increase in the foreign-born population affected changes in violent crime, the third and fourth models include only the communities ( $n=93$ ) that experienced an increase (one standard deviation above the mean) in the foreign-born population (see descriptive statistics for this subgroup in Appendix Table 2). Focusing only on communities where there was an increase in the foreign-born population between 2000 and 2009, findings of model three show that, a concentration of foreign-born residents did not influence the change in violent crime. Results of model four tell a story that suggests, all things equal, increases in the foreign-born population (2009-2000) contributed to an increase in the change in violent crime ( $\beta = 0.37^{**}$ ).

The first two models presented in the current work offer support for previous immigration-crime findings— that increased immigrant concentration in a community predicts less violent crime (see National Academies Press, 2010 for a review); further, models three and four are consistent with Kubrin, Hipp, and Kim's (2016) conclusion— the relationship between immigration and crime is complex. To examine if ethnicity contributes to this complex relationship, models five through eight examine changes in the foreign-born community populations' effect on violent crime by, in step-wise fashion, including Hispanic and non-Hispanic ethnicity of the foreign-born populations.

Across Chicago communities, all things equal, models five and six find that only community structure control variables predict change in violent crime (2012-2000). Larger concentrations of a Hispanic foreign-born population (2000) nor change in a community's Hispanic foreign-born population (2009-2000) had a statistically significant effect on change in violent crime (2012-2000). Therefore, these first six models do not support hypothesis one.

Yet, the results in models seven ( $B = -0.10^{**}$ ) and eight ( $B = -0.12^{***}$ ) suggest that a larger concentration of non-Hispanic foreign-born residents (2000) in communities predict larger decreases in the community violent crime rate between 2000 and 2012 than what was occurring elsewhere in Chicago during the era of the great crime decline. Like the results in the first two

models that examined the overall effect of foreign-born concentrations on change in violent crime, the results in model eight show that there was a significantly larger decrease in violent crime where, all things equal, there was a concentration of non-Hispanic foreign-born residents. That is, communities with a foreign-born non-Hispanic population composition of at least 17.6% (one standard deviation above the mean) there were roughly 38 fewer violent crimes per 1,000 residents. The regression models used to test hypothesis two do not find support for the idea that changes in the foreign-born Hispanic population have an inverse effect on changes in violent crime; however, the differential results and strength of the effects of changes in the foreign-born population by ethnicity does suggest that in communities, immigration and crime research, examining the ethnicities of foreign-born populations are a worthwhile endeavor.

Table 4.2 OLS Regressions: Foreign-born populations by Ethnicity & Change in Foreign-born Populations on Changes in Community Violent Crime Rates

Communities with one Standard Deviation Increase in Foreign-born Population																		
Independent Variables (2000); Change (2009-2000)	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8			
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.		
	-0.12***	0.04	-0.13***	0.04	0.004	0.08	0.02	0.08										
			-0.07	0.05			0.37**	0.17										
									-0.05	0.03	-0.06	0.04						
											-0.05	0.06						
													-0.10**	0.04	-0.12***	0.04		
															-0.10	0.06		
Percent Young Male Population	-0.02	0.29	-0.01	0.28	0.38	0.28	0.37	0.26	-0.01	0.30	-0.01	0.29	-0.16	0.31	-0.17	0.31		
Percent Families Married with Children	-0.94***	0.30	-0.92***	0.31	-1.26***	0.53	-1.50***	0.52	-1.29***	0.24	-1.27***	0.25	-1.35***	0.22	-1.36***	0.22		
Disadvantage Index	3.96***	0.83	3.96***	0.83	1.392	1.13	1.265	1.06	3.40***	0.85	4.03***	0.85	3.67***	0.82	3.60***	0.82		
Residential Instability	1.18**	0.60	1.20**	0.60	1.226	1.46	1.752	1.46	1.68***	0.53	1.71***	0.53	1.66***	0.51	1.60***	0.52		
Violent Crime (2000)	-0.62***	0.04	-0.62***	0.04	-0.66***	0.06	-0.66***	0.05	-0.62***	0.04	-0.62***	0.04	-0.62***	0.04	-0.62***	0.04		
Constant	16.90***	2.33	16.95***	2.34	12.00***	3.44	9.40***	3.63	17.24***	2.42	17.11***	2.40	19.04***	2.53	19.29***	2.57		
N	814		814		93		93		814		814		814		814			
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01																		

\*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Table 4.2 (continued) OLS Regressions: Foreign-born populations by Hispanic Nativity & Change in Foreign-born Populations (2009-2000) on Changes in Community Violent Crime Rates (2012-2000)

	Model 9		Model 10		Model 11		Model 12	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
<b>Independent Variables (2000); Change (2009-2000)</b>								
Percent of Population Foreign-born from Mexico	-0.04	0.03	-0.04	0.03				
Change in Percent of Population Foreign-born from Mexico			-0.01	0.07				
Percent of Population Foreign-born from nation other than Mexico					-0.33	0.24	-0.50**	0.19
Change in Percent of Population Foreign-born from nation other than Mexico							-0.40**	0.20
<b>Control Variables</b>								
Percent Young Male Population	-0.02	0.30	-0.02	0.30	-0.08	0.30	-0.05	0.30
Percent Families Married with Children	-1.34***	0.23	-1.33***	0.24	-1.35***	0.22	-1.30***	0.22
Disadvantage Index	3.97***	0.84	3.97***	0.85	3.88***	0.82	3.91***	0.82
Residential Instability	1.75***	0.51	1.75***	0.51	1.67***	0.54	1.63***	0.53
Violent Crime (2000)	-0.62***	0.04	-0.62***	0.04	-0.62***	0.05	-0.62***	0.04
Constant	17.42***	2.53	17.41***	2.49	18.03***	2.39	17.83***	2.39
N	814		814		814		814	

\*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME

Although I do not find support for the first two hypotheses, the results of the first eight regression models do reveal the importance of considering the role of ethnicity in immigration-crime research. Statistically significant, greater declines in violent crime occurred across Chicago communities where there were concentrations of non-Hispanic foreign-born residents. This result did not occur in models that examine the Hispanic foreign-born population. Moreover, these findings were not evident in regression models that did not disaggregate the foreign-born population by ethnicity. To examine the possibility that a similar situation is occurring in models that include the overall Hispanic foreign-born population, analyses now turn to exploring the effect of diversity and changes within the Hispanic foreign-born population, on changes in violent crime.

### VARIATION IN THE FOREIGN-BORN HISPANIC POPULATION AND CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME

Hypothesis three posits that there will be an inverse relationship between changes in the Hispanic immigrant population by nation of origin and changes in crime. Just as there is variation in the foreign-born population overall, there are different nations of origin represented in the Hispanic foreign-born population. The next four models, (Table 4.2) nine through twelve, present the regression results of Hispanic foreign-born population concentration, and changes in these populations, by Hispanic/Latino nations of origin (Mexico or other) on changes in violent crime. Again, like the previous series of regression models, structural community characteristics (disadvantage (range  $B = 3.0^{***}$   $B = 4.0^{***}$ ) and residential instability (range  $B = 1.6^{***}$   $B = 1.8^{***}$ )) predict changes in crime that support social disorganization theory. Further, the higher the crime rate in 2000, the more violent crime declined between 2000 and 2012 ( $B = -0.6^{***}$ ). Communities with more residents in married family structures also predicted larger declines in the violent crime rate ( $B = -1.3^{***}$ ). Concentrations of foreign-born Hispanic residents

from Mexico, as well as changes in this immigrant population, did not influence change in community violent crime rates.

However, model twelve reveals that changes in the foreign-born Hispanic population from Hispanic nations other than Mexico did predict a significant decrease in violent crime rates ( $B=-0.4^{**}$ ). All things equal, despite a concentration in the foreign-born Hispanic population from nations other than Mexico, change in the foreign-born Hispanic population from nations other than Mexico predict an increase in violent crime. The results of models nine through twelve provide partial support for hypothesis three; while change in a community's foreign-born population from Mexico had no effect on crime, change in a community's foreign-born population from Hispanic/Latino nations other than Mexico had a statistically significant, inverse relationship with the change in violent crime rates 2000-2012.

#### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR DISAGGREGATED FOREIGN-BORN HISPANIC POPULATION EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME

Examinations of community foreign-born Hispanic populations disaggregated by nation of origin provide support for the idea that there are differential effects of changes in Hispanic foreign-born populations on changes in violent crime- depending on where the Hispanic foreign-born populations migrated from. Given the current political debates surrounding migration to the United States from Mexico and other Hispanic/Latino nations, it is worth noting that, consistent with previous research, there are either no effects of changes in Hispanic foreign-born populations on community violent crime, or changes in some Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born populations contribute to significant decreases in violent crime. The current work contributes to the academic literature by parsing-out how differences in our community immigrant populations affect changes in violent crime.

## **ANALYSES OF ETHNORACIAL COMMUNITY CONTEXT, CHANGES IN IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS & CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME**

### **DESCRIPTIVE & BIVARIATE RESULTS BY PREDOMINANT ETHNORACIAL NEIGHBORHOOD TYPES**

The fourth, and final, hypothesis in this dissertation suggests that due to the influence of the U.S. ethnoracial regime and related community ethnoracial segregation, immigrant populations in Chicago may be restricted in, or constrained by, their settlement community choice(s). Following this logic, increases in community immigrant populations may occur in communities with larger ethnoracial minority populations where, historically, there are higher levels of socially disorganizing structural characteristics relative to predominantly white neighborhoods (Krivo and Peterson, 2000; Ousey, 1999; Peterson and Krivo, 2010). Further, if immigrant populations are settling in areas with higher levels of violent crime, then greater crime declines may simply reflect the higher starting crime rate, and population compositions may have little, if anything, to do with the change in crime (Ramey, 2013). Conversely, if there are immigrant population and subsequent violent crime changes in communities despite initially higher crime rates, the foreign-born populations and the influence of U.S. conceptualizations of race and ethnicity may indeed be part of the community-crime decline story.

For example, Table 4.3 presents the results of crosstabulations for the number of neighborhoods by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type that experienced more change in their foreign-born Hispanic and foreign-born non-Hispanic populations. First, of the 154 neighborhoods that experienced a one standard deviation above the mean change in their foreign-born population (2009-2000), it is apparent that many immigrants are choosing to live in ethnoracially integrated communities. This suggests that there is more change in foreign-born populations in communities that are less socially disorganized, and with lower violent crime, than what is reported in predominantly Black or predominantly Hispanic communities. Therefore, in integrated communities where there are changes in the foreign-born population, statistically significant changes in crime may indeed have something to do with the dynamic nature of

community population composition. Although there are not statistically significant differences between the neighborhood types where there was at least a one standard deviation above the mean change in the foreign born population by ethnicity (n=154), there is a statistically significant difference between neighborhood types that experienced this change in these foreign-born populations compared with neighborhood types that experienced less than a one standard deviation change in the foreign-born populations (n=620).

Table 4.3: Crosstabulation of neighborhood types and increase in Foreign-born by Ethnicity

Ethnoracial Neighborhood Type	Increase in Foreign-born Hispanic Population	Increase in Foreign-born non-Hispanic Population	Total
White	14	22	36
Black	10	17	27
Hispanic	8	4	12
Integrated	25	54	79
Total	57	97	154

Second, more predominantly white and more predominantly Black communities experienced increases in foreign-born non-Hispanic residents than in Hispanic foreign-born residents; however, integrated communities experienced the most growth in their proportions of the population that were foreign-born (Hispanic and non-Hispanic). This descriptive finding suggests that ethnoracial and/or socioeconomic characteristics of communities differ and may influence where immigrants choose, and are financially able, to settle. Overwhelmingly, non-Hispanic foreign-born residents settled in integrated communities; this may be because they enjoy the ethnoracial diversity provided in an integrated community as well as be in a financial position to choose to settle in areas that are not as disadvantaged as Black communities, (but are less advantaged/expensive than white communities). Based on the neighborhood types where Hispanic foreign-born immigrants tended to settle, Hispanic immigrants were either better financially prepared to settle in predominantly white communities or, like the non-Hispanic



immigrant groups, they too are financially able to settle in integrated communities and enjoy ethnoracial diversity. It is not clear from the current analyses if integrated communities begin as predominantly white or Black until immigrants make these communities their home, but it is possible that as more immigrant groups settle in communities of a predominant ethnoracial type (white or Black), the community changes from one characterized by one ethnoracial population to an integrated community.

It is interesting to note that increases in the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ population occurred in twice as many predominantly Hispanic communities (n=8) as increases of the foreign-born non-Hispanic/Latin@ population in predominantly Hispanic communities (n=4). But, in Chicago, there were far fewer predominantly Hispanic communities, compared to other community types, where there were increases in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population. This may suggest that, all things equal, changes in immigrant populations outside of ethnic enclaves will predict increases, or smaller decreases in crime due to the social isolation that Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant populations may experience. Moreover, results of a Chow test confirm that there are significant differences in the prediction of change in foreign-born populations on changes in violent crime rates by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood types. Therefore, analyses of the effects of foreign-born populations on changes in crime will progress by examining foreign-born populations and community characteristics by neighborhoods (descriptive statistics Table 4.4) of each predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type.

### ***White Neighborhoods***

The current work includes data for 146 neighborhoods that, in 2000, were predominantly white (at least 70% of the residents self-identified as white, non-Hispanic). Further, in 2000 the Decennial Census reported that on average, roughly 16% of the population in white communities self-identified as foreign-born. Within the foreign-born populations in predominantly white communities there were, on average, nearly four times more non-Hispanic foreign-born residents (13%) than Hispanic foreign-born residents (3%). The violent crime rate per 1,000 residents

ranged from zero to 92; however, on average there were 6 violent crimes per 1,000 residents. Across all 146 white communities, the disadvantage index was low, ranging from -2 to 0.4; the average disadvantage index score was -1.2, meaning that across these white communities the majority of residents held at least a high school diploma, were working, few- if any- were living below the poverty line, and there was a low proportion of female-headed households with children in the neighborhood. Further, residents in predominantly white communities tended to own their own homes and/or, were residents of the community for at least five years (residential instability index  $\bar{x} = 0.01$ ).

### ***Black Neighborhoods***

Across the Chicago communities included in this dissertation, there are consistencies with previous studies on differences in crime and community structure by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood composition (Peterson and Krivo, 2010; Krivo, Peterson and Kuhl, 2009). Not surprisingly, compared to predominantly white neighborhoods, the 310 Black communities in the current analyses experienced both higher violent crime in 2000 and a larger decline in violent crime 2000-2012 ( $\bar{x} = -3.6$  and  $\bar{x} = -8.5$  respectively). Descriptively, Black communities had a much smaller foreign-born population overall ( $\bar{x} = 1.7\%$ ) compared to white ( $\bar{x} = 15.9\%$ ), Hispanic ( $\bar{x} = 41.9\%$ ) and Integrated neighborhoods ( $\bar{x} = 29.3\%$ ). On average, predominantly Black neighborhoods had more non-Hispanic foreign-born residents ( $\bar{x} = 1.0\%$ ) than Hispanic foreign-born ( $\bar{x} = 0.8\%$ ); this stands in contrast with predominantly white communities that were on average, losing, or not gaining, non-Hispanic foreign-born residents. In 2000, the proportion of young male residents was higher in Black ( $\bar{x} = 7.0\%$ ) than white ( $\bar{x} = 5.8\%$ ) and equal to integrated communities ( $\bar{x} = 7.4\%$ ). Further, the level of disadvantage, on average, was higher ( $\bar{x} = 0.8\%$ ) than the level of disadvantage in all other neighborhood types and there was a much smaller proportion of married with children family structures in the community ( $\bar{x} = 3.3\%$ ).

### ***Hispanic Neighborhoods***

As noted throughout communities and crime research, in predominantly Hispanic communities ( $n=92$ ), the average (2000) level of disadvantage ( $\bar{x} = 0.2$ ), and residential instability ( $\bar{x} = 0.01$ ) fell between that of Black and white neighborhoods. Further, on average, Hispanic communities had a greater proportion of the community population who were male between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four years ( $\bar{x} = 10\%$ ). These 92 communities also had a proportion of married with children family structures ( $\bar{x} = 10\%$ ) in the population equal to that in white communities, compared to integrated and Black neighborhoods ( $\bar{x} = 7.6\%$  and  $3.3\%$  respectively). Moreover, on average, predominantly Hispanic communities had a violent crime rate ( $\bar{x} = 9.6$ ) that was more than 50% lower than the average crime rate in Black neighborhoods ( $\bar{x} = 21.07$ ), and higher than what was reported in white neighborhoods ( $\bar{x} = 6$ ); the change in violent crime (2012-2000) decreased more in Hispanic neighborhoods ( $\bar{x} = -8.4\%$ ) than it did in Black neighborhoods ( $\bar{x} = -8.5\%$ ). Predominantly Hispanic communities in 2000 had, on average, a great deal more foreign-born residents ( $\bar{x} = 41.9\%$ ) than any other predominant ethnoracial type neighborhood. There was a larger percent of Hispanic foreign-born residents from Mexico residing in Hispanic neighborhoods ( $\bar{x} = 36.3\%$ ) than there were Hispanic foreign-born residents from other Hispanic/Latino nations ( $\bar{x} = 3.1\%$ ). Interestingly, although the average Hispanic community tract population was decreasing ( $\bar{x} = -286$ ), the average change in the percent foreign-born Hispanic residents from nations other than Mexico remained stable, and the percent foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico decreased ( $\bar{x} = -2.3$ ).

### ***Integrated Neighborhoods***

Finally, in communities with an integrated ethnoracial population ( $n=226$ ), there was a large foreign-born population ( $\bar{x} = 29.3\%$ ), and the foreign-born population was diverse with roughly half self-identifying Hispanic/Latin@ ethnicity ( $\bar{x} = 14.9\%$ ) and the other half non-

Hispanic ( $\bar{x} = 14.4\%$ ). The 2000 violent crime rate ( $\bar{x} = 7.7$ ) was lower than the rate in both Hispanic ( $\bar{x} = 9.6$ ) and Black communities ( $\bar{x} = 21.07$ ). Like in predominantly white communities, integrated communities have lower levels of disadvantage ( $\bar{x} = -0.5$ ) and residential instability ( $\bar{x} = -0.2$ ) compared to the predominantly Black or Hispanic neighborhoods. Further, the proportion of an average integrated community population that was male between 15 and 24 years of age ( $\bar{x} = 7.4\%$ ), and/or in a married with children family structure ( $\bar{x} = 7.6\%$ ) falls between the same measures for Black or Hispanic neighborhoods.

Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics by Predominant Ethnoracial Neighborhood Types

Dependent Variable	White Communities				Black Communities				Hispanic Communities				Integrated Communities			
	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Change in Violent Crime Rate (2012-2000)	-3.6	11.4	-102.4	23.5	-8.5	24.5	-117.1	140.0	-8.4	8.6	-47.1	6.1	-6.9	11.7	-123.3	22.4
<b>Independent Variables (2000); Change (2009-2000)</b>																
Percent Foreign-born	15.9	11.2	0.4	56.1	1.7	2.4	0.0	15.2	41.9	11.1	9.6	62.2	29.3	13.0	1.4	60.7
Change in Percent Foreign-born	0.2	5.9	-13.9	20.5	0.9	3.4	-10.3	19.5	-2.4	7.9	-28.8	21.5	-2.1	8.2	-23.9	24.9
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic	3.3	2.5	0.0	11.6	0.8	1.7	0.0	13.8	41.3	11.3	5.5	62.9	14.9	10.3	0.0	43.8
Change in Percent Foreign-born Hispanic	0.5	4.4	-8.9	27.1	0.3	2.6	-11.7	17.4	-4.1	8.6	-33.1	17.9	-2.4	7.9	-24.4	29.9
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic	12.7	10.3	0.0	48.3	1.0	1.7	0.0	15.1	1.5	2.1	0.0	8.6	14.4	10.7	0.1	53.7
Change in Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic	-0.3	5.8	-27.2	15.2	0.5	2.2	-7.3	13.6	0.8	2.3	-5.0	14.3	0.4	6.6	-16.3	25.9
Percent Foreign-born from Mexico	2.0	1.9	0.0	9.5	0.4	1.4	0.0	13.1	36.3	13.2	2.8	60.2	10.8	8.6	0.0	37.2
Change in Percent Foreign-born from Mexico	0.7	4.0	-8.6	27.1	0.4	2.3	-12.2	17.9	-2.3	8.2	-27.9	15.2	-1.0	7.3	-17.2	28.0
Percent Foreign-born from nations other than Mexico	0.9	0.9	0.0	4.2	0.2	0.4	0.0	2.8	3.1	2.8	0.0	13.8	2.7	2.7	0.0	12.7
Change in Percent Foreign-born from nations other than Mexico	0.1	1.3	-3.0	5.8	0.0	0.7	-2.8	5.7	0.0	3.2	-13.8	12.6	-0.3	2.5	-9.6	6.8
<b>Control Variables</b>																
Percent Young Male	5.8	2.4	1.5	16.9	7.0	2.2	1.0	17.3	9.9	1.8	4.9	14.7	7.4	2.4	0.0	17.3
Percent Married Families with Children	6.6	3.1	0.0	12.7	3.3	1.6	0.0	9.0	10.0	1.7	4.1	15.8	7.6	2.4	1.6	13.9
Disadvantage Index	-1.2	0.6	-2.3	0.4	0.8	0.8	-1.4	3.6	0.2	0.3	-0.6	1.0	-0.5	0.5	-1.9	0.7
Residential Instability	0.0	1.3	-2.7	2.1	0.1	0.9	-2.7	2.3	0.0	0.6	-1.5	1.4	-0.2	1.0	-2.5	2.2
Total Tract Population	3742	2332	307	11643	2885	2294	314	15124	4131	2630	378	14475	3969	2858	302	15359
Change in Total Tract Population	278	535	-943	2857	-266	572	-4540	1436	-286	612	-2811	992	41	734	-2283	6570
N	146				310				92				226			

MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS: FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION CHANGES ON CHANGES IN CRIME  
BY ETHNORACIAL NEIGHBORHOOD TYPES

To test hypothesis four, that there are differential effects of changes in the immigrant population by ethnicity and predominant ethnoracial neighborhood types on changes in crime, the analyses proceed as follows. First, ten OLS models, in step-wise fashion, examine the effect of foreign-born population concentrations by ethnicity, changes in foreign-born ethnic populations, Hispanic/Latino nativity, and the change the Hispanic foreign-born by nativity while controlling for predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type (white neighborhoods as reference). A subsequent set of models with controls for predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type and a control for spatial autocorrelation of model errors is conducted next. Then, each of the ten regression models are conducted separately by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type. The results of the first ten regression models that include predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type controls, (Table 4.5), do not reveal a statistically significant influence of foreign-born populations on changes in violent crime across Black, white, Hispanic and integrated neighborhoods. The results presented in Table 4.5 suggest that the within-group changes evident in the results presented without neighborhood type controls (Table 4.1) may be misspecified models<sup>14</sup>. Although the results in Table 4.5 are consistent with the bulk of previous immigration and crime studies that conclude there is no relationship between immigrant population community composition and crime, (National Academies Press, 2015; Ousey and Kubrin, 2018), the comparison of results between models with and without ethnoracial type neighborhood context suggest that ethnoracial neighborhood type community context is important in immigration-crime study.

Recognizing that neighboring census tracts will be more similar than those that are further apart, Table 4.5.1 presents results of the first ten regression models with the control for the

---

<sup>14</sup> The  $R^2$  for all models in Table 4.1 is 0.47, AIC = 6477.2; for models in Table 4.5 the  $R^2$  is 0.49, AIC 6372.6. The Pseudo  $R^2$  for models in Table 4.5.1 is 0.50, and AIC = 6133.4.

spatial autocorrelation of model errors. There are no substantive differences between the results of the changes in foreign-born populations on changes in violent crime with or without the control for spatial autocorrelation of errors. Further, moving now to discuss OLS regression models conducted on neighborhood types separately (Table 4.6 series), reveals a very different, more complex, story- one that continues to confirm that community structure(s) matter.

Table 4.5: OLS Regression of Foreign-born on changes in violent crime with community type controls

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
<b>Independent Variables (2000); Change (2009-2000)</b>																				
Percent Foreign-born	-0.04	0.03	-0.05	0.03																
Change Percent Foreign-born			-0.05	0.05																
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic					-0.01	0.04	-0.02	0.04												
Change Percent Foreign-born Hispanic							-0.04	0.05												
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic									-0.04	0.03	-0.05	0.03								
Change Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic											-0.06	0.06								
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico													-0.01	0.04						
Change in Percent Foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico													0.02	0.06						
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic from nation other than Mexico															-0.04	0.25			-0.21	0.18
Change in Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic from nation other than Mexico																			-0.41	0.22
<b>Control Variables</b>																				
Percent Young Male Population	-0.01	0.31	-0.01	0.31	-0.02	0.32	-0.01	0.31	-0.03	0.32	-0.04	0.32	-0.01	0.32	-0.02	0.32	-0.02	0.31	0.00	0.32
Percent Families Married with Children	-0.70	0.39	-0.69	0.39	-0.77**	0.38	-0.75**	0.39	-0.74**	0.39	-0.75**	0.39	-0.76**	0.38	-0.77**	0.38	-0.77**	0.39	-0.75**	0.39
Disadvantage Index	2.12	1.30	2.13	1.30	1.98	1.27	2.02	1.28	2.05	1.27	2.00	1.27	1.99	1.27	1.98	1.28	1.98	1.26	2.03	1.25
Residential Instability	0.63	0.72	0.65	0.72	0.70	0.71	0.72	0.71	0.68	0.71	0.66	0.72	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.70	0.69	0.73	0.69	0.73
<b>Predominant Ethnoracial Type Neighborhood (White reference)</b>																				
Black Neighborhood	7.62**	3.59	7.51**	3.57	8.21**	3.52	8.13**	3.52	7.73**	3.51	7.73**	3.51	8.20**	3.53	8.24**	3.51	8.20**	3.48	8.01**	3.49
Hispanic Neighborhood	0.89	1.47	0.97	1.47	0.39	1.45	0.53	1.45	-0.36	1.66	-0.28	1.66	0.57	1.63	0.52	1.59	0.32	1.54	0.45	1.54
Integrated Neighborhood	-0.54	0.93	-0.54	0.94	-0.88	0.96	-0.90	0.96	-0.91	0.96	-0.80	0.97	-0.85	0.93	-0.84	0.93	-0.86	1.08	-0.80	1.05
Violent Crime Rate	-0.64***	0.05	-0.64***	0.05	-0.64***	0.05	-0.64***	0.05	-0.64***	0.05	-0.64***	0.05	-0.64***	0.05	-0.64***	0.05	-0.64***	0.05	-0.64***	0.05
Constant	11.31***	3.44	11.46***	3.44	10.97***	3.34	10.94***	3.34	11.49***	3.48	11.67***	3.48	10.93***	3.36	10.93***	3.36	11.01***	3.39	11.04***	3.38
N	774		774		774		774		774		774		774		774		774		774	



Table 4.5.1: OLS Regression of Foreign-born on changes in violent crime with community type controls and Spatial Error ( $\lambda$ )

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
<b>Independent Variables (2000); Change (2009-2000)</b>																				
Percent Foreign-born	-0.03	0.06	-0.04	0.06																
Change Percent Foreign-born			-0.05	0.08																
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic					-0.01	0.07	-0.02	0.10												
Change Percent Foreign-born Hispanic							-0.07	0.10												
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic									-0.02	0.07	-0.03	0.07								
Change Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic											-0.03	0.11								
Percent Foreign-born Nativity Mexico													-0.02	0.08	-0.02	0.09				
Change in Percent Foreign-born Nativity Mexico															-0.01	0.09				
Percent Foreign-born Nativity other than Mexico																	0.03	0.30	-0.20	0.34
Change in Percent Foreign-born Nativity other than Mexico																			-0.41	0.27
<b>Control Variables (2000)</b>																				
Percent Young Male Population	-0.12	0.21	-0.12	0.21	-0.13	0.21	-0.12	0.21	-0.13	0.21	-0.13	0.21	-0.12	0.21	-0.12	0.21	-0.13	0.20	-0.11	0.21
Percent Families Married with Children	-0.66**	0.28	-0.66**	0.28	-0.70**	0.28	-0.68**	0.28	-0.69**	0.27	-0.70**	0.27	-0.69**	0.28	-0.68**	0.28	-0.71**	0.27	-0.69**	0.27
Disadvantage	1.79**	0.79	1.79**	0.79	1.73**	0.79	1.77**	0.79	1.74**	0.78	1.73**	0.78	1.74**	0.78	1.75**	0.79	1.72**	0.78	1.78**	0.78
Residential Instability	0.48	0.67	0.48	0.67	0.52	0.67	0.53	0.67	0.51	0.67	0.51	0.67	0.51	0.67	0.51	0.67	0.53	0.66	0.52	0.66
<b>Neighborhood Type (white reference)</b>																				
Black Neighborhood	8.26***	2.61	8.11***	2.62	8.62***	2.49	8.46***	2.50	8.39***	2.63	8.38***	2.63	8.59***	2.49	8.58***	2.50	8.62***	2.49	8.55***	2.49
Hispanic Neighborhood	1.40	2.59	1.50	2.59	1.01	3.33	1.33	3.36	0.68	2.61	0.70	2.61	1.46	3.26	1.50	3.28	0.92	2.52	1.26	2.52
Integrated Neighborhood	0.49	1.68	0.50	1.68	0.31	1.75	0.32	1.75	0.26	1.62	0.28	1.63	0.41	1.70	0.41	1.70	0.25	1.70	0.42	1.70
Violent Crime Rate 2000	-0.65***	0.02	-0.65***	0.02	-0.65***	0.02	-0.65***	0.02	-0.65***	0.02	-0.65***	0.02	-0.65***	0.02	-0.65***	0.02	-0.65***	0.02	-0.66***	0.02
$\lambda$	2.22***	0.36	2.25***	0.37	2.29***	0.38	2.35***	0.40	2.24***	0.37	2.20***	0.35	2.29***	0.38	2.28***	0.38	2.29***	0.38	2.31***	0.39
Constant	11.19***	2.84	11.39***	2.86	11.01***	2.81	11.04***	2.80	11.22***	2.94	11.26***	2.96	10.93***	2.81	10.92***	2.81	11.01***	2.79	11.04***	2.78
N	774		774		774		774		774		774		774		774		774		774	

\*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

### ***White Neighborhoods***

Turning to the results of the ordinary least squares regression models (Table 4.6) for predominantly white communities, where the violent crime rate in 2000 was higher there were statistically significant, greater declines in violent crime between 2000 and 2012 ( $B = -0.6***$ ). Further, Consistent with Ramey's (2013) study, predominantly white communities with a change in the Hispanic/Latin@ population in 2000 (model three) predicts a statistically significant decrease in the community violent crime rate ( $B = -0.38**$ ). In other words, in predominantly white communities with average community characteristics, an average foreign-born Hispanic population concentration, and average change in the foreign-born Hispanic population, a one percent increase in the Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population predicts 4 fewer violent crimes in the community<sup>15</sup>. This finding supports previous cross-sectional immigration and crime research; yet, this model lacks the time elements truly necessary to account for causal relationships between residential instability, disadvantage and crime.

In white Chicago neighborhoods, more residential instability in 2000 predicted increases in violent crime (range:  $B = 1.9***$  to  $B = 2.4***$ ). Moreover, white communities with more disadvantage predict higher crime, and where there were changes in ethnic heterogeneity- measured as change in the percent foreign-born Hispanic and change in the foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico, the models predict higher violent crime (or less of a decrease in violent crime 2000-2012). Therefore, the models for white communities that do account for changes in the foreign-born population largely support social disorganization theory. For example, in

---

<sup>15</sup> To calculate the change in violent crime in white communities with average levels of control characteristics, the following is the OLS regression equation with values for B0 through B6 and corresponding means, where B0 is the constant, B1 is the regression coefficient for change in foreign-born Hispanic, B2 is the regression coefficient for percent foreign-born Hispanic, B3 is the regression coefficient for percent young male, B4 is the regression coefficient for percent families married with children, B5 is the regression coefficient for the disadvantage index, B6 is the regression coefficient for residential instability and B7 is the regression coefficient for prior violent crime rate. Each B is multiplied by the corresponding variable mean in white communities ( $x_1 \dots x_7$ ). Therefore, Model 4:

$$Y(\text{change in violent crime}) = B0 + B1(x_1) + B2(x_2) + B3(x_3) + B4(x_4) + B5(x_5) + B6(x_6) + B7(x_7)$$
$$3.6 = 0.734 + (-0.27*1) + (0.25*.5) + (.37*5.8) + (0.07*6.6) + (0.86*-1.2) + (2.4*0)$$

predominantly white communities with average community characteristics, a one percent increase in the foreign-born Hispanic population predicts nearly 4 more violent crimes (3.6).

Furthermore, keeping in mind that only fourteen of the 146 predominantly white neighborhoods experienced a one standard deviation above the mean increase in the percent foreign-born Hispanic population, the concentration of Hispanic foreign-born residents ranged between one and nine percent. It appears that predominantly white communities were very sensitive to changes in the foreign-born Hispanic population and this may be because in most of the white neighborhoods there were so few Hispanic foreign-born residents in the community to begin with. Any ethnoheterogeneity introduced into the population may have had an indirect, or direct, effect on increases in violent crime. Perhaps, this change in our immigrant population (increases in the foreign-born from Latin nations, particularly Mexico) that has occurred since the conceptualization of Shaw and McKay's social disorganization theory is now evident only when the foreign-born are disaggregated by ethnicity.

### ***Black Neighborhoods***

Turning now to the results of OLS regression models conducted on the 310 predominantly Black communities, there are some effects of foreign-born population concentrations, changes in the foreign-born populations and changes in violent crime. The base model (Model 1, see Table 4.6.1) confirms that across this subset of communities, more disadvantage (2000) predicted a greater increase in the violent crime rate ( $B=4.12^{**}$ ); however, residential instability predicts the opposite ( $B= -2.7^{**}$ ). Further, a higher violent crime rate in 2000 predicted a greater decrease, or much smaller increase, in violent crime 2000-2012 ( $B= -0.7^{***}$ ). Moreover, all things equal, once the change in the foreign-born population is considered (Model 2), an increase in the foreign-born population predicts a significantly larger decrease, or smaller increase, in the violent crime rate despite the foreign-born population concentration, disadvantage, residential instability and the existing 2000 violent crime rate ( $B= -0.7^{**}$ ). Interestingly, an increase in the (2000 - 2009) Hispanic foreign-born population (Model 4) predicts a significantly larger decline in violent crime rates ( $B= -0.8^{***}$ ) than the decline evident in model two that included a measure for change in the overall foreign-born population. The result in Model 8 suggests that the change in a Black community's foreign-born population from Mexico predicted a large, statistically significant decrease (or smaller increase) in violent crime (2012-2000) ( $B= -1.01^{***}$ ). Further, model ten sheds light on how diversity within the Hispanic foreign-born population predicts changes in crime; where there was a concentration of Hispanic foreign-born residents from nations other than Mexico, there was a statistically significant, larger, decrease in the violent crime rate ( $B=-4.6^{**}$ ).

It is likely that the effects of changes in the foreign-born population on changes in violent crime rates in Black neighborhoods reflect two things: first, and consistent with previous immigration-crime studies, where there is a small proportion of foreign-born residents in the Black Chicago communities, a measurable increase in the foreign-born population contributes to greater declines in violent crime. Vélez (2009) found that in the most disadvantaged

communities, increases in the immigrant population operate to bolster social organizing community characteristics and thus, indirectly contribute to decreases in violence (Vélez, 2009). Second, the nativity of the foreign-born population in a Black community matters. Although the statistically significant result of a concentration of a non-Mexican foreign-born population on changes in violent crime may exist simply because more non-Mexican foreign-born people live in predominantly Black communities, this result reveals the importance of studying why ethnicity and nativity in community level immigration and crime research differentially affect changes in violent crime. It could be that non-Mexican immigrants move into predominantly Black communities because these are the neighborhoods that are most affordable for them, or it could be that non-Mexican immigrants, those from Cuba and the Dominican Republic, have darker skin tones as well as speak in a Spanish dialect that is different from the Spanish spoken by native-born Hispanics (Daniel, 2002; Díaz-Campos and Navarro-Galisteo, 2009; Zentella, 1990). Thus, these immigrant groups can get their start in the U.S. living near other foreign-born residents who speak a similar dialect, who look somewhat physically similar to the existing community residents, and who share in some of their experiences with U.S. conceptualizations of race, ethnicity, and resulting prejudice, discrimination and racism (sociological salience principle).

Table 4.6: OLS Regression of Foreign-Born Populations in White Communities on Changes in Violent Crime

Independent Variables (2000); Change (2009-2000)	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Percent Foreign-bom	-0.04	0.03	-0.03	0.03																
Change Percent Foreign-bom			0.13	0.08																
Percent Foreign-bom Hispanic					-0.38**	0.2	-0.27	0.2												
Change Percent Foreign-bom Hispanic							0.25**	0.1												
Percent Foreign-bom non-Hispanic									-0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.03								
Change Percent Foreign-bom non-Hispanic											-0.02	0.08								
Percent Foreign-bom Hispanic from Mexico													-0.29	0.28	-0.26	0.26				
Change in Percent Foreign-bom Hispanic from Mexico															0.28**	0.12				
Percent Foreign-bom non-Hispanic from nation other than Mexico																	-1.15**	0.48	-1.05**	0.4
Change in Percent Foreign-bom non-Hispanic from nation other than Mexico																			0.18	0.34
<b>Control Variables (2000)</b>																				
Percent Young Male Population	0.45	0.25	0.41	0.25	0.42	0.25	0.37	0.24	0.481**	0.25	0.479**	0.25	0.47	0.25	0.40	0.24	0.39	0.25	0.39	0.25
Percent Families Married with Children	-0.06	0.27	-0.01	0.27	0.06	0.27	0.07	0.26	-0.06	0.27	-0.06	0.27	0.03	0.27	0.03	0.26	-0.07	0.26	-0.04	0.27
Disadvantage Index	1.22	1.06	1.38	1.07	1.63	1.09	0.86	1.14	0.82	0.98	0.77	0.96	1.20	1.08	0.61	1.12	1.08	0.90	1.00	0.87
Residential Instability	1.91**	0.75	2.06**	0.79	2.39***	0.88	2.40***	0.87	1.84**	0.73	1.83**	0.75	2.17**	0.87	2.21**	0.86	2.04***	0.76	2.09**	0.81
Violent Crime Rate	-0.60***	0.02	-0.59***	0.02	-0.60***	0.02	-0.60***	0.02	-0.60***	0.02	-0.60***	0.02	-0.60***	0.02	-0.60***	0.02	-0.61***	0.02	-0.61***	0.02
Constant	2.87	2.71	2.77	2.72	3.36	2.47	2.20	2.46	1.75	2.55	1.80	2.65	2.00	2.36	1.49	2.24	3.62	2.51	3.20	2.47
N	146		146		146		146		146		146		146		146		146		146	

\*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Table 4.6.1: OLS Regressions of Foreign-Born Populations in Black Communities on Changes in Violent Crime

Independent Variables (2000); Change (2009-2000)	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Percent Foreign-born	-0.21	0.36	-0.33	0.35																
Change Percent Foreign-born			-0.65**	0.26																
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic					-0.29	0.43	-0.46	0.40												
Change Percent Foreign-born Hispanic							-0.79***	0.3												
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic									-0.14	0.68	-0.24	0.68								
Change Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic											-0.41	0.39								
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico													-0.04	0.64	-0.09	0.61				
Change in Percent Foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico															-1.01***	0.38				
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic from nation other than Mexico																	-2.89	1.93	-4.57**	2.36
Change in Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic from nation other than Mexico																			-2.03	1.66
<b>Control Variables (2000)</b>																				
Percent Young Male Population	-0.61	0.79	-0.57	0.77	-0.61	0.80	-0.59	0.78	-0.63	0.78	-0.61	0.78	-0.63	0.81	-0.65	0.80	-0.62	0.77	-0.55	0.78
Percent Families Married with Children	-0.42	1.17	-0.54	1.13	-0.39	1.14	-0.35	1.14	-0.48	1.19	-0.58	1.16	-0.47	1.10	-0.49	1.08	-0.41	1.21	-0.31	1.22
Disadvantage Index	4.12**	2.12	3.697	2.08	4.31**	2.06	4.44**	2.07	4.126	2.3	3.76	2.3	4.24**	2.05	4.33**	2.05	4.29**	2.06	4.44**	2.06
Residential Instability	-2.67**	1.04	-2.18**	1.09	-2.78***	1.07	-2.63**	1.08	-2.65**	1.16	-2.41**	1.21	-2.72**	1.08	-2.52**	1.11	-2.73***	1.03	-2.71***	1.03
Violent Crime Rate	-0.65***	0.06	-0.65***	0.06	-0.64***	0.06	-0.65***	0.06	-0.64***	0.06	-0.65***	0.06	-0.64***	0.06	-0.65***	0.06	-0.65***	0.06	-0.65***	0.06
Constant	20.86***	4.28	22.43***	4.47	20.36***	4.38	20.59***	4.43	20.92***	4.86	21.84***	4.93	20.59***	4.54	21.48***	4.66	20.94***	4.27	20.29***	4.38
N	310		310		310		310		310		310		310		310		310		310	

\*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

### ***Hispanic Neighborhoods***

Moving to the presentation of regression results for the 92 predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods examined in the current work, Table 4.6.2 offers support for the idea that there are differential effects of the foreign-born Hispanic population by nativity on changes in violent crime rates (2012-2000). All things equal, in predominantly Hispanic communities, despite disadvantage and prior (2000) violent crime rates, model ten suggests that an increase in the population of Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born residents from nations other than Mexico predicted a significantly greater decrease in the violent crime rate ( $B = -0.4^{**}$ ). That is, in Hispanic communities with average levels of violent crime, disadvantage, residential instability, an average percent of the population that is young and male, as well as an average proportion of residents in married family structures, every one percent more than the average population concentration that was foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ from nations other than Mexico ( $\bar{x} = 3.1\%$ ) predicts a decrease in community crime by roughly 7 violent crimes<sup>16</sup>. This result is similar to the results presented for predominantly Black communities where there was an inverse effect of a non-Mexican, Hispanic, foreign-born population concentration on violent crime rates.

### ***Integrated Neighborhoods***

The ordinary least squares regression results for the 226 integrated communities (Table 4.6.3) examined in the current work depart, at least somewhat, from those for other neighborhood types. In integrated communities, none of the usual crime predicting structural characteristics (control variables) significantly predict changes in the violent crime rate until the foreign-born populations are disaggregated by ethnicity (foreign-born non-Hispanic, foreign-born Hispanic). Where crime rates were higher in 2000, there were greater changes in the violent crime rate

---

<sup>16</sup> The increase in crime (Y) was calculated similarly for Hispanic communities as it was for white communities (see footnote 12).



( $B=-0.8$ ); however, in integrated communities neither the aggregate foreign-born population nor foreign-born population by ethnicity predicted significant changes in violent crime. Moreover, in models nine and ten, the concentration of Hispanic foreign-born residents from nations other than Mexico- not the change in this population- predicts a statistically significant, larger, decrease in the violent crime rate ( $B= -0.32^{***}$  and  $-0.38^{***}$  respectively).

Table 4.6.2: OLS Regressions of Foreign-Born Populations in Hispanic Communities on Change in Violent Crime

Independent Variables (2000); Change (2009-2000)	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Percent Foreign-born	-0.05	0.05	-0.06	0.06																
Change Percent Foreign-born			-0.04	0.08																
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic					0.02	0.07	0.00	0.08												
Change Percent Foreign-born Hispanic							-0.06	0.09												
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic									-0.57	0.47	-0.57	0.49								
Change Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic											0.03	0.29								
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico													-0.05	0.05	-0.04	0.06				
Change in Percent Foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico															0.05	0.08				
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic from nation other than Mexico																	0.42	0.26	0.24	0.24
Change in Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic from nation other than Mexico																			-0.40**	0.21
<b>Control Variables (2000)</b>																				
Percent Young Male Population	0.09	0.46	0.10	0.45	-0.05	0.41	-0.03	0.39	-0.17	0.43	-0.17	0.42	0.12	0.42	0.10	0.41	0.02	0.49	-0.03	0.47
Percent Families Married with Children	0.21	0.59	0.21	0.60	0.04	0.64	0.09	0.69	0.18	0.42	0.20	0.58	0.20	0.62	0.16	0.65	0.14	0.52	0.12	0.51
Disadvantage Index	6.75**	3.08	6.72**	3.07	6.20**	3.07	6.15**	3.02	5.343	2.94	5.35	2.98	6.93**	3.21	6.85**	3.27	6.83**	3.07	5.57**	2.88
Residential Instability	-4.68***	1.74	-4.80***	1.77	-4.89***	1.83	-5.09***	1.85	-5.08***	1.72	-5.09***	1.7	-4.69***	1.75	-4.42***	1.65	-4.86***	1.6	-4.22***	1.4
Violent Crime Rate	-0.38***	0.12	-0.38***	0.12	-0.38***	0.12	-0.38***	0.11	-0.37***	0.11	-0.37***	0.11	-0.38***	0.12	-0.39***	0.12	-0.40***	0.1	-0.41***	0.1
Constant	-3.54	5.73	-3.35	5.77	-3.15	5.73	-3.42	5.73	-1.78	5.80	-2.05	7.00	-4.00	5.80	-3.64	5.88	-5.12	5.59	-3.30	5.41
N	92		92		92		92		92		92		92		92		92		92	

\*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Table 4.6.3: OLS Regressions of Foreign-Born Populations in Integrated Communities on Change in Violent Crime

Independent Variables (2000); Change (2009-2000)	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Percent Foreign-born	-0.06	0.05	-0.05	0.05																
Change Percent Foreign-born			0.04	0.05																
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic					-0.06	0.04	-0.05	0.04												
Change Percent Foreign-born Hispanic							0.03	0.05												
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic									-0.003	0.03	-0.001	0.03								
Change Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic											0.02	0.06								
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico													-0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.05				
Change in Percent Foreign-born Hispanic from Mexico															0.03	0.05				
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic from nation other than Mexico																	-0.32**	0.15	-0.38***	0.14
Change in Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic from nation other than Mexico																			-0.16	0.14
<b>Control Variables (2000)</b>																				
Percent Young Male Population	0.18	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.22	0.16	0.21	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.182	0.16	0.199	0.16	0.197	0.16	0.142	0.16	0.169	0.16
Percent Families Married with Children	-0.30	0.26	-0.32	0.26	-0.40	0.23	-0.41	0.23	-0.50**	0.21	-0.50**	0.21	-0.50**	0.22	-0.50**	0.22	-0.38	0.23	-0.358	0.23
Disadvantage Index	1.14	1.13	1.09	1.14	0.97	0.96	0.90	1.03	0.53	0.90	0.54	0.91	0.65	0.97	0.56	1.03	0.85	0.88	0.89	0.89
Residential Instability	0.42	0.56	0.46	0.57	0.14	0.47	0.19	0.49	0.00	0.45	-0.01	0.45	0.00	0.44	0.06	0.46	0.38	0.50	0.39	0.50
Violent Crime Rate	-0.79***	0.05	-0.79***	0.05	-0.79***	0.05	-0.79***	0.05	-0.78***	0.05	-0.78***	0.05	-0.78***	0.05	-0.78***	0.05	-0.79***	0.05	-0.79***	0.05
Constant	8.51***	2.5	8.41***	2.51	8.06***	2.4	8.12***	2.37	7.96***	2.46	7.90***	2.37	7.93***	2.39	7.94***	2.4	8.31***	2.39	8.11***	2.39
N	226		226		226		226		226		226		226		226		226		226	

\*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

#### SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS: FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME BY PREDOMINANT ETHNORACIAL NEIGHBORHOOD TYPE NEIGHBORHOODS

Overall, the results of the OLS regression models by ethnoracial neighborhood types present mixed support for hypothesis 4. There are differential effects of foreign-born populations by ethnicity (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) on changes in violent crime across neighborhood types. In white neighborhoods, increases in the Hispanic foreign-born population predict increases in the change in violent crime rates. For Black neighborhoods, where the initial population of Hispanic foreign-born residents is considerably smaller than in white neighborhoods, increases in the Hispanic foreign-born population predict greater decreases, or smaller increases, in the change in violent crime rates. Although there are differential effects of foreign-born population concentrations and changes in these populations at different levels of disaggregation, (thus supporting Kubrin and colleague's assertion (2016) that the effects of foreign-born populations on violent crime are complex), these findings do not necessarily suggest that overall, foreign-born populations in communities affect violent crime.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION**

Early Chicago School scholarship theorized that immigrant populations would move into the communities most affordable for them, and immigrants would then relocate as soon as financially able. The current work returns to Chicago to systematically examine how, in the new millennium, changes in immigration affects change in violent crime. The high-crime/delinquency Chicago communities examined in Shaw and McKay's (1942) seminal work were economically disadvantaged with little access to socially organizing resources; these areas, particularly within the zone of transition (Burgess, 1924; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw and McKay, 1942) also had larger, churning, immigrant, and migrant Black populations. That immigrant populations were also well represented in the communities with the most crime enabled members of the public and polity to anecdotally connect immigration to crime thus offering support for anti-immigrant policies/behaviors. Yet, based on their empirical work, Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that although immigrant populations contributed to residential instability and poverty in some areas, the immigrant groups were not inherently criminogenic; rather, community structure drove residents' vulnerability to, or protection from, crime (Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw and McKay, 1942).

Social disorganization, measured only as structural community characteristics (i.e., disadvantage, residential mobility and poverty) to explain differential community crime rates has, once again, fallen out of favor with many criminologists interested in community immigrant population and crime relationships. Based on empirical findings from studies of crime in ethnic enclaves, scholars have concluded that structural explanations for the crime declines that occurred in communities with large concentrations of immigrants, increased poverty, few residents in professional occupations and linguistic isolation were insufficient, at best. Instead, the immigrant revitalization perspective has taken center stage to explain that, in large part, due to the mechanism of immigrant self-selection (Bauer et. al., 2001; Butcher and Piehl, 1995; Tonry,

1997) immigrant concentration in a community strengthens social organization. As immigrant resident settlement re-populates disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods (Reid et al., 2005; Vélez 2009) immigrant groups rely on their social capital (Martinez et al., 2004) to bolster social organization and the local economy (National Academies, 2015; Sampson, 2008; Vélez 2009). However, the lion's share of immigration and crime studies that found evidence of immigrant revitalization were cross-sectional and relied on a pan-ethnic foreign-born measure of a community's immigrant population (Desmond and Kubrin, 2009; Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012; Lee and Martinez, 2002; Lee et al, 2001; Martinez, 2000; Martinez et al., 2004; 2008; Morenoff and Sampson, 1997; Nielsen et al., 2005; Ramey, 2013; Stowell and Martinez, 2007). Once research expanded to include more than one time point, diverse communities (rather than ethnic enclaves in cities with predictable settlement patterns), and disaggregated foreign-born populations, results did not consistently support immigrant revitalization; rather, criminologists concluded that immigration had either no effect or an inverse effect on crime (Kubrin et al., 2016; National Academies, 2015; Stowell, 2007). Yet, our understanding remained limited regarding changes in community crime where immigrant populations, disaggregated by ethnicity and/or nation of origin, in more diverse communities, predicted differential crime effects.

Throughout Chapters One and Two, this dissertation presented arguments that differential crime results in community-level immigration and crime research may depend on mechanisms within community ethnoracial contexts in tandem with immigrant population ethnicity and ethnic nation of origin. There is reason to believe that mechanisms of immigrant self-selection, characteristics of some migrant groups, and community context of reception explain why there are differential crime effects of immigrant populations across previous immigration-crime studies. To examine potential differential changes in crime where there were changes in immigrant populations, this dissertation built on previous works by including more than one time point and disaggregating the foreign-born population across communities in a mid-western city with many immigrant groups, a long history of immigrant settlement, and a diverse yet segregated

city. Moreover, the hypotheses remained consistent with the findings of previous immigration and crime literature; specifically, that changes in communities' proportions of immigrant populations by ethnicity and nation of origin influence inverse changes in crime. Using data from several secondary sources, the current work expands immigration and community crime literature, guided by the frameworks of social disorganization and immigrant revitalization, to examine how recent changes in ethnic immigrant populations affect changes in violent crime within ethnoracial community contexts.

Unlike the immigrants of the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries, immigrants in the new millennium are migrating primarily from Hispanic/Latin@ and, increasingly, Asian as well as African nations of origins. Like the findings in Stowell and Martinez's (2009) work on port cities on the East coast, West coast, and Southwest, the current study found that immigrant populations in contemporary America were not necessarily living in the most disadvantaged communities in Chicago; rather, immigrants were increasingly settling outside of ethnic enclaves, in integrated communities, with less economic disadvantage, where residents tended to have at least a high school diploma, and where there were fewer female headed households. In other words, consistent with Stowell's (2007) work, many immigrants were moving into communities that were, to some extent, insulated from crime producing social disorganization mechanisms. Therefore, it is not surprising that this study does not find support for hypothesis one, that there is an inverse relationship between changes in a community immigrant population and change in crime, but instead finds support for the existing body of literature that concludes there is no relationship between changes in the proportion of a community's immigrant population and changes in violent crime (see National Academies Press, 2010 and Ousey and Kubrin, 2017 for review). However, the current work also finds support for Kubrin and colleague's (2016) work, once the foreign-born population is disaggregated by ethnicity, Hispanic/Latin@ nation of origin, and settlement community context, the conclusion of a null relationship between immigration and crime is not necessarily the end of the story.

The effect of changes in immigrant populations on changes in community violent crime rates varied- depending on the predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type where the proportion of the community's immigrant populations changed, the immigrant population's ethnicity, and Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants' nation of origin. Rumbaut (2009) argues that migrants from Hispanic and Latin@ nations of origin are not homogenous; this assertion together with Massey and Sánchez's (2010) finding that immigrant assimilation is often influenced by the native-born community population, offer a hint at the mechanisms that may underlie the differential results found in this and previous immigration-crime research. Results discussed in Chapter Four offer some support for social disorganization theory; however, the results are complex and one such complexity found in this study rests with the measurement of immigrant populations by ethnicity, and, more specifically, the measurement of Hispanic/Latin@ populations from Mexico. It is interesting to note that in this dissertation, similar to what has been found in previous studies on immigrant revitalization, in predominantly Black communities, changes in violent crime rates are influenced more by the change in foreign-born populations than what is evident in other neighborhood types.

#### **WHAT IS IT ABOUT ETHNICITY AND HISPANIC/LATIN@ NATION OF ORIGIN?**

Shaw and McKay (1942) found that in Chicago, in the mid-twentieth century, crime was a social fact less about the people who inhabited a neighborhood, (recall that Shaw and McKay did disaggregate the immigrant population by nation of origin), and more about the structure of the place itself. They argued that some places were more conducive to being home to those with fewer financial resources, lower levels of education, fewer professional skills, and recent migrants while other places were better suited for those with more wealth, more education, skill, opportunities for economic growth, and more time spent in the United States to build both economic and social capital (Shaw and McKay, 1942). In Chapter Four, descriptive analyses of Chicago communities (2000) confirmed that community structures still varied by many of the



same characteristics noted in Shaw and McKay's early (1942) work, and these community characteristics remained fairly stable between 2000 and 2009. Moreover, as Peterson and Krivo (2010) assert, the ethnoracial segregation and community structure disparities evident across communities continue to stress the importance of accounting for community population demographics in meso-level crime research.

Expanding research on the effects of immigrant populations (post-1965) on violent crime in the U.S. requires recognition of not only how racial segregation operates in community-crime scholarship but, due to institutionalized racism and ethnic discrimination, calls for an understanding of how immigrant population race and ethnicity fit within the U.S. ethnoracial regime. The lesser-known legacy of the Bracero movement of 1942 established dark-skinned Spanish-speaking U.S. residents, as well as documented and undocumented Mexican migrants as poor, less-educated, low-skilled and less capable/worthy of living in communities rich in economic and human capital (Chavez, 2016; Ferraro, 2014). From this legacy, and the well-known legacy of Black slavery, institutionalized racism and ethnic discrimination continue to influence popular ethnoracial stereotypes, home lending, home ownership, public school funding, educational access/quality, and employment opportunities (Peterson and Krivo, 2010). Therefore, not finding support for hypothesis two, that changes in the foreign-born Hispanic/Latin@ population had an inverse effect on changes in violent crime, but instead finding differential effects of changes in immigrant populations based on immigrant ethnicity and Hispanic/Latin@ nation of origin on changes in violent crime are not surprising.

Recognizing that race and ethnicity structure social life across communities, it stands to reason that immigrant populations in Chicago communities are inducted into the ethnoracial/social class hierarchy soon after their arrival in the U.S. (National Academies, 2015). However, as noted by Bonilla-Silva (2002), immigrant populations are likely settling into a tri-racial (i.e., "white", "honorary white" and "collective black" (Bonilla-Silva, 2002:4)) rather than bi-racial (i.e., white, Black) hierarchy. The results presented in Chapter Four of the current work

offer partial support for the idea that changes in community violent crime are inversely related to changes in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population by Hispanic/Latin@ nation of origin. Immigrant populations that are non-Hispanic/Latin@ and light-skinned (Eastern European or from some Asian nations) may join the White strata and, with little fanfare, settle in the most advantaged communities that they can afford. Non-Mexican, light-skinned, Hispanic/Latin@, (and some from Western Europe) immigrant populations may join Bonilla-Silva's theorized "honorary white" class with only opportunities to settle in lower crime, less advantaged, neighborhoods. Finally, darker-skinned immigrant populations from disadvantaged nations (i.e., Vietnam, Mexico, Africa) particularly those who are darker-skinned, join Bonilla-Silva's theorized "collective Black" class with settlement opportunities limited to the most disadvantaged, higher crime neighborhoods.

In any case, if the U.S. does indeed have a tri-racial hierarchy, (or even a new bi-racial white and non-white hierarchy) in the new millennium, lighter-skinned non-Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants to the U.S., as well as the lighter-skinned Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants from nations other than Mexico may be met with less anti-immigrant sentiment and discrimination than Mexican immigrants. As noted throughout Chavez's (2013) work, Latino threat operates to construct all Hispanic/Latin@ persons (particularly new immigrants) as Mexican, thus placing this ethnic population in a lower social stratum- and the legacy of the Bracero program may continue to fuel native-born prejudice as well as the social and economic exclusion of darker-skinned, Spanish-speaking immigrants. As argued throughout this dissertation, immigrant population ethnicity(ies) may constrain community settlement choice, social/economic exclusion of immigrant populations in some communities more than in others and, contribute to changes in crime.

The use of broad, pan-ethnic, foreign-born measures in much of the previous immigration-crime research does not capture the heterogeneity of the foreign-born population nor allow for better understanding how changes in the proportions of ethnic immigrant groups in

communities affect community structure, social organization, or social control. As seen in much of the immigrant revitalization research and suggested by the results of the current work in predominantly Black neighborhoods, communities suffering from higher crime, de-population and cumulative disadvantage benefit from the social organization and economic stimulation driven by immigrant settlement. Moreover, without disaggregating foreign-born populations it is difficult to determine if all immigrant populations affect community change similarly, or if heterogeneity in the ethnic immigrant population matter for better understanding community settlement, community organization and safety.

### **IMMIGRATION IN COMMUNITY CONTEXT**

Over time, variations in crime at the community level have been explained by the opportunities for crime in the area, the routines of residents, levels of collective efficacy, and the ability for residents to organize against social problems (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993, Bursik and Webb, 1982; Krivo, Peterson and Kuhl, 2009; Vélez, 2009). Although the current work does not have direct measures for crime opportunities, nor residents' routines, it returns to the early work of the Chicago School and relies on measures of social (dis)organization, ethnoracial community composition, and population change to predict changes in violent crime. Peterson and Krivo consistently find, in their work on ethnoracially segregated communities and crime, that areas with the fewest quality resources for upward social mobility are predominantly Black and, to a lesser extent, predominantly Hispanic (Peterson and Krivo, 2010). For this reason, the current work examined the importance of ethnoracial neighborhood compositions as contextual clues to variation in crime where immigrant populations lived and where the proportion of immigrants in community populations were changing.

The current study finds mixed support for hypothesis four, that immigrant population changes and related changes in violent crime will vary based on the predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type of the host community. Interestingly, the current analyses revealed differential

effects of immigrant population concentrations, and/or changes in the proportion of a community population that was foreign-born until predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type was included in the statistical models. Therefore, the influence of community context is one key to understanding the competing results found in this, and other, immigration and crime studies.

Ethnoracial community segregation structures residential life in ways that benefit residents of predominantly white communities and block opportunities for residents of predominantly Black and minority communities (see Peterson and Krivo, 2010 for review). Further, some notable research on immigration and community crime has revealed a revitalizing effect in depopulated, predominantly Black and minority, urban neighborhoods as immigrants move into and become an influential proportion of the neighborhood population (Vélez, 2009). Consistent with the immigrant revitalization hypothesis, in predominantly Black communities in Chicago (2012-2000), increases in the proportion of Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born residents (particularly those from Hispanic/Latin@ nations other than Mexico) as well as increases in the non-Hispanic/Latin@ foreign-born population predicted statistically significant decreases in community violent crime. It may be that in predominantly Black, depopulated, communities, the existing (native-born) community population lacks the social organization required to resist the population composition changes and instead may ignore or welcome the changes to community social structures that result from a smaller, yet growing, immigrant population. This enables the growing immigrant population to bolster the local economy, build social capital and strengthen social organization thus insulating the community from crime (Vélez, 2009).

Further, the current work found that most communities experiencing measurable change in the proportion of the community population that was foreign-born (2009-2000) were ethnoracially integrated and relatively lower in violent crime than predominantly Black and Hispanic communities; however, where there were larger population concentrations of non-Hispanic immigrants, there were greater crime declines. It is not clear from the current analyses if integrated neighborhoods become ethnoracially integrated as a result of growing immigrant

populations in the community yet, even in ethnoracially integrated communities, concentrations of the Hispanic/Latin@ population from nations other than Mexico predicted decreases in violent crime. This finding likely reflects within-community population or structural dynamics, such as discrimination, that prevented (or discouraged) Mexican immigrants from participating fully in collective efficacy to drive similar crime declines. Again, these findings- despite controls for community structural characteristics- likely support the idea that, due at least in part to Latino threat, anti-immigrant sentiments, and discrimination, the community population and/or structure dynamics are different where there are changes in the proportion of Mexican immigrants in a neighborhood. Moreover, absent other social structure characteristics significantly influencing change in crime where there are concentrations of foreign-born residents in integrated communities, the inverse relationship of larger proportions of married families with children in the community and violent crime supports the concepts of both social capital and social organization. More adults in the community often translates into more informal controls, closed social capital, and supervision of youth in the community thus promoting community safety.

Furthermore, findings suggest that, in Chicago, compared with neighborhoods of other predominant ethnoracial types, there were fewer predominantly Hispanic communities that experienced change in the proportion of Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants in the population. It could be that, Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants from nations other than Mexico choose Hispanic communities for settlement due to language or other cultural similarities, and are therefore able to strengthen community social organization. Perhaps, the native-born Hispanic residents who identify Mexico as their ancestral home and immigrant Mexican populations welcome hold onto Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants from other Latin nations and this strengthens the mechanisms necessary for crime control (like collective efficacy). Therefore, in Hispanic communities where there were changes in the community's proportion of immigrants from Mexico there were not significant changes in crime- but where there were concentrations of Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants from other nations, violent crime decreased. It may be that the introduction of small

proportions of non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants into predominantly Hispanic communities strengthen crime controlling mechanisms just enough to decrease crime. These results emphasize the need for better understanding, and perhaps accounting for, the diverse histories of Spanish-speaking foreign and native-born residents in community crime research.

Without narrow, focused measures of the immigrant population, scholars and policy makers may miss key opportunities for addressing inequality and social justice issues specific to incoming migrant populations. Like the effects of non-Hispanic/Latin@ population changes on crime, where there were changes in a community's proportion of Hispanic/Latin@ immigrants from nations other than Mexico there was an inverse relationship to changes in violent crime. This highlights the importance of disaggregating the Hispanic/Latin@ populations by nativity and ethnicity (i.e., native versus foreign-born, and foreign-born by ethnicity as well as Hispanic/Latino national origin) in social science immigration research. Further, as immigration policies and human conflict around the world continue to change, measures of immigrant populations should, at least, be disaggregated by ethnicity to aid our understanding of how immigrant populations shape and/or change community safety. Moreover, as seen in the current work, due to ethnoracial segregation across U.S. cities, including the ethnoracial characteristics of communities in community-level immigration-crime analyses are important. Community ethnoracial population composition is closely related to social and economic isolation, discriminatory practices, as well as community structure; it is necessary that we continue to recognize that the constructions of race and ethnicity structure social life in ways that may contribute to any differential effects of immigrant population changes on community safety.

## **LIMITATIONS**

### **DEFINITION AND MEASURE OF COMMUNITY**

In sociological and criminological research, there have been literary discussions regarding the measurement of neighborhood and community constructs since Hunter and Suttles (1972) identified, and defined, four different measures of neighborhoods/communities (i.e., face

block, defended neighborhoods, community of limited liability, and expanded communities of limited liability). Each definition of Hunter and Suttles' (1972) conceptualizations of neighborhoods/communities rely on how well residents in a geographical area know one another and/or how often they encounter one another to work toward a common political or economic goal (Hunter and Suttles, 1972). More recently, with expansive access to secondary, quantitative data, scholars who conduct research on communities/neighborhoods use either census tracts (see Graif and Sampson, 2009 for a discussion), community areas (Sampson and Graif, 2009), census block groups (Hipp, 2007), street segments (Weisburd et. al., 2004) or areas geographically centered on an individual residence or street block (see the operationalization of the egohood and review of neighborhood measurement in Hipp and Boessen, 2013) to measure communities/neighborhoods.

The current work builds on a large body of quantitative criminological literature and uses the census-tract level of aggregation as its measure of community; however, the use of census tract measures may not fully capture the true population and/or geographic area that residents would identify as their community. The Chicago census tracts analyzed in this dissertation have, on average, roughly 3,500 residents and their populations were relatively stable between 2000 and 2009. Therefore, the meso-level census tract operationalization of community used in this dissertation may span geographic area and population that is far larger than what Chicago residents consider part of their community or exclude some areas and population that residents might identify as part of their community.

#### GENERALIZABILITY OF FINDINGS

Given the expansive community and crime research that originated, and has continued for nearly a century, on Chicago neighborhoods, this dissertation examined the dynamic nature of communities, immigrant populations and violent crime across Chicago (2012-2000). The choice to examine communities across Chicago was driven by the rich quality, and large quantity, of well-known, theoretically driven, empirical, community-level studies on Chicago communities

together with the reliability and availability of social science data collected on violent crime, over time, at the census-tract level. The current work adds to community-level immigration and crime research by examining violent crime changes across communities in a city with a long history of immigrant settlement, diverse immigrant groups, and less predictable settlement patterns than what has been noted in previous immigration-crime studies (for review, see National Academies Press, 2010 as well as Ousey and Kubrin, 2017). Yet, despite the number of communities included, history of rich community-level research, and quality measures available for the communities examined here (n= 814), this dissertation's findings are limited to communities across Chicago (2012-2000).

#### TIME MEASURES AND OMITTED VARIABLES

Briefly noted in Chapter Four, simultaneity, endogeneity, and omitted variables are limitations in this, and other, community-level immigration and crime studies. As dynamic places, changes that occur in the community can influence changes in crime; however, changes in crime can also influence changes in community structure and populations (Becker, 2016; Hipp, 2010; Kirk and Laub, 2010; Liska and Bellair, 1995). For example, while non-Hispanic immigrant populations grow in predominantly Black communities, this population change may directly or indirectly affect violent crime; likewise, as crime declined in predominantly Black communities, non-Hispanic immigrant populations may have seized the opportunity to live in a lower-crime neighborhood. However, as Boggess (2017) found, using Structural Equation Models (SEM) in her study on simultaneity in community-crime studies, in Los Angeles communities with stable levels of residential churn, change in community ethnoracial composition predicted greater increases in violent crime- except where there were also increases in the proportion of immigrants in the community population (Boggess, 2017). Therefore, due to the population stability of the Chicago communities examined in the current work, the use of measures at multiple time points, and findings fairly consistent with Boggess' (2017) work, the



potential for reciprocal relationships between change in community characteristics and change in violent crime rates are worth noting but are not a grave concern.

Many notable immigration and crime studies have contributed to our empirical and theoretical knowledge on the relationships between immigration, communities and crime; however, the cross-sectional nature of many of the previous studies limited our understanding of how changes in community characteristics can, over time, influence violent crime. This dissertation includes four time points, (2000 and 2012 for crime measures, 2000 and 2009 for census measures), thus including the most reliable data available at the census tract level for Chicago while attempting to ensure the proper temporal order of variables. Yet, as Liska and Bellair (1995) posit, community changes that influence change in crime occur slowly and over many years. Therefore, the short period of time included in this dissertation may fail to demonstrate the full impact of changes in immigrant populations on changes in community violent crime.

The very nature of theoretical development, and empirical discovery in social science rests on the fact that social groups, behaviors, and organization are ever-changing. Within, and across, the Chicago communities analyzed in the current work, there may have been multiple competing mechanisms that were not measured for this dissertation's analyses (i.e., discrimination, population cohesiveness, crime opportunities, documentation of immigrant populations, policing, and political/legal changes or influences). These omitted variables may have been working to directly or indirectly affect changes in violent crime. Moreover, as a community-level quantitative work that relies on secondary sources, this dissertation is limited to available, theoretically guided, measures and constructs. Therefore, there is ample opportunity for replication of this dissertation, replication using other time points and locations, as well as for conducting similar research that includes measures and concepts omitted from this project (i.e., discrimination within and between communities, documentation status of immigrant populations,

reasons for population migration by ethnicity and nation of origin, as well as measures of collective efficacy, and comparative works).

Moreover, the current work accounts only for spatial autocorrelation as a nuisance in the regression models; it does not account for potential relationships between geographic location and proximity to tracts experiencing change in population, change in crime, nor change in the foreign-born populations. It could be that change in any population, community characteristic or violent crime rate in one census tract affects related changes in a nearby or adjacent tract; that is, how the dependent variable ( $y$ ) in tract ( $i$ ) is affected by the independent variables in neighboring tracts ( $x_i, x_j \dots x_n$ ) (Morenoff and Sampson, 1997). Therefore, adding spatial lags of independent variables and/or examining the effect of predominant ethnoracial characteristics of nearby communities where there are changes in foreign-born populations will add another layer of depth to community-level immigration and crime study.

## **FUTURE RESEARCH**

Building on previous communities, immigration and crime research, this study relied on the theoretical frameworks of social disorganization and immigrant revitalization; however, there are many avenues for theoretical development related to immigration, communities, and crime. Since the mid-1960s, the majority of the U.S. immigrant population has originated from Hispanic/Latin@ nations (Lopez and Bialik, 2017); however, scholars who intend to better understand links between immigration and crime should not use pan-ethnic or simple foreign-born measures that imply the influence of all immigrant populations are the same in all communities (DiPietro and Bursik, 2015). Moreover, as seen in this dissertation, foreign-born populations are not all moving into strictly immigrant communities, ethnic enclaves, and/or those with concentrated disadvantage, nor do they impact identical changes in community violent crime rates. Further, in Chicago (2009-2000), Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant populations were not all settling in predominantly Hispanic communities. Roughly half of the Hispanic communities in this dissertation experienced changes in the proportion of immigrants in their populations; however, the effect of these population changes varied by immigrant populations' ethnicity and Hispanic/Latin@ nation of origin. To advance criminological theory on the effects of immigration on community crime, criminologists should turn to confirming and testing mechanisms such as self-selection and community contexts of reception to explain why some immigrant populations settle into and revitalize some communities but not others.

The current work does not provide evidence to suggest that there is something inherently criminogenic about immigrants from any nations and, based on decades of individual-level immigration and crime studies, immigrant populations remain no more criminogenic than native-born populations. Yet, considering the differential results across communities where there were increases in immigrant populations (disaggregated by ethnicity and nativity) there remain numerous avenues for future study. Including more cities, more time points, different measures of

communities, and measuring theoretically guided concepts omitted from this dissertation may yield support for, or reveal different, explanations for the differential community effects of changing immigrant populations on changes in violent crime.

The disciplines of criminology, sociology, and, demography, are in unique positions to design and conduct mixed-method, longitudinal research on communities in the United States and other nations where immigration regularly occurs. For example, there is a growing body of literature across the social sciences on the effects of immigration on resident perceptions of/attitudes toward immigrants (Naumann, Stoetzer, and Pietrantonio, 2018), and the relationship between immigration and crime (Piopiunik and Ruhose, 2017) in Europe.

One opportunity for comparative criminological research- and prime for the replication of this dissertation- is research on immigration and crime in Europe, specifically in Germany or Russia, with measures for ethnic German<sup>17</sup> and Turkish immigrants. The differential results found in this dissertation across neighborhood ethnoracial type, after disaggregation of the Hispanic/Latin@ population by nation of origin, are not all that different from what recent scholarship on the relationship between changes in the ethnic German population and crime across counties in Germany (Piopiunik and Ruhose, 2016). Piopiunik and Ruhose (2016) find that there are significant increases in crime in German counties where there are increases in ethnic German immigrants. Throughout Piopiunik and Ruhose's (2016) study, it seems that social disorganization increases as ethnic German immigration to a county increases; thus, immigrant population growth suggests an indirect effect on crime. However, Piopiunik and Ruhose (2016) also emphasize that ethnic Germans are limited in their settlement county choices. Therefore, despite the typical characteristics of the ethnic German migrant population (young, linguistically isolated, low-skilled, disadvantaged, with low-levels of education) the structural characteristics of

---

<sup>17</sup> Ethnic Germans are immigrants to Germany who are "descendants of German colonists who had migrated to Russia and other East European countries in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century" who then migrate to live in Germany (Piopiunik and Ruhose, 2016).

the regions where ethnic immigrant populations increase can limit the immigrant population's ability to strengthen mechanisms of social organization (Piopiunik and Ruhose, 2016).

Perhaps more salient to the current work are the similarities of Turkish immigrant history in Germany to Mexican immigrant history in the United States. Whereas in the United States, the Bracero program brought low-skilled, less-educated, poor, Mexican migrant men to the United States to bolster the U.S. farm and field labor pool, Turkish migrants (also low-skilled, less-educated, and, poor) were "guest workers" in Germany as part of the *Gastarbeiter* program who migrated after World War II to West Germany as part of the postwar reconstruction effort (Mandel, 2008; von Bieberstein, 2016). Turkish migrants have, historically, faced ethnoracial exclusion in Germany (von Bieberstein, 2016) like the ethnoracial "othering" (Latino threat) that many Mexican (native with Mexican ancestry and foreign-born) populations may experience in the United States. Research on Turkish immigrant populations in Germany has largely focused on employment and economic effects. However, meso-level immigration and crime research may benefit from comparative, ethnoracially disaggregated study (or at least disaggregation by nations of origin) on changes in immigration and changes in crime<sup>18</sup>.

Moreover, in addition to comparative research, there are several other components in the study of immigration and crime that scholars can influence/actively participate in to further the body of immigration-community-crime studies. First, we must be clear in our definitions of ethnicity, race, and immigration. While the foreign-born measure used throughout early immigration and crime research was, for a long period of time, the only consistent measure of our immigrant population, the U.S. Census and other secondary sources have refined (to a small degree) how the immigrant population is identified and measured in official statistics. If, as is suggested by the findings in this dissertation, ethnicity and nation of origin play a role in

---

<sup>18</sup> As recently as the 2011 Census, Germany reported that more than 22% of the population were foreign-born; further, the German Federal Statistical Office (2016) notes that migrant nativity is predominantly from Asia, other European nations, and, Africa thus potentially offering many different nations of origin and perhaps study by ethnoracial disaggregation in the German immigrant population.

differential immigration-crime results, then scholars should continue to hone the operationalization of ethnicity. Further, we should work to influence official source methodologies to consistently use measurable, consensus definitions for the concept of ethnicity.

The use of clear, consensus measures of immigrant populations by ethnicities can expand immigration and crime research by providing scholars and policy makers opportunities to identify the culturally-relative resources needed in communities with growing immigrant populations to best encourage social organization, collective efficacy, and community safety. For example, communities with growing immigrant populations from nations where neighbors are not to be trusted may benefit from intentional community-building events. Perhaps the growing immigrant population in a community is fluent in a language or dialect that has key words at odds with the languages or dialects spoken by the native-born population; in this case, a certain amount of revision may be necessary in community, school, legal, medical and criminal justice messaging/materials. Only systematic research that uses clear, consistent, measures of our immigrant populations can reveal needs that are specific to the various immigrant groups who live in our communities.

Second, the very nature of community and social groups is change; to better understand how changes in community populations influence community structure and organization, longitudinal research is necessary. The current work used panel data from the American Community Survey, and the Decennial Census to create census tract change measures. In addition to collecting clear measures of immigrant populations, there is a need to continue collecting crime data at meso and micro units of aggregation across the United States (i.e., comparable census tract, block group units). Following the changes of the same communities, across multiple cities, over time, will be fruitful for discovering mechanisms and patterns that influence community organization, structure, and crime. Moreover, conducting longitudinal analyses on communities across the U.S. rather than limiting examinations to one city as was done in the current work, or

to cities with predictable immigrant populations and settlement patterns, will advance theoretical development as well as the generalizability of empirical findings.

Third, including measures for property crime and assaults is important for providing a more comprehensive examination of any immigration-crime relationships. It may be that where there are significant changes in the proportion of community populations who are foreign-born, there are differential changes in property and violent crime rates. Scholars looking to include property crime and assault measures in immigration-crime research must be cognizant of the various reasons for under-reporting that occurs in areas with large immigrant populations; however, to gain a better understanding of immigration and community crime, scholars can build on the current work by including reliable measures of other crimes. Moreover, a comprehensive understanding of immigration and crime can aid policy makers and program directors to make targeted, culturally-relative revisions to programs and messaging that communities receive regarding crime, victimization, and working with local law enforcement. Such revisions to messaging can improve crime reporting and/or decrease fear of crime/fear of reporting crime. Culturally relative and appropriate policy/program changes to improve residents' safety and security in increasingly diverse communities will not manifest without theoretical and empirical advances to immigrant population-specific scholarship that also accounts for community context.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a necessary, key component to identifying why immigrant populations with different ethnic backgrounds, from different nations, may influence crime is expanding ethnic minority representation and scholarship across the social sciences. A mixed-method approach to immigration, communities, and crime research requires scholars fluent in various dialects, intimately familiar with the norms and customs of various immigrant groups, who can develop and analyze qualitative materials. Asking community residents about their experiences and the dynamics within their neighborhoods will be an informative way to examine why there are crime declines, crime increases, or why there is no change in crime where immigrant populations are living and changing. Rich, multi-lingual, qualitative data can provide

measures for many of the variables omitted in this dissertation. Moreover, they can shed light on differences between communities with documented and undocumented populations, with foreign-born populations from the same or different nations of origin, how and why gendered constructions in other nations and the host nation can influence community structure as well as collective efficacy, and the receptiveness of native-born resident populations to changing immigrant populations in the community. Qualitative evidence alone, or in combination with official secondary source data, may lead to theoretical contributions that offer a more complete picture of community safety mechanisms in areas with diverse and changing populations. Such theoretical and empirical advances are most possible when social science communities intentionally cultivate ethnoracial inclusivity across the disciplines while funding, highlighting, and including the contributions made by our future, as well as current, immigrant and ethnoracial minority scholars in our most widely-read and respected peer-reviewed publications.

## **CONCLUSION**

Decades of cross-sectional studies on the effect of immigrant populations on community organization and crime have yet to offer support for the continued public/political rhetoric that posits increases in immigration has a strong, clear, relationship to increases in crime (Chavez, 2013; Johnston and Morse, 2011; Green, 2016; Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012; Provine and Doty, 2011; Reid et al, 2005; Zatz and Smith, 2012). Yet, despite the conclusions presented in the body of immigration-crime literature- specifically that there is an inverse or null effect of immigrant population increases on community violent crime- there remains strong public sentiment counter to empirical results and aspects of immigration-crime research left to explore (Ousey and Kubrin, 2017). This dissertation adds another layer of depth to criminological immigration and communities work by disaggregating Chicago communities' Hispanic/Latin@ population by nativity, immigrant population by ethnicity, and immigrant population by Hispanic/Latin@ nation of origin.



The findings presented in this work paint a picture of a more nuanced relationship between immigrant population changes in communities and changes in community crime than what has been presented in the lion's share of notable immigration and crime studies. In predominantly white communities, changes in the Hispanic foreign-born population and Hispanic foreign-born population from Mexico may destabilize social organization enough to inhibit crime controlling mechanisms. Yet, across all other neighborhood predominant ethnoracial neighborhood types, changes in immigrant populations have a null or inverse effect on violent crime. Long-standing public and political anti-immigrant rhetoric that claim increases in immigration result in violent crime still have little to no empirical support; however, the findings in the current work continue to stress the importance of community context and the construction of ethnicity within the U.S. ethnoracial social structure. Further, the current work also suggests that in Chicago (2012-2000), in some communities, increases in the proportion of a community population who were foreign-born did not consistently have a null or inverse effect on violent crime rates. The question: "Why are there differences?" remains, and research to identify the mechanisms that drive differential immigration and community crime results will certainly contribute to criminological theory as well as inform policy and program changes that promote community safety.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: VARIABLES AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS

Variable	Operationalization
Percent Young Male	Percent of tract population who are male and age 15-24 years
Percent Married with Children	Percent of tract population who are married with children
Percent Foreign-born	Percent of tract population who report their birth as outside the United States
Change in Percent Foreign-born	Percent of tract population who report their birth as outside the United States 2009 minus 2000.
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic/Latino	Percent of tract population who report birth in a Latin nation (as defined by U.S. Decennial Census)
Change in Foreign-born Hispanic/Latino	Percent of tract population who report birth in a Latin nation (as defined by U.S. Decennial Census) 2009 minus 2000.
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic/Latino	Percent of tract population who report birth in a nation other than a Latin nation
Change in Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic/Latino	Percent of tract population who report birth in a nation other than a Latin nation 2009 minus 2000.
Percent white non-Hispanic	Percent of tract population who self-report identifying with white race and non-Hispanic.
Percent Black non-Hispanic	Percent of tract population who self-report identifying with Black race and non-Hispanic.
Percent Asian non-Hispanic	Percent of tract population who self-report identifying with Asian race and non-Hispanic.
Percent Hispanic non-foreign-born	Percent of tract population who self-report any race and Hispanic ethnicity.
White Neighborhood (1)	Percent of the tract population who self-report White non-Hispanic race/ethnicity is greater than or equal to 70%
Black Neighborhood (1)	Percent of the tract population who self-report Black non-Hispanic race/ethnicity is greater than or equal to 70%
Hispanic Neighborhood (1)	Percent of the tract population of any race who self-report Hispanic ethnicity is greater than or equal to 70%
Minority Neighborhood (1)	Sum of the percent of the tract population who self-report Hispanic ethnicity of any race or Black race is greater than or equal to 70%
Integrated Neighborhood (1)	Percent of the tract population who self-report Hispanic ethnicity of any race, or Black race, or White race, or Asian race is less than or equal to 70%
Disadvantage Index	Average of the standardized scores of six variables: Percent secondary, low-wage jobs, percent unemployed, percent professional, percent female-headed households, percent high school graduates, and percent poverty
Residential Instability Index	Average of the standardized scores of two variables (percent renting and percent who moved into residence in the past year)
Violent Crime 2000	Sum of murders and robberies known to police 1999, 2000, 2001; divided by three and rounded to nearest whole number.
Violent Crime 2012	Sum of murders and robberies known to police 2011, 2012 and 2013, divided by three and rounded to nearest whole number.
Change in Violent Crime	Violent Crime 2000 subtracted from Violent Crime 2012.

**APPENDIX TABLE 1: HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2 WITH PROPOSED MODELS 1 THROUGH 6**

Hypothesis 1: In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, there will be decreases in community (2012-2000) violent crimes (2012-2000)

Hypothesis 2: In Chicago communities where there are increases (2009-2000) in the non-Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population, there will be decreases in community violent crimes (2012-2000)

Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Foreign-born Population & Change in Foreign-born Population on Change in Violent Crime Rate	Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Foreign-born Hispanic Population & Change in Foreign-born Hispanic Population on Change in Violent Crime Rate	Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Foreign-born non-Hispanic Population & Change in Foreign-born non-Hispanic Population on Change in Violent Crime Rate
<b>Dependent Variable</b> Change in Violent Crime Rate (2012-2000)	Change in Violent Crime Rate (2012-2000)	Change in Violent Crime Rate (2012-2000)
<b>Control Variables 2000</b>  Ethnoracial Neighborhood Type (2000) (White Reference) Predominantly Black Predominantly Asian Predominantly Hispanic/Latin@ Disadvantage Index Residential Instability Index	Ethnoracial Neighborhood Type (2000) (White Reference) Predominantly Black Predominantly Asian Predominantly Hispanic/Latin@ Disadvantage Index Residential Instability Index	Ethnoracial Neighborhood Type (2000) (White Reference) Predominantly Black Predominantly Asian Predominantly Hispanic/Latin@ Disadvantage Index Residential Instability Index
<b>Independent Variables</b> Model 1: Percent Foreign-born 2000 Model 2: Percent Foreign-born 2000 & Change in Percent Foreign-born (2009-2000)	Model 3: Percent Foreign-born Hispanic 2000 Model 4: Percent Foreign-born Hispanic 2000 & Change in percent Foreign-born Hispanic (2009-2000)	Model 5: Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic Model 6: Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic & Change in Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic (2009-2000)

# **APPENDIX TABLE 1.1: HYPOTHESES 3 AND 4 WITH PROPOSED MODELS 7 THROUGH 23**

Hypothesis 3: Where there are changes in the Hispanic/Latin@ immigrant population by nation of origin (2009-2000) there will be an inverse effect of immigrant population change on community violent crime.

Hypothesis 4: In communities by predominant ethnoracial type, where there is a change in the immigrant population by ethnicity (2009-2000) there will be inverse effects on community violent crime.

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model with Control Variables, Foreign-born Hispanic Nations of Origin , Change in the Percent Foreign-born from each nation(2009-2000) on: Change in Violent Crime Rate(2012-2000)			
<u>Model 7</u>			
<b>Dependent Variable</b> Change in Violent Crime Rate (2012-2000)			
<b>Control Variables</b> (please see control variables used in models 1-6)			
<b>Independent Variables</b> Percent Foreign-born Tract Population from the Following Nations (2000) Change(2009-2000) in the Percent Foreign-born Tract Population from Each of the Following Nations (2009-2000)			
Argentina	Cuba	Guatemala	Panama
Bolivia	Dominican Republic	Honduras	Paraguay
Chile	Ecuador	Mexico	Peru
Cost Rica	El Salvador	Nicaragua	Other Hispanic/Latino Nation
* A Chow Test of this model was performed on each predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type as a preliminary test of hypothesis four. The following models will test hypothesis four, and, based on the results of the Chow test, nations of origin may then be included in separate models by predominant ethnoracial neighborhood type.			
Proposed Models to Test Hypothesis 4 (The models below will be run separately for White, Black, Hispanic, and Integrated Neighborhoods)			
<u>Models 8-23</u>			
Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Percent Foreign-born Hispanic (2000) and Change in Percent Foreign-born Hispanic (2009-2000) on Change in Violent Crime Rate (2012-2000)		Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic (2000) and Change in Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic (2009-2000) on Change in Violent Crime Rate (2012-2000)	
<b>Dependent Variable</b> Change in Violent Crime Rate (2012-2000)			
<b>Control Variables</b>			
<b>Independent Variables</b>			
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic (2000)		Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic (2000)	
Change in Percent Foreign-born Hispanic (2009-2000)		Change in Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic (2009-2000)	

**APPENDIX TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR COMMUNITIES WHERE FOREIGN-BORN INCREASED**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>Min.</b>	<b>Max.</b>
Change in Violent Crime Rate (2012-2000)	-7.81	13.51	-53.73	13.59
<b>Independent Variables (2000); Change (2009-2000)</b>				
Percent Foreign-born	17.82	13.72	0.00	50.00
Change in Percent Foreign-born	10.38	4.39	6.04	25.55
Percent Foreign-born Hispanic	9.32	12.01	0.00	50.21
Change in Percent Foreign-born Hispanic	5.71	7.39	-5.88	29.91
Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic	8.62	10.22	0.00	38.34
Change in Percent Foreign-born non-Hispanic	4.56	6.76	-14.92	25.93
Percent Foreign-born Nativity Mexico	7.43	10.87	0.00	48.79
Change in Percent Foreign-born Nativity Mexico	5.72	7.15	-6.54	28.04
Percent Foreign-born Nativity other than Mexico	1.18	1.86	0.00	11.08
Change in Percent Foreign-born Nativity other than Mexico	0.45	2.66	-11.08	15.92
<b>Control Variables</b>				
Crime Rate (2000)	21.92	20.58	0.58	92.58
Percent Young Male	7.29	2.91	1.58	17.28
Percent Families with Children	6.43	3.36	0.95	12.25
Disadvantage Index	-0.16	0.97	-2.11	2.62
Residential Instability	0.05	1.08	-2.50	2.12
Tract Population	3093	2320	334	11643
Change in Tract Population	185	885	-1473	6570
N=93				

## REFERENCES

- Alba, Richard and Victor Nee. 1997. "Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration." *The International Migration Review*. 31(4):826-874.
- Allison, Paul D. 1990. "Chang Scores as Dependent Variables in Regression Analysis." *Sociological Methodology*. 20:93-114.
- American Sociological Association. 2017. "Race and Ethnicity".  
<http://www.asanet.org/topics/race-and-ethnicity>.
- Anderson, Elijah. 1999. *Code of the Street: Decency, violence and the moral life of the inner city*. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York.
- Anselin, Luc. 2017. *Spatial Regression: Specification of spatial dependence*. The Center for Spatial Data Science, University of Chicago.
- Baumer, Eric P. Maria B. Vélez, and Richard Rosenfeld. 2018. "Bringing Crime Trends Back into Criminology: A critical assessment of the literature and a blueprint for future inquiry". *Annual Review of Criminology*. 1(1):39-61.
- Becker, Jacob. 2016. "The Dynamics of Neighborhood Structural Conditions: The effects of concentrated disadvantage on homicide over time and space. *City & Community*. 15(1):64-82.
- Bloemraad, Irene and Christine Trost. 2008. "It's a family affair: Intergenerational mobilization in the spring 2006 protests". *American Behavioral Scientist*. 52(4):507-532.
- Boggess, Lyndsay N. 2017. "Disentangling the Reciprocal Relationship between Change in Crime and Racial/Ethnic Change". *Social Science Research*. 68(1):30-42.
- Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2002. "We are all Americans!: the Latin Americanization of racial stratification in the USA". *Race and Society*. 5(1):3-16.
- .2004. "From Bi-Racial to Tri-Racial: Towards a new system of racial stratification in the USA". *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 27(6): 931-950.
- Bordura, David J., 1958-59. "Juvenile Delinquency and Anomie: An attempt at replication". *Social Problems*.6:230-238.
- Bratsberg, Bernt, James F. Ragan, Jr. and Zafar M. Nasir. 2002. "The Effect of Naturalization on Wage Growth: A Panel Study of Young Male Immigrants". *Journal of Labor Economics*. 20(3):568-597.
- Brown, Anna and Eileen Patten. 2014. "2012, Hispanics in the United States Statistical Portrait". *Numbers, Facts and Trends Shaping Your World*. Pew Research Center.  
<http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/04/29/2012-statistical-information-on-hispanics-in-united-states/>

- Browning, Christopher R. 2002. "The Span of Collective Efficacy: Extending social disorganization theory to partner violence". *Journal of Marriage and Family*. 64:833-850.
- Burgess, Ernest W. 1925. *The Growth of the City: An introduction to a research project*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bursik, Robert Jr. and Jim Webb. 1982. "Community Change and Patterns of Delinquency." *American Journal of Sociology*. 88:24-42.
- Bursik, Robert Jr. 1984. "Dynamics and Ecological Studies of Delinquency". *Social Forces*. 63(2):393-413.
- . 2009. "The Dead Sea Scrolls and Criminological Knowledge: 2008 Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology". *Criminology*. 41(1):5-16.
- Bursik, Robert Jr., and Harold Grasmick. 1993. "Economic Deprivation and Neighborhood Crime Rates, 1960-1980". *Law and Society Review*. 27:263.
- Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison Piehl. 1995. *Immigration and Incarceration*. Research Programs, John F. Kennedy School of Government. Harvard University.
- Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi. 1986. "Econometric Models Based on Count Data: Comparisons and applications of some estimators and tests". *Journal of Applied Econometrics*. 1(1):29-53.
- Chavez, Leo R. 2013. *The Latino Threat: Constructing immigrants, citizens and the nation*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Chilton, Roland and John Dussich. 1974. "Methodological Issues in Delinquency Research: Some alternative analyses of geographically distributed data". *Social Forces*. 53(1):73.
- Chinchilla, Norma, Nora Hamilton, and James Loucky. 1993. "Central Americans in Los Angeles: An immigrant community in transition". In J. Moore & R. Pinderhughes, eds. *In the barrios: Latinos and the underclass debate*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 51-78.
- Chow, Gregory C. 1960. "Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions". *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*. 28(3):591-605
- Cohen, Jeffrey H. and Nidia Merino Chavez. 2013. "Latino Immigrants, Discrimination and Reception in Columbus, Ohio". *International Migration*. 52(2):24-31.
- Cottrell, Catherine A. and Steven L. Neuberg. 2005. "Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups: A sociofunctional threat-based approach to 'prejudice'". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 88(5):770-789.
- Daniel, G. Reginald. 2002. *More than Black? Multiracial Identity and the New Racial Order*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

- Davis, Robert C. and Nicole Henderson. 2003. "Willingness to Report Crimes: The role of ethnic group membership and community efficacy." *Crime and Delinquency*. 49(4):564-580.
- Desmond, Scott A. and Charis E. Kubrin. 2009. "The Power of Place: Immigrant communities and adolescent violence". *The Sociological Quarterly*. 50(4):581-607.
- Díaz-Campos, Manuel and Inmaculada Navarro-Galisteo. 2009. "Perceptual Categorization of Dialect Variation in Spanish". In J. Collentine, M. García, B. Lafford, and F. M. Marín (eds.). *Selected Proceedings of the 11<sup>th</sup> Hispanic Linguistics Symposium*. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Proceedings Project.
- DiPietro, Stephanie. M. & Bursik, Robert J., 2012. "Studies of the new immigration: The dangers of pan-ethnic classifications". *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 641(1):247-267.
- Feldmeyer, Ben. 2009. "Immigration and Violence: The Offsetting Effects of Immigrant Concentration on Latino Violence". *Social Science Research*, Volume 38, pp. 717-732.
- Feliciano, Cynthia and Yader R. Lanuza. 2017. "An Immigrant Paradox? Contextual attainment and Intergenerational Educational Mobility". *American Sociological Review*. 82(1):211-241.
- Fernandez, Lilia. 2017. "Latina/o Immigration before 1965: Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Postwar Chicago". In *The Latina/o Midwest Reader*. Omar Valerio-Jimenez, Santiago Vaquerria-Vasquez, and Claire F. Fox (eds). pp. 85-101. University of Illinois Press.
- Ferraro, Vincent A. 2014. *The New Americans: Immigrants and Crime in the New Destinations*. LFB Scholarly Publications LLC.
- . 2016. "Immigration and Crime in the New Destinations, 2000-2007: A test of the disorganizing effect of migration". *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*. 32:23-45.
- Flores, René. 2017. "Do Anti-Immigrant Laws Shape Public Sentiment? A study of Arizona's SB 1070 Using Twitter Data". *American Journal of Sociology*. 123(2):333-384.
- Foley, Michael W. and Dean R. Hoge. 2007. *Religion and the New Immigrants: How Faith Communities form our Newest Citizens*. Oxford University Press.
- German Statistical Office. 2016. "Migration Status and Length of Stay". *Statistische Ämter Des Bundes Und der Länder*. <https://www.statistikportal.de/de/bevoelkerung>
- Gordon, Robert A. 1967. "Issues in the Ecological Study of Delinquency". *American Sociological Review*. 32(6):927.
- Graif, Corina and Robert J. Sampson. 2009. "Spatial Heterogeneity in the Effects of Immigration and Diversity on Neighborhood Homicide Rates". *Homicide Studies*. 13(3):242-260.



- Green, David. 2016. "The Trump Hypothesis: Testing immigrant populations as a determinant of violent and drug-related crime in the United States". *Social Science Quarterly*. 97(3):506-524.
- Gujarati, Damodar N. 2018. *Linear Regression: A Mathematical Introduction*. Sage Publications, Inc. Los Angeles.
- Hagan, John. 2012. "America's Deadly and Duplicitous Divide". In *Divergent Social Worlds: Neighborhood Crime and the Racial-Spatial Divide*. Ruth D. Peterson and Lauren J. Krivo. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. pp. xvii-xvi.
- Hipp, John R. 2007. "Block, Tract, and Levels of Aggregation: Neighborhood structure and crime and disorder as a case in point". *American Sociological Review*. 72(5):659-680.
- Hipp, John R. 2010. "A Dynamic View of Neighborhoods: The reciprocal relationship between crime and neighborhood structural characteristics". *Social Problems*. 57(2):205-230.
- Hipp, John R. and Adam Boessen. 2013. "Egohoods as Waves Washing Across the City: A new measure of 'neighborhoods'". *Criminology*. 51(2):287-327.
- Hirschman, Charles. 2004. "The role of Religion in the Origins and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups in the United States". *International Migration Review*. 38(3):1206-1233.
- Hunter, Albert D. and Gerald Suttles. 1972. "The Expanding Community of Limited-Liability" in *The Social Construction of Communities*, ed. Gerald Suttles University of Chicago Press. pp. 44-80.
- Jensen, Leif, Jeffrey H. Cohen, Almeida Jacqueline Toribio, Gordon F. De Jong, and Leila Rodríguez. 2006. "Ethnic Identities, Language, and Economic Outcomes Among Dominicans in a New Destination". *Social Science Quarterly*. 87(5): 1088-1099.
- Johnston, Gillian, and Ann Morse. 2011. "2010 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States". In *Washington, DC: National conference of State Legislatures*. Immigrant Policy Project: Washington, DC.
- Kasarda John D. and Morris Janowitz. 1974. "Community Attachment in Mass Society". *American Sociological Review*. 39(3):328.
- Kirk, David S. and John H. Laub. 2010. "Neighborhood Change and Crime in the Modern Metropolis". *Crime and Justice*. 39(1):441-502.
- Kornhauser, Ruth. 1978. *Social Sources of Delinquency*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Krivo, Lauren J., Ruth D. Peterson, and Danielle C. Kuhl. 2009. "Segregation, Racial Structure and Neighborhood Violent Crime". *American Journal of Sociology*. 114(6):1765-1802.
- Kruskal, William H. and W. Allen Wallis. 1952. "Use of Ranks in One-Criterion Variance Analysis". *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. 47(260):583-621.

- Kubrin, Charis E. and Hiromi Ishizawa. 2012. "Why Some Immigrant Neighborhoods are Safer than Others: Divergent Findings from Los Angeles and Chicago". *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 641(1): 148-173.
- Kubrin, Charis E., John R. Hipp and Young-An Kim. 2016. "Different than the Sum of Its Parts: Examining the Unique Impacts of Immigrant Groups on Neighborhood Crime Rates". *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*. 34(1): 1-36.
- Landale, Nancy S. and R. Salvador Oropresa. 2001. "Migration, social support and perinatal health: an origin-destination analysis of Puerto Rican women". *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*. 166-183.
- Lander, Bernard. 1954. *Towards an Understanding of Juvenile Delinquency*. New York. Columbia University Press.
- Langton, Lynn, Marcus Berzofsky, Christopher Krebs and Hope-Smiley-McDonald. 2012. "Victimizations Not Reported to the Police, 2006-2010". *Special Report, National Crime Victimization Survey*. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, Washington D.C.
- Lauritsen, Janet L. 2001. "The Social Ecology of Violent Victimization: Individual and contextual effects in the NCVS". *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*. 17(1):3-32.
- Lee, Matthew, Ramiro Martinez, Jr., and Richard Rosenfeld. 2001. "Does Immigration Increase Homicide? Negative evidence from three border cities". *Sociological Quarterly*. 42(4):559-580.
- Lee, Matthew T. and Ramiro Martinez, Jr. 2002. "Social Disorganization Revisited: Mapping the recent immigration and Black homicide relationship in northern Miami". *Sociological Focus*. 35(4):363-380.
- Ley, David. 2008. "The Immigrant Church as an Urban Service Hub". *Urban Studies*, 45, pp. 2057-2074.
- Light, Michael T. and Ty Miller. 2018. "Does Undocumented Immigration Increase Violent Crime?" *Criminology*. 56(2):370-401.
- Liska, Allen E. and Paul E. Bellair. 1995. "Violent-crime Rates and Racial Composition: Convergence over time". *American Journal of Sociology*. 101(3):578-610.
- Logan, John, Zengwang Xu, and Brian J. Stults. 2014. "Interpolating US Decennial Census Tract Data from as Early as 1970 to 2010: A longitudinal tract database". *The Professional Geographer*. 66(3):412-420.
- Logan, John R., Brian J. Stults, and Zengwang Xu. 2016. "Validating Population Estimates for Harmonized Census Tract Data, 2000-2010". *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*. 106(5):1013-1029.
- Lopez, Gustavo and Kristen Bialik. 2017. "Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants". *Fact Tank News in the Numbers*. Pew Research Center. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/03/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/>

- MacDonald, John M., John R. Hipp, and Charlotte Gill. 2013. "The Effects of Immigrant Concentration on Changes in Neighborhood Crime Rates". *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*. 29(1):191-215.
- Mackert, Jürgen. 2004. *Die Theoriesozialer Schließung: Tradition, Analysen, Perspektiven*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Mandel, Ruth. 2008. *Cosmopolitan Anxieties*. Duke University Press, London.
- Martin, Susan. 2010. *A Nation of Immigrants*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Martinez, Ramiro, Jr. 2000. "Immigration and Urban Violence: The link between immigrant Latinos and types of homicide". *Social Science Quarterly*. 81(1):363-374.
- . 2002. *Latino Homicide: Immigration, violence and community*. New York. Routledge.
- Martinez, Ramiro and Matthew T. Lee. 2000. "Comparing the Context of Immigrant Homicide in Miami: Haitians, Jamaicans and Mariels". *International Migration Review*. 34(3):794-812.
- Martinez, Ramiro, Matthew T. Lee and Amie L. Nielsen. 2004. "Segmented Assimilation, Local Context and Determinants of Drug Violence in Miami and San Diego: Does ethnicity and immigration matter?". *International Migration Review*. 38(1):131-157.
- Martinez, Ramiro, Jr., Richard Rosenfeld, and Dennis Mares. 2008. "Social Disorganization, Drug Market Activity, and Neighborhood Violent Crime". *Urban Affairs Review*. 43(6):846-874.
- Martinez, Ramiro, Jr., Jacob I. Stowell, and Janice A. Iwama. 2016. "The Role of Immigration: Race/Ethnicity and San Diego Homicides Since 1970". *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*. 32(3):471-488.
- Massey, Douglas S. and Magaly Sánchez. 2010. *Brokered Boundaries: Immigrant identity in anti-immigrant times*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Messing, Jill Theresa, David Becerra, Allison Ward-Lasher, and David K. Androff. 2015. "Latinas' Perceptions of Law Enforcement: Fear of deportation, crime reporting and trust in the system". *Journal of Women and Social Work*. 30(3):328-340.
- Moore, Joan. 2008. "Forward". In Telles, Edward E. and Vilma Ortiz. 2009. *Generations of Exclusion: Mexican Americans, Assimilation, and Race*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Morenoff, Jeffrey D. and Robert J. Sampson. 1997. "Violent Crime and the Spatial Dynamics of Neighborhood Transition: Chicago, 1970-1990". *Social Forces*. 76(1):31-64.
- Morenoff, Jeffrey D., Robert J. Sampson, and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 2001. "Neighborhood inequality, collective efficacy, and the spatial dynamics of urban violence". *Criminology* 39(3):517-558.

- Morey, Brittany N. 2018. "Mechanisms by which Anit-Immigrant Stigma Exacerbates Racial/Ethnic Health Disparities". *American Journal of Public Health*. 108(4):460-463.
- National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine. 2015. *The Integration of Immigrants into American Society*. Panel on the Integration of Immigrants into American Society, M.C. Waters and M.G. Pineau, Eds. Committee on Population, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
- Naumann, Elias, Lukas F. Stoetzer, and Giuseppe Pietrantuono. 2018. "Attitudes Towards Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration in Europe: A survey experiment in 15 European countries". *European Journal of Political Research*. 57(4):1009-1030.
- Nielsen, Amie L. Matthew T. Lee and Ramiro Martinez, Jr. 2005. "Integrating Race, Place, and Motive in Social Disorganization Theory: Lessons from a comparison of Black and Latino homicide types in two immigrant destination cities". *Criminology*. 43(3):837-872.
- Osgood, D. Wayne. 2000. "Poisson-Based Regression analysis of Aggregate Crime Rates". *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*. 16(1):21-43.
- Ousey, Graham C., and Charis Kubrin. 2009. "Exploring the Connection Between Immigration and Violent Crime Rates in U.S. Cities, 1980-2000". *Social Problems*. 56:447-473.
- . 2017. "Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Contentious Issue". *Annual Reviews in Advance; Annual Review of Criminology 2018* 1:1(1-22).
- Papachristos, Andrew V., Noli Brazil, and Tony Cheng. 2018. "Understanding the Crime Gap: Violence and inequality in an American city". *City & Community*. 17:4(1051-1074).
- Paral, Rob. 2003. "Chicago's Immigrants Break Old Patterns". *Migration Policy Institute: Migration Information Source*. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/chicagos-immigrants-break-old-patterns>.
- Park, Robert E., Ernest W. Burgess, and R.D. McKenzie. 1924. *The City*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Passel, Jeffrey S. and Paul Taylor. 2010. "Unauthorized immigrants and their US-born children". Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC.
- Peterson, Ruth D. and Lauren J. Krivo. 2001. *National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS)*. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2010-05-05.
- . 2010. *Divergent Social Worlds: Neighborhood Crime and the Racial-Spatial Divide*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Piopiunik, Marc and Jens Ruhose. 2017. "Immigration, Regional Conditions, and Crime: Evidence from an allocation policy in Germany". *European Economic Review*. 92(1):258-282
- Portes, Alejandro and Min Zhou. 1993. "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants". *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Volume 1, pp. 74-96.

- Provine, Doris Marie and Roxanne Lynn Doty. 2011. "The Criminalization of Immigrants as a Racial Project". *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*. 27(3):261-277.
- Ramey, David M. 2013. "Immigrant Revitalization and Neighborhood Violent Crime in Established and New Destination Cities". *Social Forces*. 92(2): 597-629.
- Reid, Lesley Williams, Harald E. Weiss, Robert M. Adelman, and Charles Jaret. 2005. "The Immigration-Crime Relationship: Evidence across US metropolitan areas". *Social Science Research*. 34(4):757-780.
- Rumbaut, Rubén. 2009. "Pigments of Our Imagination: On the Racialization and Racial Identities of 'Hispanics' and 'Latinos'". In J.A. Cobas, J. Duany and J. Feagin (eds.) *How the U.S. Racializes Latinos: White Hegemony and Its Consequences*. (pp. 15-36). Paradigm Publishers.
- Salas, Lorraine Moya, Cecilia Ayón, and Maria Gurrola. 2013. "Estamos traumatizados: The effect of anti-immigrant sentiment and policies on the mental health of Mexican immigrant families". *Journal of Community Psychology*. 41(8):1005-1020.
- Salinas, Lupe S. 2007. "Immigration and Language Rights: The evolution of private racist attitudes into American public law and society". *Nevada Law Journal*. 7(895):915-932.
- Sampson, Robert J. 2008. "Rethinking Crime and Immigration". *Contexts*. 7:28-33.
- Sampson, Robert J. and Corina Graif. 2009. "Neighborhood Social Capital as Differential Social Organization: Resident and leadership dimensions". *American Behavioral Scientist*. 52(11):1579-1605.
- Sampson, Robert J. and W. Byron Groves. 1989. "Community Structure and Crime: Testing social disorganization theory". *American Journal of Sociology*. 94:774-802.
- Sampson, Robert J., Stephen Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. 1997. "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A multilevel study of collective efficacy". *Science*. 277(5328):918-924.
- Shaw, Clifford R., and Henry D. McKay. 1942. *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stowell, Jacob. I. 2007. *Immigration and Crime: The effects of immigration on criminal behavior*. New York: LFB Scholarly Pub. LLC
- Stowell, Jacob, I. and Ramiro Martinez. 2007. "Displaced, Dispossessed, or Lawless? Examining the link between ethnicity, immigration, and violence". *Aggression and Violent Behavior*. 12(5):564-581.
- . 2009. "Incorporating Ethnic-Specific Measures of Immigration in the Study of Lethal Violence". *Homicide Studies*. 13(3): 315-324.
- Terriquez, Veronica and Hyeoung Kwon. 2014. "Intergenerational family relations, civic organisations, and the political socialisation of second-generation immigrant youth". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 41(3):425-447.

- Theodore, Nik and Nina Martin. 2007. "Migrant Civil Society: New voices in the struggle over community development". *Journal of Urban Affairs*. 29(3):269-287.
- Thomas, W.I., and Florian Znaniecki. 1920. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Tiefelsdorf, Michael. 1997. "Modeling Spatial Processes: The identification and analysis of spatial relationships in regression residuals by means of Moran's I". *Wilfrid Laurier University*.
- Tilley, Charles. 1998. *Durable Inequality*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Tonry, Michael. 1997. "Ethnicity, Crime and Immigration". *Crime and Justice*. 21(1):1-29.
- United States Census Bureau. 2017. "Facts for Features: Hispanic heritage month 2017". <https://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/2017/hispanic-heritage.html>
- .2017. "Hispanic Origin". <https://www.census.gov/topics/population/hispanic-origin/about.html>
- .2014. "American Community Survey Design and Methodology Report". <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/methodology/design-and-methodology.html>
- Vélez, Maria B., 2009. "Contextualizing the Immigration and Crime Effect: An Analysis of Homicide in Chicago Neighborhoods". *Homicide Studies*, 13(3), pp. 325-335.
- Vélez, Maria B. and Christopher J. Lyons. 2012. "Situating the Immigration and Neighborhood Crime Relationship across Multiple Cities". In *Punishing Immigrants: Policy, Politics, and Injustice*. eds. Ramiro Martinez, Marjorie Sue Zatz, and Charis Elizabeth Kubrin. New York University Press.
- Vertovec, Steven. 2003. "Migration and Other Modes of Transnationalism: Towards Conceptual Cross-Fertilization. *The International Migration Review*. 37(3):641-665.
- . 2004. "Cheap Calls: The social glue of migrant transnationalism". *Global Networks*. 4(2):219-224.
- Von Bieberstein, Alice. 2016. "Not a German Past to be Reckoned With: Negotiating migrant subjectivities between Vergangenheitsbewältigung and the nationalization of history. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*. 22(1):902-919.
- Ward, Michael D. and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2019. *Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences: Spatial Regression Models*. Sage Publications.
- Weisburd, David, Shawn Bushway, Cynthia Lum, and Sue Ming Yang. 2004. "Trajectories of Crime at Places: A longitudinal study of street segments in the city of Seattle". *Criminology*. 42(2):283-322.
- Wilson, William J. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

- Wimmer, Andreas. 2013. *Ethnic Boundary Making*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wirth, Louis. 1938. "Urbanism as a Way of Life". *American Journal of Sociology*. 1(1):1-24.
- Zatz, Marjorie S. and Hilary Smith. 2012. "Immigration, Crime and Victimization: Rhetoric and reality". *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*. 8(1):141-159.
- Zentella, Ana Celia. 1990. "Lexical Leveling in Four New York City Spanish Dialects: Linguistic and social factors". *Hispania*. 73(4): 1094-1105.
- Zimmerman, Klaus. F., Thomas K. Bauer, and Magnus Lofstrom. 2001. "Immigration Policy, Assimilation of Immigrants and Natives' Sentiments Towards Immigrants: Evidence from 12 OECD-countries". *The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies*. UC-San Diego. 1-48.